

PALAMAS TRANSFORMED. PALAMITE INTERPRETATIONS  
OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOD'S 'ESSENCE' AND  
'ENERGIES' IN LATE BYZANTIUM

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Half a century ago, E. von Ivánka<sup>1</sup> made the following suggestion. The Neo-Palamists of the twentieth century<sup>2</sup> departed from Byzantine Palamism, for they construed the distinction between the 'essence' and 'energies' of God not as a metaphysical statement objectively applied to God *per se* (or, to put it otherwise, as a statement valid *a parte rei*), as Palamas did, but as an only seeming compromise on divine simplicity that unavoidably emerges when an *ens finitum et*

1. E. VON IVÁNKA, "Le fondement patristique de la doctrine palamite", in: S. KYRIAKIDÈS, A. XYGOPOULOS, P. ZÉPOS (eds.), *Πρακτικὰ τοῦ Θ' διεθνoῦς βυζαντινολογικοῦ συνεδρίου (Θεσσαλονίκη, 12-19 Ἀπριλίου 1953)*, Vol. II, Athens 1956, pp. 127-132; IDEM, *Platonismo cristiano. Recezione e Trasformazione del Platonismo nella Patristica (Plato Christianus. Übernahme und Umgestaltung des Platonismus durch die Väter, Einsiedeln 1964). Presentazione di G. REALE. Introduzione di W. BEIERWALTES. Traduzione di E. PEROLI*, Milan 1992, pp. 337-338; 345. Cf. H.-G. BECK, "Humanismus und Palamismus", in: *Actes du XII<sup>e</sup> Congrès International d'Études Byzantines à Ochrid (1961)*, Vol. I, Belgrade 1963, pp. 63-82, esp. 76.

2. IVÁNKA had named V. LOSSKY (*Essai sur la théologie mystique de l'Orient chrétien*, Paris 1944, pp. 67; 74-75) and C. KERN ("Les éléments de la théologie de Grégoire Palamas", in: *Irenikon* 20 (1947), pp. 6-33 (Part I) and 164-193 (Part II); see esp. 164 and 188-189). KERN seems to have misunderstood the description of Palamas' doctrine of God in S. GUICHARDAN, *Le problème de la simplicité divine en Orient et Occident aux XIV<sup>e</sup> et XV<sup>e</sup> siècles: Grégoire Palamas, Duns Scot, Georges Scholarios. Étude de théologie comparée*, Lyon 1933, p. 96 (cited by Kern). One can now add, *inter alios*, one of the editors of Palamas' works, G.I. MANTZARIDES (cf. the critique of his interpretation of Palamas' aforesaid distinction by I. BULOVIĆ in his: *Τὸ μυστήριον τῆς ἐν τῇ ἁγίᾳ Τριάδι διακρίσεως τῆς θείας οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας κατὰ τὸν ἅγιον Μᾶρκον Ἐφέσον τὸν Ἐδνευζιόν*, Thessaloniki 1983, p. 146, n. 23). M. Jugie seems to have been the first to notice that the Byzantine Palamites were not strict followers of their hero; I devote a special note (pp. 370-371, n. 329) to this. On the distinction between Palamas and the Neo-Palamists cf. J. NADAL CAÑELLAS, *La résistance d'Akindynos à Grégoire Palamas. Enquête historique, avec traduction et commentaire de quatre traités édités récemment. Vol. I: Traduction de quatre traités de la "Refutation du Dialogue entre un Orthodoxe et un Barlaamite" de Grégoire Palamas (Spicilegium sacrum Lovaniense. Études et documents, tome 50)*, Leuven 2006, pp. XVIII-XIX.

*multiplex* such as the human mind tries to grasp the *infinitum et simplex* being of God. I would like to suggest that, in fact, what Ivánka described as “neo-Palamism” had already appeared from the mid-fourteenth century. The idea that the distinction between ‘essence’ and ‘energies’ is just a *postulatum* necessary for the human mind to grasp God was *grosso modo* shared not only by several anti-Palamite thinkers of Late Byzantium, who thereby refuted Palamas’ *distinctio realis*, but also by most Palamites, who thereby compromised Palamas’ distinction in a way that Palamas would hardly have approved — indeed, that he had actually reproved in his polemics against Gregory Acindynos. On the one hand, the anti-Palamites liked this idea, because it served their abasement of the ontological *status* of the divine ‘energies’. On the other, the Palamites felt it necessary to soften the harsh Palamite distinction between God’s ‘essence’ and ‘energies’ as well as between the various ‘energies’ themselves and adopted the Patristic idea that God is simple *ex parte objecti* but multiple *ex parte subjecti* (κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν or λόγῳ, i.e., conceptually or by reason); and they interpreted Palamas’ distinctions this way. Further, in so doing, most thinkers on both sides were influenced by Demetrios and Prochoros Cydones’ translations of Thomas Aquinas’ *Summa contra Gentiles*, *Summa theologiae*, and *De potentia*.<sup>3</sup>

Since the sum total of the thinkers in both camps is too large to allow for a full treatment of their views in a single article, I shall limit myself to what the pro-Palamites meant when saying that God’s ‘essence’ and ‘energies’ are distinguished κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν. I will also omit George Scholarios Gennadios II, since his interpretation of the Palamite distinction under discussion is so idiosyncratic that it can hardly be taken for Palamite at all.<sup>4</sup>

As will be seen, Palamites had (just like the anti-Palamites) the possibility to use two lights to settle the problem of the simplicity and

3. For a descriptive overview of the history of Byzantine Thomism see A. FYRIGOS, “Tomismo e anti-Tomismo a Bisanzio (con una nota sulla *Defensio S. Thomae adversus Nilum Cabasilan* di Demetrio Cidone)”, in: A. MOLLE (ed.), *Tommaso d’Aquino e il mondo bizantino*, Venafro 2004, pp. 27-72.

4. Cf., *inter alios*, BECK, “Humanismus...” (cf. *supra*, n. 1), p. 75: “...auch er [sc. Gennadios Scholarios] ein Palamit, ob nun ‘mitigé’ oder nicht”. I hope to explore Scholarios’ genuinely anti-Barlaamite but only nominally Palamite stance elsewhere. Let me only say here that, once one takes into account the history of Palamism up to Scholarios, his mitigated Palamism is not as astonishing as it has thus far appeared.

multiplicity of God, the light of their own tradition (*lux ex Oriente*), namely the Greek Patristic ways of application of ἐπίνοια to God, and some *lux ex Occidente* through the Greek translation of Aquinas' above-mentioned writings. After making some remarks on Palamas' distinction between God's 'essence' and 'energies', I shall try to show that the various ways in which the Palamites later qualified distinction's being drawn κατ' ἐπίνοιαν were not as Palamite as their professed or official Palamism would at first sight suggest and that this was due to the way they used both the Greek and the Latin *lux*.

## 1. THE BACKGROUND

### 1.1. Lux ex Oriente: *The Greek Patristic Tradition*

The fullest Patristic exposition of what ἐπίνοια means and how it can serve the Christian intellectual's task to describe and account for God's unity and multiplicity occurs in Book I of Basil of Caesarea's *Adversus Eunomium*.<sup>5</sup> Basil, drawing upon Stoic logic,<sup>6</sup> said that distinguishing κατ' ἐπίνοιαν or λόγῳ means dividing by our mind a being into *i*) its parts, *ii*) its categorical properties (substance, quality, quantity, etc.), and *iii*) its previous and subsequent states or acts, judging

5. BASIL OF CAESAREA, *Adversus Eunomium* (a.D. 363/366) I,6, 19-29; 41-51; 54-57; I,7, 1-29 (edd. B. SESBOÛÉ, G.-M. DE DURAND, L. DOUTRELEAU, *Basile de Césarée. Contre Eunome, suivi de Eunome, Apologie. Introduction, traduction et notes. Tome I* [Sources chrétiennes, vol. 299], Paris 1982, pp. 184-190). On the three definitions of ἐπίνοια in Basil's text see J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, "The Sources of Content and Use of *Epinoia* in Basil of Caesarea's *Contra Eunomium* I: Stoicism and Plotinus" (in Modern Greek), in: *Βυζαντινὰ* 20 (1999), pp. 7-42, esp. 10-27.

6. As I showed elsewhere: J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, "The Sources of Content" (cf. *supra*, n. 5); "Glossogony or Epistemology? Eunomius of Cyzicus' and Basil of Caesarea's Stoic Concept of *Epinoia* and its Misrepresentation by Gregory of Nyssa", in: L. KARFIKOVA, T. BOHM, S. DOUGLAS, J. ZACHHUBER, V.H. DRECOLL (eds.), *Proceedings of the 10<sup>th</sup> International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa: "Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium II: Philosophy and Theology of Language" (Olomouc, 15-18 September 2004; Center for Patristic, Medieval and Renaissance Texts) (Supplements to "Vigiliae Christianae")*, Leiden 2006, pp. 387-397, esp. Appendix (pp. 395-397). Cf. IDEM, "Alcuin and the Realm of Application of Aristotle's Categories", in: J. MEIRINHÓS and A. PACHECO (eds.), *Intellect et Imagination dans la Philosophie Médiévale. Actes du XI<sup>e</sup> Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale de la Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.). Porto du 26 au 31 août 2002* (Rencontres de philosophie médiévale, vol. 11), Vol. I, Turnhout 2004, pp. 1733-1742 (esp. 1736-1738).

from its present state. Basil borrows from the Stoic logical tradition the example of grain (“σῖτος”). Grain, though being one “subject”, has various parts, has also many “qualities” (size, colour, etc.), and takes on various forms, formerly being a “seed”, then turning into “bread” to eat, and so on. In this sense, it can consistently be described as both one and many. This is the case with God, too; God is ‘one’ in virtue of His essence, and yet ‘many’ things on account of His permanent qualities as well as His temporal activities.<sup>7</sup> In Stoic logic (if not even earlier), the various things predicated of a subject in that sense were also called “ἑτερόνυμα” (“beings with various names” denoting their various aspects).<sup>8</sup> To use some scholastic terms of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, this covers the *distinctio realis minor* and the *distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re*.

This doctrine is also expounded in a pseudo-Athanasian writing,<sup>9</sup> and was hastily integrated into John of Damascus’ *Dialectica*,<sup>10</sup> thus acquiring great authority for subsequent Byzantine theologians, as

7. I reproduce the exposition of Basil’s definitions of ἐπίνοια from my “Glossogony or Epistemology?” (cf. *supra*, n. 6), p. 390.

8. As I incidentally showed in my “Glossogony or Epistemology?” (cf. *supra*, n. 6), p. 389. I intend to explore the Ancient Greek origins and the Late Antique and Byzantine history of the four-fold distinction “ὁμώνυμα - συνώνυμα - ἑτερόνυμα - πολυώνυμα” in an Appendix of my forthcoming monograph: *Ἐννόμιος Κυζίκιον: οἱ φιλοσοφικὲς συνιστώσες τῆς σκέψης του. Μὴ ἀποκατάσταση* (Athens). On the identity of ἐπίνοια with ἑτερόνυμα see the passages from the Aristotelian commentators of Late Antiquity collected in DEMETRACOPOULOS, “The Sources of Content” (cf. *supra*, n. 5), pp. 23-24.

9. PS.-ATHANASIOS OF ALEXANDRIA, *De sancta Trinitate dialogi* I (PG 28: 1144D). This passage was attributed by some to Maximus Confessor; see, e.g., PROCHOROS CYDONES’ *Περὶ καταφατικῶν καὶ ἀποφατικῶν τρόπων ἐπὶ τῆς θεολογίας καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ ὄρει τοῦ Κυζίου θεοφανείας* (*Vat. gr.* 678, f. 50<sup>v</sup>). In this pseudo-Athanasian writing, there is an echo of Basil of Caesarea’s second definition of ἐπίνοια, albeit in a Trinitarian context (PG 28: 1136D-1137A). Cf. also DIDYMUS CAECUS’ *Commentarii in “Psalms” 22-26.10*, ad 26,7, ed. M. GRONWALD, *Didymos der Blinde. Psalmenkommentar. Teil 2* (Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen, vol. 4), Bonn 1968, p. 109,18-20; Origen and Basil of Caesarea are the background to this passage.

10. JOHN OF DAMASCUS (ob. ca. 750), *Dialectica* LXV,84-97 (based on BASIL OF CAESAREA’S *Adversus Eunomium* I,6-7 and GREGORY OF NYSSA’S *Contra Eunomium* II,180; ed. W. JAEGER, *Gregorii Nysseni opera. Vol. I: Contra Eunomium I-II*, Leiden 1960, pp. 276,29-277,7 and elsewhere); ed. B. KOTTER, *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos. I: Institutio elementaris. Capita philosophica*, Berlin 1969, p. 135. Cf. MICHAEL PSELLUS, *Opusc. theol.* CVII, ll. 140-142, ed. P. GAUTIER, *Michaelis Pselli theologia*, Leipzig 1989, p. 427; NICEPHOROS BLEMMYDES, *Ἐπιτομὴ λογική*, ch. 5: “Περὶ ἐπινοίας”, PG 142: 725A-C.

well as (in a rather dull way) into a scholium of Ps.-Maximus Confessor's *Scholia in (Ps.-)Dionysium Areopagitam*.<sup>11</sup>

Obviously enough, this solution to the problem of God's simplicity and multiplicity preserved effectively the unity of God's being. It is not clear, however, if it did so at the expense of His simplicity, for it left room for a class of *absolute* divine attributes ('goodness', 'power', 'justice', etc.) which, typically belonging to the Stoic category of *quality* (*ποιόν*), cannot be construed as identical with His essence. This is suggested by another famous Basilian passage: "The operations are various, and the essence simple; what we say is that we know our God from His operations, but do not undertake to approach near to His essence itself. His operations come down to us, but His essence remains beyond our reach".<sup>12</sup> Contrary to a widespread Palamite and pro-Palamite reading of this passage,<sup>13</sup> it should be noted that Basil

11. PS.-MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *Scholia in Dionysii Areopagitae librum "De divinis nominibus"*, ad V,8 (ed. B.-R. SUCHLA, *Corpus dionysiacum. I: Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita. De divinis nominibus* [Patristische Texte und Studien, vol. 33], Berlin 1990, p. 186,3), PG 4: 325A; 325C (based on Basil's first definition). The former of these two ps.-Maximian passages was noticed by GUICHARDAN, *Le problème* (cf. *supra*, n. 2), p. 44. Cf. also PS.-MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *op. cit.*, ad V,5 (PG 4: 317D), based on Basil's first and second definition of ἐπίνοια (passage noticed by D. PETAVIUS, *Dogmata theologica. Editio nova... curante J.-B. FOURNIALS. Tomus primus, in quo de Deo Deique proprietatibus agitur*, Paris 1865 (11644), cols. 110b-111a).

12. BASIL OF CAESAREA, *Epistle 234*, 1, 27-31, ed. Y. COURTONNE, *Saint Basile. Lettres. Texte établi et traduit. Tome III*, Paris 1966, p. 42; translation by B. JACKSON, in: P. SCHAFF and H. WACE (ausp.), *The Treatise "De Spiritu Sancto", The Nine Homilies in Hexaemeron, and the Letters of Saint Basil the Great. Translated with Notes*, in: *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church. Second Series. Translated into English with Prolegomena and Explanatory Notes. Vol. 8: S. Basil. Letters and Selected Works*, New York 1894, pp. 620-621, slightly modified.

13. See, e.g., GREGORY PALAMAS, *Capita CL*, 111, ed. P.K. CHRESTOU, *Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ συγγράμματα*, Vol. V, Thessaloniki 1992, p. 96,20-22 = ed. R.E. SINKEWICZ, *Saint Gregory Palamas. The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters. Introduction, Critical Edition and Translation*, Toronto 1988, pp. 208-210; *Against Gregoras II*,49, ed. P.K. CHRESTOU, in: P.K. CHRESTOU (ausp.), *Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ συγγράμματα*, Vol. IV, Thessaloniki 1988, p. 300,7-11; *Περὶ θεῶν ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τῆς κατ' αὐτὰς μελέξεως* 19, ed. G.I. MANTZARIDES, in: P.K. CHRESTOU (ausp.), *Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ συγγράμματα*, Vol. II, Thessaloniki 1966 (1994), p. 111,4-8; PHILOTHEOS KOKKINOS, *Against Gregoras VIII*, ll. 1453-1457, ed. D.B. KAIMAKES, *Φιλοθέου Κοκκίνου δογματικά ἔργα*. Vol. I (Θεσσαλονικεῖς βυζαντινοὶ συγγραφεῖς, vol. 3), Thessaloniki 1983, p. 303; DAVID DISHPATOS, *Λόγος κατὰ Βαυλαῦμ καὶ Ἀκινδύνον πρὸς Νικόλαον Καβάσιλαν*, ed. D.G. TSAMES, *Δαβὶδ Δισυπάτων Λόγος κατὰ Βαυλαῦμ καὶ Ἀκινδύνον πρὸς Νικόλαον Καβάσιλαν* (Βυζαντινὰ κείμενα καὶ μελέται, vol. 10), Thessaloniki 1973, pp. 48,11-14; 78,7-11; JOSEPH BRYENNIOS, *Λόγος διδασκαλικαῖς χρήσεσι καὶ Γραμμικαῖς ὁήσεσι παριστῶν ὅτι καὶ ἡ θεία ἐνέργεια καὶ τοῖς ἀξίοις θεωρουμένη ἐλλαμψις καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ Θαβωρίῳ παραδειχθεῖσα χάρις ἄκτιστος, περὶ*

does not say that we know God's 'energies', but that we know Him "from His activities", that is, we can infer His existence as well as some of His properties from His actions. In other words, according to Basil, there are three levels in God: *i*) essence, which is absolutely inaccessible (or, better, is defined as what is inaccessible in God); *ii*) properties, which can be known by means of His actions; and *iii*) actions, which testify to His existence as well as His properties.

In fact, Basil was not the first to use ἐπίνοια as a means of describing God; as I have shown elsewhere,<sup>14</sup> his *Adversus Eunomium* I,6-7 briefly presented above (pp. 265-266) relies upon a passage from Plotinus, where it is said that the second One is not in fact many things, but It just appears to us to be many things, because of the various "ἐπίνοιαί" we use in order to grasp It.<sup>15</sup> So, it is not quite clear whether Basil, by stating that the divine names are "ἐπίνοιαί", speaks of a *distinctio a parte rei* between the 'divine names' (according to the Stoic model) or of a *distinctio a parte mentis* (according to Plotinus' model).<sup>16</sup>

Θείας ἐνεργείας, ed. E. BOULGARIS, *Ἰωσήφ Βγεννίου τὰ εἰρηθέντα*, Vol. II, Leipzig 1768 (repr., Thessaloniki 1990; with an Introduction by EIR. DELEDEMOS), p. 101,12-16. Cf., *inter alios*, L.C. CONTOS, "The Essence-Energies Structure of Saint Gregory Palamas with a Brief Examination of Its Patristic Foundation", in: *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 12/3 (1967), pp. 283-294, esp. 286; P. SCAZZOSO, *La teologia di S. Gregorio Palamas (1296-1359) (in rapporto alle fonti e nel suo significato odierno)*. Prefazione C.G. BONIS, Milan 1970, p. 89; J.-C. LARCHET, *La théologie des énergies divines. Des origines à Saint Jean Damascène*, Paris 2010, pp. 155-156.

14. See DEMETRACOPOULOS, "The Sources of Content" (cf. *supra*, n. 5), pp. 21-40.

15. PLOTINUS, *Enneads* V,9,5; VI,2,3.

16. Ἐπίνοια was used in Patristic literature in two other contexts, too, i.e., the Trinity and Christology. In the former, it served the purpose of properly describing the distinctness of the persons of the Holy Trinity, which is 'conceptual', for all the unity of God's essence, which is 'real'. See, e.g., the lengthy exposition of PS.-CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA'S *De Trinitate* 10 (PG 77: 1141B-1145B), which was integrated fully and *verbatim* in JOHN OF DAMASCUS' *Expositio fidei*, 8,223-297; ed. B. KOTTER, *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos. II: Expositio fidei / Ἐκθεσις ἀκριβῆς τῆς ὁρθοδόξου πίστεως*, Berlin 1972, pp. 28-31; passage not noted in the *apparatus fontium*; CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA'S *Commentarii in "Johannem"* I, 3 and 5 and II,1 (ed. P.E. PUSEY, *Sancti patris nostri Cyrilli archiepiscopi Alexandrini in D. Joannis Evangelium*, Vol. I, Oxford 1872 (repr. Brussels 1965), pp. 44; 72; 191); *Thesaurus de sancta consubstantiali Trinitate* 4 (PG 75: 44C; cf. *op. cit.* 11 and 12; PG 75: 141B-C and 184A). In the latter, it was used to properly describe the way the two natures of Christ must be declared both as fully true, if taken separately, and united in the second person of the Holy Trinity. See, e.g., PS.-CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA'S *De Trinitate* 25 and 26 (PG 77: 1169A and 1172A; passages fully and *verbatim* integrated in JOHN OF DAMASCUS' *Expositio fidei* 91,105-107 and 144-145, ed. KOTTER, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-217; cf. also JOHN OF DAMASCUS' *Contra Iacobitas* 29-30, ed. KOTTER, *op. cit.*, Band IV, Berlin-New York 1981, p. 120). Still, some theologians

1.2. Lux ex Occidente: *Thomas Aquinas*

Late Byzantium, however, unlike the early and middle periods, had access to some major texts of Latin-speaking Christendom as well. Three of them, i.e. Thomas Aquinas' *Summa contra Gentiles*, translated in 1354 by Demetrios Cydones, *Summa theologiae*, translated by Demetrios and Prochoros Cydones, probably in 1355/58, and *De potentia*, translated before 1359/1361, referred to the same question, namely, that of reconciling the simplicity and multiplicity of *Deus unus* with His various qualities and acts, and offered a different solution. According to Aquinas, there are two sorts of 'things' predicated of God: *i*) 'essence', which is absolutely simple and identical both with His 'power' and the rest of His 'absolute' names ('eternity', 'goodness', 'wisdom', 'justice', etc.); these names differ from each other as well as from God's 'essence' only "conceptually, not really" ("κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἐπινοίας τρόπον, ... οὐ τῆ ἀληθεία τοῦ πράγματος"<sup>17</sup>); *ii*) the 'relative'

were reluctant to use this term in the context of Christology. For instance, THEODOTUS OF ANCYRA (*post* 381-*ante* 446), in a speech he delivered in the 4th Ecumenical Council, regarded the conceptual distinction of the two natures of Christ as a threat to Christ's unity (*Ὁμλία λεχθεῖσα ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῆς γεννήσεως τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*; ed. E. SCHWARTZ, *Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum*, Vol. 1,1,2, Berlin 1927, pp. 83,37-84,6; 87,6; 87,19-20; 89,22-28; 89,34-90,2). Further, SYMEON THE NEW THEOLOGIAN held a similarly fideist line by rejecting both "really" and "conceptually" distinguishing between the persons of the Holy Trinity (*Hymni XXI,23-34*, ed. J. KODER, *Syméon le Nouveau Théologien. Hymnes. Tome II: Hymnes 16-40. Texte critique et index par J. KODER. Traduction et notes par L. NEYRAND* [Sources chrétiennes, vol. 174], Paris 1971, p. 132; cf. the repeated general apophatic declarations in SYMEON's 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> *Theological Oration*, ed. J. DARROUZÈS, *Syméon le Nouveau Théologien. Traités théologiques et éthiques. Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes. Tome I: Théol. I-III - Éth. I-III* [Sources chrétiennes, vol. 122], Paris 1966, pp. 96-152). As we will see, many heroes of the Palamite controversy did not fail to argue for their own and against their opponents' views of the distinction under discussion on the grounds of the patristic views of how Christians are supposed to understand the distinction between the persons of the Trinity and between the two natures of Christ. More Greek patristic passages where ἐπινοία and λόγος (taken as a *distinctio realis cum fundamento in re*) are used as means of distinguishing the two natures of Christ have been collected by GUICHARDAN, *Le problème* (cf. *supra*, n. 2), pp. 45-46.

17. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles* II,10 (Qualiter potentia in Deo dicatur / Πῶς ἂν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ ἡ δύναμις λέγεται): "1. Ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ ἀρχὴ ἐστὶν ἑαυτοῦ, ἡ δὲ θεία ἐνέργεια οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ (II,9), φανερόν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὡς ἐν τῷ Θεῷ ἡ δύναμις οὐχ ὡς ἀρχὴ τῆς ἐνεργείας λέγεται, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀρχὴ τοῦ γεγεννημένου. Καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ δύναμις ἀποσκοπεῖν εἰς ἕτερον ποιεῖ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς λόγον (ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ἐνεργητικὴ δύναμις ἀρχὴ εἰς ἕτερον, ὡς ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ τῶν *Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά* [ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics* V,12,1-2, 1019a15-20] φησιν ὁ Φιλόσοφος), φανερόν ὅτι ἡ 'δύναμις' κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὰ γεγεννημένα παράθεσιν λέγεται ἐν τῷ Θεῷ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ πράγματος, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ

divine names ('creator', 'merciful', etc.); in these cases, "our mind invents various names to refer to its various... concepts [of God]" ("κατὰ διαφόρους... νοήσεις ὁ νοῦς διάφορα εὐρίσκει ὀνόματα..."<sup>18</sup>). Properly speaking, these names do not refer to God Himself, but to the results of His action in the world. So they differ from each other inasmuch as they denote just different aspects of His activity, not various realities (in whatever sense) within God Himself.

Aquinas adds that it would be false to suppose that the 'relation' of God with the world is an in-between 'reality', for if this were the case, we would have to pose a second 'relation' of God with this 'reality', in order to explain its existence, and so on *in infinitum*. This leaves room only for taking God's relative 'names' as *ἐπίνοιαι*,<sup>19</sup> that is, as predicates that hold true to the extent that the human mind is able to describe the relations between God and created beings. Aquinas distinguishes between three sorts of conceptual predicates:

- i*) predicates referring to objectively existent realities ("qualities" and "quantities") within a being;
- ii*) predicates referring to a relation between two beings either mutually (e.g., 'father – child') or unilaterally (e.g., 'knowledge' –

παράθεσιν πρὸς τὴν ἐνέργειαν, εἰ μὴ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἐπινοίας τρόπον, καθόσον ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς διαφόροις νοήσεσιν ἐκάτερον θεωρεῖ, τὴν θεῖαν δηλαδὴ δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτῆς. "Ὅθεν, εἰ καὶ τινες ἐνέργειαι ἀρμόζουσι τῷ Θεῷ πρὸς μὴδὲν πεποιημένον μεταβαίνουσαι, ἀλλὰ μένουσαι ἐν τῷ ἐνεργοῦντι, κατ' ἐκείνας 'δύναμις' ἐν τῷ Θεῷ οὐ λεγθήσεται, εἰ μὴ τὸν κατ' ἐπίνοιαν τρόπον, οὐ μὴν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πράγματος ἀλήθειαν. 'Ἐνέργειαι δὲ τοιαῦται εἰσι τὸ νοεῖν καὶ θέλειν. Ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἄρα δύναμις, εἰ βουλοίμεθα λέγειν ἰδίως, οὐ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐνεργείας ἀποσκοπεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀποτελέσματα μόνον. Ὁ νοῦς ἄρα καὶ ἡ θέλησις οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ ὡς δυνάμεις, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνέργειαι μόνον. 2. Φανερόν δὲ ἔτι ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ὅτι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῶν τῷ Θεῷ ἀπονεμομένων, ὡσπερ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ θέλειν καὶ προάγειν τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὰ ὅμοια, οὐκ εἰσὶ διάφορα πράγματα' ἐπεὶ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τούτων ἐκάστη ἐν τῷ Θεῷ ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῦ, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ ταυτὸν. "Ὅπως δὲ τὸ πολλαπλοῦν τῶν σημασιῶν οὐ λυμάνεται τῇ τοῦ ἐνὸς πράγματος ἀληθείᾳ, ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ βιβλίῳ (I,31; 35) δεδειγμένων φανερόν εἶναι δύναται" (*Vat. gr. 610, f. 105<sup>r-v</sup>*).

18. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles* I,35,2 (cf. *infra*, p. 296).

19. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles* II,13,1-3: "Ὁὐ δύναται δὲ λέγεσθαι ὡς αἰ προειρημέναι ἀναφοραὶ ὑφ'εσθήκασιν ἔξω, ὡσπερ τινὰ πράγματα ἐκτὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ ἔσχατον ἀγαθόν, ἀνάγκη ἂν ἦν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀναφορὰς ἐκείνας τὰς πράγματα οὐσας ἀναφορὰς πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἐτέρας εὐρεῖν· καὶ εἰ κακεῖναι πάλιν πράγματα εἶεν, ἀνάγκη πάλιν τρίτας σχέσεις εὐρεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο ἐπ' ἄπειρον. Οὐκ ἄρα αἰ σχέσεις, αἷς ὁ Θεὸς πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἀνάγεται πράγματα, εἰσὶ τινὰ πράγματα ἔξω τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑφ'εστώτα. Οὐκ ἄρα δυνατόν τὰς ἀναφορὰς, αἷς ὁ Θεὸς πρὸς τὰ κτίσματα ἀναφέρεται, εἶναι τινὰ πράγματα ἐκτὸς αὐτοῦ. ... Καταλείπεται ταύτας ἀποπέμπεσθαι τούτῳ κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπινοίας" (*Vat. gr. 610, f. 106<sup>r</sup>*). See also *De potentia*, 3,3 (cf. *infra*, pp. 314-315).



'knowable'; 'being on the right...' – 'being on the left...') depending on each other;

iii) predicates that spring solely from the human mind, such as the various self-identical truisms (*a is a*).

The various names predicated of God with respect to His creature fall under case (ii), especially its second clause, i.e., the unilateral relation. For the former pole (God) can exist without the latter (creature) but not *vice versa*; therefore, this relation denotes something relevant only to the latter.<sup>20</sup>

In this respect, Aquinas was a source apt to be used for anti-Palamite purposes. At the same time, however, Aquinas did not classify this relation under case (iii), which means that he ascribed a degree of reality to this relation. Further, Aquinas stressed that taking refuge in various "names" to describe the absolutely simple God is merely the result of man's being inferior to God (even more, an essentially corporeal being) and thus doomed to grasp Him "analogically", that is, truly yet imperfectly, especially *in statu viae*. This idea appeared to be in keeping with the traditional Byzantine apophaticism;<sup>21</sup> accordingly, as we will see, it was fervently embraced by some Palamite thinkers, who created a mixture of the Greek Patristic with the Thomistic idea of explaining divine multiplicity in terms of its being conceived *κατ' ἐπίνοιαν*. Apparently, Demetrios Cydones' rendering of Aquinas' 'intentio' and 'ratio' (in this context) as 'ἐπίνοια' and 'λόγῳ' played an important role for some Palamites to re-state their Palamism with smoother, more acceptable, Thomistic colours.<sup>22</sup> Since

20. This is a brief exposition of Thomas' doctrine, based on passages from his two *Summae* and the *De potentia*. A fuller exposition of his thought on the issue is offered in ch. 6 ("Relations") of R.W. SCHMIDT's *The Domain of Logic according to Saint Thomas Aquinas*, The Hague 1966, pp. 130-174 (and *passim*).

21. Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, *De potentia*, 7,5 ad 14: "...ἐκ τοῦ τὸν ἡμέτερον νοῦν τῆς θείας οὐσίας μὴ παρισούσθαι, τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ θεία οὐσία διαμένει, τὸν ἡμέτερον νοῦν ὑπερβαῖνον, καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἄγνωστος ἡμῖν· καὶ διατοῦτο ἐκεῖνο ἐστὶν ἔσχατον τῆς ἀνθρωπείας γνώσεως περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὸ γινῶναι ἐκλυτὸν ἀγνωστοῦντα τὸν Θεόν, ἐφόσον ἴσμεν [obviously, the translator read "cognoscimus"] τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς πᾶν ὃ περὶ αὐτοῦ νοοῦμεν ὑπερβαῖνον" (*Coisl. gr.* 96, f. 187<sup>v</sup>). Most probably, the translation of the *De potentia* was made by Prochoros Cydones; see G. MERCATI, *Notizie di Procoro e Demetrio Cidone, Manuele Caleca e Teodoro Meliteniota ed altri appunti per la storia della teologia e della letteratura bizantina del secolo XIV* (Studi e Testi, vol. 56), Vatican City 1931, pp. 36-37.

22. If I am right in suggesting that BASIL OF CAESAREA'S *Adversus Eunomium* I,6-7 and the Latin *Paraphrasis Themistianā* (350/380) of Aristotle's *Categories* (traditionally known

Aquinas did not know Greek, and since, as far as I know, no Latin translation of Basil of Caesarea's *Adversus Eunomium* had ever been produced up to the time of Aquinas,<sup>23</sup> Aquinas elaborated his doctrine of the 'divine names' without using Basil's ἐπίνοια, which he never referred to, either explicitly or implicitly, in his *Summae*. Thus, the above Greek rendering should rather be ascribed to Cydones' philosophical and theological ingenuity.

## 2. GREGORY PALAMAS' SHARP DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOD'S 'ESSENCE' AND 'ENERGIES'

Gregory Palamas (1296-1357) introduced a peculiar *distinctio realis* between the "essence" or "nature" of God and His "powers" or "energies".<sup>24</sup>

as PS.-AUGUSTINE's *Categoriae decem*, §§27-29, have a common (Greek) source (by now lost) (DEMETRACOPOULOS, "Glossogony or Epistemology?"; cf. *supra*, n. 6), then it seems that Cydones, unconsciously but with remarkable success, retroversed the Latin rendering of the ancient Greek ἐπίνοια as *intentio*. His rendering was to become established in Late Byzantium; see, e.g., THEODORE GAZES' *Antirrheticon* 13-14 and 35-39, ed. L. MOHLER, *Kardinal Bessarion als Theologe, Humanist und Staatsmann. Funde und Forschungen. III. Band. Aus Bessarions Gelehrtenkreis. Abhandlungen, Reden, Briefe von Bessarion, Theodoros Gazes, Michael Apostolios, Andronikos Kallistos, Georgios Trapezuntios, Niccolò Perotti, Niccolò Capranica*, Paderborn 1942 (repr. 1967), pp. 211,18-212,21 and 218,36-220,2; on the place of *intentio* and ἐπίνοια in the intellectual discussions between Theodore Gaza, Bessarion and John Argyropoulos, see J. MONFASANI, "Greek and Latin Learning in Theodore Gaza's *Antirrheticon*", in: M. PADE (ed.), *Renaissance Readings of the Corpus Aristotelicum*, Copenhagen 2001, pp. 61-78 = study V in: IDEM, *Greeks and Latins in Renaissance Italy. Studies on Humanism and Philosophy in the 15<sup>th</sup> Century*, Ashgate 2004, esp. 72-74; IDEM, "Theodore Gaza as a Philosopher: a Preliminary Survey", in: R. MAISANO and A. ROLLO (eds.), *Manuele Crisolora e il ritorno del greco in Occidente. Atti del convegno internazionale (Napoli, 26-29 giugno 1997)*, Naples 2002, pp. 269-281 (= study IV in: MONFASANI, *Greeks and Latins*), esp. 280.

23. See the recent survey of the "Greek Philosophical Works Translated into Latin" by M. TRIZIO, Appendix B2 in: R. PASNAU (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge 2009, pp. 797-801, esp. 800, s.v. "Basil of Caesarea". Some passages from Basil's *Adversus Eunomium* which occur in Aquinas' *Contra errores Graecorum* might well have derived from various intermediary sources. In general, no traces of direct influence by Basil's doctrine of the 'divine names' on Aquinas are discernible. On Aquinas and Greek Patristic literature see Á. B.Y. DURÁN's effort, "El nominalismo Arriano y la filosofía cristiana: Eunomio y San Basilio", in: *Augustinus* 5 (1960), pp. 206-226, to present Aquinas' doctrine of the divine names as identical to Basil's and contrary to Eunomius'. This fails *e limine*, since it defectively presents Basil's and fully misrepresents Eunomius' thought. In fact, Eunomius' doctrine is much closer to Aquinas than Basil's.

24. See, e.g., GREGORY PALAMAS, *Against Acindynos II*, 19,91: "Καὶ ἡ δύναμις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ Θεοῦ ἄκτιστος διατελεῖ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας διενήνοχεν"; edd. L. CONTOYIANNES

Although he declared that “it is impossible to think of any sort of incision or division between God’s essence and energy”,<sup>25</sup> he went so far as to distinguish between “ὑπερκειμένη οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ” (God’s “essence”, which is remote) and “θεότης ὑφειμένη” (“the inferior rank of God’s being”), that is, God’s “energies”. He insisted so much on the real character of this distinction that he contended that it is at least as real as the distinction between the Persons of the Holy Trinity (Father, Son and Holy Spirit).<sup>26</sup> Indeed, he qualified that

- B. PHANOURGAKES, in: P.K. CHRESTOU (ausp.), *Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ συγγράμματα*, Vol. III, Thessaloniki 1970, p. 149,18-19. See also GREGORY PALAMAS, *Triads III*, 2 (1340), 11, ed. P.K. CHRESTOU, in: CHRESTOU (ausp.), *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Thessaloniki 1962, p. 665,15; *Προσαῶς ἡ θεία ἔνωσις καὶ διάκρισις* 10, ed. MANTZARIDES, in: CHRESTOU, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 76,15-17; *Περὶ θείων ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τῆς κατ’ αὐτὰς μελέξεως* 6, 21, ed. MANTZARIDES, *op. cit.*, pp. 101,13-14; 112,27-28; *Διάλογος ὀρθοδόξου μετὰ Βαυλααμίτου* 52, ed. MANTZARIDES, *op. cit.*, p. 214,5-7; *Ὅτι Βαυλαὰμ καὶ Ἀζίνδυνος εἰσὶν οἱ διχοτομοῦντες κακῶς ὄντως καὶ ἀθέως εἰς δύο ἀνίσους θεότητας τὴν μίαν* 7; 13; 14, ed. MANTZARIDES, *op. cit.*, pp. 267,11-12; 273,3-5; 273,30-31; *Πρὸς Δανιὴλ Αἴνον* 6, ed. N.A. MATSOUKAS in: CHRESTOU, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 379,28-31; *Against Acindynos I*, 6,23, 7,31; II, 12,54; VI, 20,75 et al., edd. CONTOYIANNES-PHANOURGAKES, *op. cit.*, pp. 55,28-56,1; 61,31; 124,22-23; 443,4-5. Palamas equates *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια* in God on the basis of some Greek patristic passages, mainly on BASIL OF CAESAREA’S *De Spiritu sancto* IX,22,31-33, ed. B. PRUCHE, *Basile de Césarée. Sur le Saint-Esprit. Introduction, texte, traduction et notes. Réimpression de la deuxième édition revue et augmentée* (Sources chrétiennes, vol. 17bis), Paris 2002 (21968), p. 326, and JOHN OF DAMASCUS’ *Expositio fidei* 37,2-13 (“Περὶ ἐνεργείας”), ed. KOTTER (cf. *supra*, n. 16), p. 93. Still, he distinguishes between *δύναμις* taken as the internal and eternal properties of God and *ἐνέργεια* as their external and yet equally uncreated and eternal manifestation. Besides, some patristic passages cited by Palamas seem to imply a threefold distinction; see, e.g., MAXIMUS CONFESSOR’S *Capita theologica et oeconomica* II,1 (PG 90: 1125C), cited in *Διάλογος ὀρθοδόξου μετὰ Βαυλααμίτου* 16; 51, ed. MANTZARIDES, *op. cit.*, pp. 178,17; 213,17-214,1; PS.-ATHANASIUS OF ALEXANDRIA, *In Annuntiationem Deiparae* (PG 28: 920B), cited in *Against Acindynos* II,21,100, edd. CONTOYIANNES-PHANOURGAKES, *op. cit.*, p. 157,11. Cf. GREGORY OF NYSSA, *Orationes de Beatitudinibus* VII, ed. J.F. CALLAHAN, *Gregorii Nysseni opera. Vol. VII, Pars 2: De oratione Dominica. De Beatitudinibus*, Leiden-New York-Cologne 1992, p. 150,25-27. On the nature of this distinction cf. G. KAPRIEV, *Philosophie in Byzanz*, Würzburg 2005, pp. 286-289.

25. GREGORY PALAMAS, *Against Acindynos II*, 12,54, edd. CONTOYIANNES-PHANOURGAKES (cf. *supra*, n. 24), p. 124,25-27.

26. GREGORY PALAMAS, *Capita CL* (probably 1347/48), 75, ed. CHRESTOU (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 77,26-27 = ed. SINKEWICZ (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 170; *Against Gregoras II* (1355/57), 41, ed. CHRESTOU (cf. *supra*, n. 13), pp. 294,32-295,4; *Against Acindynos* II,8,29; III,19,85; VI,14,53, edd. CONTOYIANNES-PHANOURGAKES (cf. *supra*, n. 24), pp. 105,24-29; 222,31-33; 426,8-12; *Εἰς τὴν ῥῆσιν ἐκ τῶν “Θησαυρῶν” τοῦ ἁγίου Κυρίλλου* 8, ed. PHANOURGAKES, in: CHRESTOU (ausp.), *op. cit.*, Vol. IV (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 107,10-22; *Capita CL*, 113, ed. CHRESTOU (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 98,4-15 = ed. SINKEWICZ, *op. cit.*, p. 212; *Πρὸς Ἀρσένιον* I, ed. MATSOUKAS (cf. *supra*, n. 24), p. 316,4-11.

there should not be any wonder for us that, in God's case, essence and energy are in some sense one and are one God, and at the same time essence is the cause of the energies and, in virtue of its being their cause, is superior to them. For the Father and the Son, too, are one thing and one God, and yet "the Father is greater" (Joh. 14,28) than the Son in terms of His being the cause. And if there [sc. in the case of the Holy Trinity], for all the self-subsistence of the Son and for all His being co-substantial [with the Father], "the Father is" nevertheless "greater" [than the Son], *all the more* will the essence be superior to the energies, since these two things are neither the same nor different in substance, as these properties [sc. being of the same or of different substance] regard self-subsistent realities and no energy at all is self-subsistent.<sup>27</sup>

Obviously, Palamas regarded the division between God's essence and energies as radically different and thus greater than (in fact, as we will see, infinite) that between the persons of the Holy Trinity.

As for the nature of these non-self-subsistent realities and their connection with the essence, Palamas declared that God's natural properties ("φυσικὰ προσόντα"), although they are neither "substances" ("οὐσίαι") or "natures" ("φύσεις") nor "accidents" ("συμβεβηκότα"),<sup>28</sup> are nevertheless "realities" ("πράγματα")<sup>29</sup> and might be called "quasi-accidents" or "accidents in some sense" ("συμβεβηκότα πως"); "συμβεβηκότα ἔστιν ὅπως".<sup>30</sup> To him, the multiplicity of God,

27. GREGORY PALAMAS, *Περὶ θείων ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τῆς κατ' αὐτὰς μεθέξεως* 19: "Τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ δεῖ θαυμάζειν, εἰ ἔν ἐστὶ πως οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια ἐπὶ Θεοῦ καὶ εἷς ἐστὶ Θεός, εἴτα ἡ οὐσία αἰτία τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐστὶ καὶ ὡς αἰτία ὑπέροκειται αὐτῶν. Καὶ γὰρ ὁ Πατήρ καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς ἔν ἐστὶ καὶ εἷς ἐστὶ Θεός, ἀλλ' αἰτίας καὶ "μείζων" τοῦ Υἱοῦ τῷ αἰτίῳ ὁ "Πατήρ". Εἰ δ' ἐκεῖ, καίτοι ἀνυποστάτου καὶ ὁμοουσίου ὄντος τοῦ Υἱοῦ, ὅμως ὡς αἰτίας "μείζων ὁ Πατήρ", πολλῶ μᾶλλον τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ὑπερέξει ἡ οὐσία, μῆθ' "ὁμοουσίῶν" μῆθ' "ἐτερουσίῶν"; cf. JOHN OF DAMASCUS' *Institutio elementaris* 6, ed. KOTTER (cf. *supra*, n. 10), p. 23, αὐτῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν: τῶν γὰρ ἀνυποστάτων ταῦτα, οὐδεμία δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἀνυπόστατος ἐστίν", ed. MANTZARIDES (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 111,10-20.

28. On the Greek and Latin (Augustinian) background to Palamas' rejection of seeing God's properties as "accidentia"/"συμβεβηκότα" in the logical sense of the term see J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, *Augustine and Gregory Palamas: Aristotle's Categories and the Psychological Images of the Holy Trinity* (in Modern Greek: *Ἀβγουστίνος καὶ Γρηγόριος Παλαμῆς: τὰ προβλήματα τῶν ἀριστοτελικῶν κατηγοριῶν καὶ τῆς τριαδικῆς ψυχοθεολογίας*; with three Appendices), Athens 1997, p. 54. Cf. GREGORY PALAMAS, *Περὶ θείων ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τῆς κατ' αὐτὰς μεθέξεως* 29, ed. MANTZARIDES (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 116,11.

29. GREGORY PALAMAS, *Letter to Athanasius of Cyzicus* 42; 44, ed. MATSOUKAS (cf. *supra*, n. 24), pp. 450,31-451,1; 453,1-4; *Against Gregoras* II,21, ed. CHRESTOU (cf. *supra*, n. 13), pp. 280,35-281,13.

30. GREGORY PALAMAS, *Capita CL*, 127; 135, ed. CHRESTOU (cf. *supra*, n. 13), pp. 107,9; 111,22 = ed. SINKEWICZ (cf. *supra*, n. 13), pp. 230,10; 240,9-10; *Against Acindynos* VI,73; 77-78, edd. CONTOYIANNES-PHANOURGAKES (cf. *supra*, n. 24),

although grasped by a created being, is as real as His unity both in regard to the essence-persons and the essence-energies multiplicity. Palamas argues at length against Gregory Acindynos' idea that "we humans speak of the uncreated powers and energies of God in the plural because of the partitional character of our knowledge, i.e., because we are capable neither of discussing nor of thinking of the non-partitioned realities".<sup>31</sup> In a public dispute with Nicephoros Gregoras, Palamas stated with remarkable clarity: "The fact that it is we who conceive of Him both in terms of division and unity does not mean that He is not really so".<sup>32</sup> In this sense, Palamas' distinction between God's 'essence' and 'energies', for all his numerous apologetic declarations of accepting God's unity, is a sort of 'distinc-

pp. 441,6-19; 443,25-445,24. This phrase was borrowed from CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA'S *Thesaurus* XXXI (PG 75: 445D-448A: "τρόπον τινὰ συμβέβηκε"; 449A (passage *infra*, n. 51); cf. J.S. NADAL (CAÑELLAS), "La critique par Akindynos de l'herméneutique patristique de Palamas", in: *Istina* 3 (1974), pp. 297-328, esp. 305; DEMETRACOPOULOS, *Αὐγουστῖνος* (cf. *supra*, n. 28), p. 143, n. 154); and GREGORY NAZIANZEN'S *Oratio* XXXI, 6,7-11, edd. P. GALLAY and M. JOURJON, *Grégoire de Nazianze. Discours 27-31: Discours théologiques. Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes* (Sources chrétiennes, vol. 250), Paris 1978, p. 286.

31. "...διὰ τὸ μεριστὸν τῆς ἡμετέρας γνώσεως τὰς ἀκτίστους δυνάμεις καὶ ἐνεργείας τοῦ Θεοῦ πληθυντικῶς ἐκφέρομεν, μὴ δυνάμενοι ἀμερίστως διαλέγεσθαι μηδὲ νοεῖν περὶ τῶν ἀμερίστων", *apud* GREGORY PALAMAS, *Against Acindynos* VI,14,49, ed. CHRESTOU (cf. *supra*, n. 13), pp. 424,5-8; cf. *op. cit.* VI,14,51; 15,54; ed. CHRESTOU, pp. 425,6-9; 426,30-427,3; cf. GREGORY ACINDYNOS, *Ἐτέρα ἔκθεσις καὶ ἀνασκευή τῶν τοῦ Παλαμῆ πονηροτάτων αἰρέσεων* 119; ed. J. NADAL CAÑELLAS, *Les Traités contradictoires de Grégoire Acindyne contre Grégoire Palamas. IV: Textes critiques complémentaires*, forthcoming (my sincere thanks to Prof. Dr. J. Nadal Cañellas for allowing me access to his forthcoming edition of this Acindynian writing). This is the way John Cyparissiotis, too, accounts for the compositional character of human speech about God; JOHN CYPARISSIOTES, *Κατὰ τῶν τοῦ Παλαμικοῦ τόμου διαζρίσεων καὶ ἐνώσεων ἐν τῷ Θεῷ* VI,6; VIII,22; ed. K.E. LIAKOURAS, *Ἰωάννου Κυπαρισσιώτου, Κατὰ τῶν τοῦ Παλαμικοῦ τόμου διαζρίσεων καὶ ἐνώσεων ἐν τῷ Θεῷ. Τὸ κείμενον νῦν τὸ πρῶτον ἐκδιδόμενον (editio princeps). Διατριβὴ ἐπὶ διδακτορίᾳ*, Athens 1991, pp. 298,22-26; 474,9-25; *Περὶ τῆς θείας οὐσίας καὶ θείας ἐνεργείας διαφορᾶς, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταύτην παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ ἀνεροεῖν* 3, ed. B.L. DENTAKES, *Ἰωάννου τοῦ Κυπαρισσιώτου Περὶ τῆς θείας οὐσίας καὶ θείας ἐνεργείας διαφορᾶς, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταύτην παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ ἀνεροεῖν, νῦν τὸ πρῶτον ἐκδιδόμενον (editio princeps)* (Ἡσυχαστικά καὶ φιλοσοφικά μελέται, vol. 10), Athens 1976, pp. 49,1-60,5.

32. GEORGE FACRASES, *Ἐπίτομος κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν διήγησις τῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ παλατίου ἐνώπιον τοῦ βασιλέως γενομένης διαλέξεως τοῦ ἀγνωστάτου Θεσσαλονίκης κῦρ Γρηγορίου καὶ Γρηγοῦ τοῦ φιλοσόφου* 15: "Οὐδ' ὅτι καὶ διαιρετῶς νοεῖται καὶ ἠνωμένως παρ' ἡμῶν, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει κατὰ ἀλήθειαν", ed. CHRESTOU, in: CHRESTOU (ausp.), Vol. IV (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 213,26-29 = ed. M. CANDAL, "Fuentes Palamíticas. Diálogo de Jorge Facrasi sobre el contradictorio de Palamas con Nicéforo Grégoras", in: *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 16 (1950), pp. 303-357, esp. 344,23-25.

tio realis' hardly compatible with God's simplicity.<sup>33</sup> Palamas, based directly on Gregory Nazianzen and Augustine, conceived of God's simplicity in a compromised way, that is, in terms of another divine property, i.e., impassibility: "it is not acting and energy but being acted upon and passivity which causes composition".<sup>34</sup>

33. It is not always taken into account that defending unity is not sufficient for one to vindicate simplicity effectively. For example, PALAMAS' *Περὶ θείας καὶ θεοποιῶν μεθέξεως ἢ περὶ τῆς θείας καὶ ὑπερφυῶν ἀπλότητος* 7, ed. MANTZARIDES (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 142,12-16, does not entitle one to state that "Palamas affirmed the divine simplicity as strongly as anyone could wish", D. COFFEY, "The Palamite Doctrine of God: a New Perspective", in: *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 32/4 (1988), pp. 329-358, esp. 334. In this writing, Palamas, relying on Basil of Caesarea's *Adversus Eunomium* II,29,20-33, edd. B. SESBOÛÉ, G.-M. DE DURAND, L. DOUTRELEAU, *Basile de Césarée. Contre Eunome, suivi de Eunome. Apologie. Introduction, traduction et notes*, tome II (Sources chrétiennes, vol. 305), Paris 1983, pp. 122-124, explicitly states that he would not be prepared to defend simplicity throughout; GREGORY PALAMAS, *op. cit.* 28-29, ed. MANTZARIDES, *op. cit.*, pp. 161,17-162,14. Of course, I do not imply that the doctrine of God's absolute simplicity belongs to the essential core of Christian theology; cf. the correct remarks of M. STROHM, "Die Lehre von der Einfachheit Gottes. Ein dogmatischer Streitpunkt zwischen Griechen und Lateinern", in: *Kyrios* 7 (1967), pp. 215-228. In the final analysis, from the historical point of view, such a core includes very few things, if any.

34. GREGORY PALAMAS, *Capita CL*, 145, ed. CHRESTOU (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 116,8-9 = ed. SINKEWICZ (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 250. See also *Περὶ θείων ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τῆς κατ' αὐτὰς μεθέξεως* 6, ed. MANTZARIDES (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 100,29-30; *Περὶ θείας καὶ θεοποιῶν μεθέξεως* 25; 26, ed. MANTZARIDES, *op. cit.*, pp. 158,11-14; 159,6-8; *Πρὸς Λαυῖλ Αἴνον* 8, ed. MATSOUKAS (cf. *supra*, n. 24), pp. 381,26-382,10; *Πρὸς τὸν εὐλαβέστατον ἐν μοναχοῖς Διονόσιον* 4, ed. MATSOUKAS, *op. cit.*, p. 496,31-33. This idea goes back to Plato (*Respublica* II, 380D-E). On Gregory and Augustine as the source of Palamas' idea see DEMETRACOPOULOS, *Ἀγνοστίνοσ* (cf. *supra*, n. 28), pp. 33-34. Augustine himself had quoted from Gregory Nazianzen's *Oration XXIX*. That Palamas drew upon Augustine's *De Trinitate* has been "virtually simultaneously" established more than a decade ago by R. FLOGAUS, "Der heimliche Blick nach Westen. Zur Rezeption von Augustins *De Trinitate* durch Gregorios Palamas", in: *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik* 46 (1996), pp. 275-297, and myself, *Ἀγνοστίνοσ* (cf. *supra*, n. 28), pp. 52-54; 85-94; 181-192; cf., *inter alia*, R.E. SINKEWICZ, "Gregory Palamas", in: C.G. CONTICELLO and V. CONTICELLO (eds.), *La théologie byzantine et sa tradition. II: XIII<sup>e</sup>-XIX<sup>e</sup> siècles*, Turnhout 2002, pp. 131-188, esp. 163. Still, not all of Palamas' borrowings from Augustine's *De Trinitate* have been detected as yet. From a forthcoming additional list I have composed, I am picking out, just as an example, the dependence of GREGORY PALAMAS' *Capita CL*, 40, ed. CHRESTOU (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 58,3-7 = ed. SINKEWICZ (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 128, on AUGUSTINE'S *De Trinitate* XIV,14,18, ll. 14-25 in Maximos Planoudes' translation, edd. M. PΑΡΑΘΗΜΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, I. TSAVARI, G. RIGOTTI, *Ἀγνοστίνοσ Περὶ Τριτάδος βιβλία πεντεκαίδεκα, ἅπερ ἐκ τῆς Λατίνων διαλέκτου εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα μετήργεκε Μάξιμος ὁ Πλανούδης. Εἰσαγωγή, ἑλληνικὸ καὶ λατινικὸ κείμενο, γλωσσάριο. Editio princeps*. Vol. II, Athens 1995, p. 823.

As Gregory Acindynos<sup>35</sup> and Nicephoros Gregoras<sup>36</sup> (1293-1361) noticed in Palamas' own time, Palamas' explicit distinction between "lower deity" and "God's transcendental essence"<sup>37</sup> as well as his plural use of θεότης<sup>38</sup> is redolent of Proclus' metaphysical tenet that each level of the hierarchical structure of beings derives its ontological grade from its essence, whereas it produces the lower level by granting, in terms of its superior, existence, substance, qualities, and energy to its inferior.<sup>39</sup> Of course, we need not take the criticism of Palamas'

35. Acindynos describes Palamas' doctrine as a revival of the Platonic theory of Ideas; see, e.g., his *Πνευματική διαθήκη* 9, ll. 39-41, edd. J. NADAL CAÑELLAS and D. BENETOS; I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Juan Nadal Cañellas (Rome) and the Lecturer Dr. Dionysios Benetos (Athens) for kindly allowing me access to their forthcoming edition of Gregory Acindynos' *Opera minora* (Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca; Turnhout, Leuven University Press; the reader should be warned that the line numbers indicated above may not eventually coincide with those to appear in the volume in print; yet the divergence is not expected to be so great as to render the above passages unidentifiable). Further, Acindynos (*Ἐτέρα ἔκθεσις καὶ ἀνασκευὴ τῶν τοῦ Παλαμῆ ποιησοτάτων αἰρέσεων* 22 and 125, ed. NADAL CAÑELLAS, *Les Traités contradictoires...*; cf. *supra*, n. 31), parallels Palamas' doctrine with PROCLUS' *Commentary on "Timaeus"* II, ed. E. DIEHL, *Procli Diadochi In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, Vol. I, Leipzig 1903, p. 361,22-25, and *Commentary on "Parmenides"* II, ed. C.G. STEEL, *Procli In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria. Tomus I, libros I-III continens*, Oxford 2007, p. 147 = ed. V. COUSIN, *Procli philosophi Platonici opera inedita. Pars III*, Paris 1864 (repr. Hildesheim 1961), p. 743,6-8, as well as with PROCLUS' *Theologia Platonica* IV,14, edd. H.D. SAFFREY and L.G. WESTERINK, *Proclus. Théologie Platonicienne. Livre IV. Texte établi et traduit*, Paris 1981, p. 44,16-19.

36. NICEPHOROS GREGORAS, *Historia Byzantina* XXIII (= *Oratio dogmatica I*), 2, ed. L. SCHOPEN, *Νικηφόρου τοῦ Γρηγοροῦ Ῥωμαϊκῆ ἱστορία. Corpus scriptorum historiae Byzantinae, Pars XIX,2: Nicephorus Gregoras, Vol. II*, Bonn 1830, pp. 1100,21-1101,3; XXXV (= *Oratio dogmatica VI*), 14-15, ed. I. BEKKER, *Νικηφόρου τοῦ Γρηγοροῦ Ῥωμαϊκῆ ἱστορία. Corpus scriptorum historiae Byzantinae, Pars XIX,3: Nicephorus Gregoras, Vol. III*, Bonn 1855, pp. 481,5-482,14. Cf. VON IVANKA, *Platonismo* (cf. *supra*, n. 1), p. 318; G. PODSKALSKY, *Theologie und Philosophie in Byzanz. Der Streit um die theologische Methodik in der spätbyzantinischen Geistesgeschichte (14./15. Jh.)*, seine systematischen Grundlagen und seine historische Entwicklung, Munich 1977, p. 163.

37. GREGORY PALAMAS, *Epistle to Acindynos III* (a.D. 1341), 15: "Ἐστὶν ἄρα 'θεότης' ὑφειμένη κατὰ τοὺς θεοσόφους θεολόγους, ὡς κἀνταῦθ' εἶπεν ὁ μέγας Διονύσιος (Ps.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITE, *Epistle II*, 1; edd. G. HEIL and A.M. RITTER, *Corpus dionysiacum. II: Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita. De coelesti hierarchia. De ecclesiastica hierarchia. De mystica theologia. Epistulae* [Patristische Texte und Studien, vol. 36], Berlin-New York 1991, p. 158,4), δῶρον οὐσα τῆς ὑπερκειμένης οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ", ed. J. MEYENDORFF, in: P.K. CHRESTOU (ausp.), Vol. I (cf. *supra*, n. 24), p. 306,18-20). Cf. the list of passages offered by D. STIERNON, "Bulletin sur le Palamisme", in: *Revue des Études Byzantines* 30 (1972), pp. 231-337, esp. 240.

38. GREGORY PALAMAS, *Πρὸς Ἀρσένιον* 4, ed. MATSOUKAS (cf. *supra*, n. 24), p. 317,27-28.

39. Cf. JOHN CYPARISSIOTES, *Κατὰ τῶν τοῦ Παλαμικοῦ τόμου διαζοίσεων καὶ ἐνόσεων ἐν τῷ Θεῷ* V,19, ed. LIAKOURAS (cf. *supra*, n. 31), p. 276,19-22.

adversaries at face value. Indeed, the passages they invoked do not correspond with concrete passages in any of Palamas' writings. Still, the Palamite terms "lower deity" or "deities" and "God's transcendental essence" do appear in Proclus' writings,<sup>40</sup> and are used by Palamas in a non-Dionysian, if not anti-Dionysian, way.<sup>41</sup>

Palamas' metaphysical Platonism, though noticed by several scholars, has been described as "inconsapevole".<sup>42</sup> Still, as we will see later on (pp. 355-356), Palamas consciously and directly integrated some of Syrianus' and Proclus' metaphysical tenets (as stated in some concrete passages of these Neoplatonists) in his description of the structure of divine reality (as well as some of Simplicius' or Priscianus Lydus' epistemological tenets in his description of the participation of man in the divine realm). This being the case, it is all too natural that Palamas, in his bulky literary production, full of Patristic quotations and allusions, subscribed to the passage from Basil's *Adversus Eunomium* on ἐπίνοια only once<sup>43</sup> and that, even in that single case,

40. See, e.g., PROCLUS' *Institutio theologica* 18; 150, ed. E.R. DODDS, *Πρόκλων Διαδόχου Στοιχείωσις θεολογική. Proclus. The Elements of Theology. A Revised Text with Translation, Introduction and Commentary*, Oxford 1963, pp. 20,5-7; 132,6-15.

41. Ps.-Dionysius applies the terms ὑφειμένον and ἐπερχεῖμενον only to angels and human souls, not to God; cf., e.g., PS.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITE, *De caelesti hierarchia* IV,4; edd. HEIL-RITTER (cf. *supra*, n. 37), p. 22,17-18; *De divinis nominibus* V,8; ed. SUCHLA [cf. *supra*, n. 11], p. 186,5-7. That Palamas' doctrine cannot successfully be traced back to the *corpus dionysiacum* and that one must, therefore, take Proclus as a major source of Palamas' speculative theology is indicated by a Ps.-Dionysian passage from the *De divinis nominibus* V,2, which sounds like an anticipant rejection of Palamas' doctrine (ed. SUCHLA (cf. *supra*, n. 11), p. 181,16-19; passage interpreted as incompatible with Palamas' theological thought by VON IVÁNKA, *Platonismo* [cf. *supra*, n. 1], p. 343). Further, later on, GEORGE PACHYMERES (1242-ca. 1310), in his *Commentary on the "De Divinis nominibus"*, said that calling God 'being *per se*', 'life *per se*', and 'wisdom *per se*' should not be construed as implying that such a distinction is really existent in God; quite the contrary, this distinction can be attributed to God Himself neither *simpliciter* ("ἁπλοῶς") nor even conceptually ("κατ' ἐπίνοιαν"), but only in reference to God's creatures (on V,5; PG 3: 840A-B). Cf. PS.-MAXIMUS CONFESSOR's comment on PS.-DIONYSIUS' *Epist. IX* (PG 3: 497A4-6). On the Neoplatonic character of Palamas' doctrine of energies see also VON IVÁNKA, *Platonismo*, pp. 308-310; 325-326; G. PODSKALSKY, "Gottesschau und Inkarnation", in: *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 35 (1969), pp. 5-44, esp. 40-41; J. NADAL CAÑELLAS, "Gregorio Akíndinos", in: CONTICELLO-CONTICELLO (eds.), *La théologie byzantine* (cf. *supra*, n. 34), pp. 189-314, esp. 239-240; 253.

42. VON IVÁNKA, *Platonismo* (cf. *supra*, n. 1), pp. 308-310.

43. GREGORY PALAMAS, *Διάλογος ὀρθοδόξων μετὰ Βαλαλαμίτων* 38-42, ed. G.I. MANTZARIDES (cf. *supra*, n. 13), pp. 200,24-206,25; Basil's passage appears in p. 200,25-27. Palamas is also attested to have used the *distinctio rationis* in the record of one of his



he avoided stating that God's "energies" are distinguished both from each other and from God's "essence" *κατ' ἐπίνοιαν*;<sup>44</sup> instead, he just picked up a sentence from Basil's passage, which says that "there are many truly different names of God".<sup>45</sup>

Further, the greatest hindrance for Palamas to describe his distinction as 'conceptual' was that, borrowing a phrase of Maximus Confessor which was to become misleadingly famous,<sup>46</sup> he explicitly posed an infinite gap between God's 'essence' and 'energies'; the former, he stated, "stands infinitely infinite times higher" (*ἀπειράκις ἀπείρως*

public disputes with Nicephoros Gregoras by GEORGE FACRASES, *Ἐπίτομος κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν διήρησις τῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ παλατίου ἐνώπιον τοῦ βασιλέως γενομένης διαλέξεως τοῦ ἀγιοτάτου Θεσσαλονίκης κῆρ Γρηγορίου καὶ Γρηγοῦ τοῦ φιλοσόφου* 26; ed. P.K. CHRESTOU (cf. *supra*, n. 32), p. 229,12-25 = ed. CANDAL, "Fuentes" (cf. *supra*, n. 32), p. 356,27-28: "...τοῦ λόγον χωρίζοντος τὰ ἀχώριστα..." (with reference to the distinction between "νοῦς" (substance) and "διάνοις" (the activity of this substance), which is used as a model of the distinction between God's 'essence' and 'energies'); cf. GREGORY PALAMAS, *Λόγος διασαφῶν ἐν ἐπιτόμῳ τῆρ τοῦ Βασιλαῖμ καὶ Ἀκινδύνου δόξαν καὶ τῶν ἐπέρ εἰσεβείας ἀντιλεγόντων αὐτοῖς* 4; ed. PHANOURGAKES, in: CHRESTOU (ausp.), Vol. III (cf. *supra*, n. 24), p. 90,9-13; *Against Gregoras* IV,12; ed. CHRESTOU, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 347,26-27.

44. Contrary to what is the case with the anti-Palamites, who had no problem citing the relevant passage in full. See, e.g., GREGORY ACINDYNOS, *Ἐτέρα ἐκθεσις καὶ ἀνασκευὴ τῶν τοῦ Παλαμῆ ποιηροτάτων αἰρέσεων* 84, ed. NADAL CAÑELLAS (cf. *supra*, n. 31); PROCHOROS CYDONES, *Περὶ καταφατικῶ καὶ ἀποφατικῶ τρόπων ἐπὶ τῆς θεολογίας καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ ὄρει τοῦ Κυρίου θεοφανείας* (*Vat. gr.* 678, f. 56<sup>v</sup>).

45. Palamas uses *ἐπίνοια* in his *Ποσαχῶς ἡ θεία ἔνωσις καὶ διάκρισις* 9, ed. MANTZARIDES, in: CHRESTOU (ausp.), Vol. II (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 76,6-9, but in a different sense, roughly equivalent to the Stoic *ἀναλογισμός* (leading oneself from a result to its cause and forming an idea of the nature of its cause). A. LÉVY, *Le créé et l'incréé: Maxime le Confesseur et Thomas d'Aquin. Aux sources de la querelle palamienne* (Bibliothèque thomiste, vol. LVIX), Paris 2006, p. 33, holds that Palamas described his distinction as "conceptual". Still, the passage he quotes from "un des grands traités de Grégoire Palamas" is in fact from a writing by Philotheos Kokkinos (cf. *infra*, pp. 284-285, n. 59).

46. MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *Capita theologica et oeconomica* I,49: "Πάντων τῶν ὄντων καὶ μετεχόντων καὶ μεθεκτῶν ἀπειράκις ἀπείρως ὁ Θεὸς ὑπερεξήρηται. Πᾶν γὰρ εἴ τι τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον ἔχει κατηγορούμενον, ἔργον Θεοῦ τυγχάνει, καὶ τὸ μὲν κατὰ γένεσιν ἦρται τοῦ εἶναι χρονικῶς, τὸ δὲ κατὰ χάριν τοῖς γεγονόσιν ἐμπέφυκεν οἷά τις δύναμις ἔμφυτος «τὸν ἐν πᾶσιν ὄντα Θεόν» (Eph. 4,6) διαπρυσίως κηρύττουσα" (PG 90: 1101A). Cf. *op. cit.* I,7: "Ἀρχὴ πᾶσα καὶ μεσότης καὶ τέλος εἰς ἅπαν τὴν σχετικὴν δι' ὅλου κατηγορίαν οὐκ ἔρρηται. Θεὸς δὲ καθόλου πάσης σχέσεως ὑπάρχων ἀπειράκις ἀπείρως ἀνώτερος, οὔτε ἀρχὴ οὔτε μεσότης οὔτε τέλος εἰκότως ἐστίν" (PG 90: 1085B). As H. KOCH, *Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita in seinen Beziehungen zum Neuplatonismus und Mysterienwesen. Eine litterarhistorische Untersuchung*, Mainz 1900, p. 78, n. 2, notes, this phrase, which is Proclean in origin, is contained in PS.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITE'S *De divinis nominibus* VIII,2-3, ed. SUCHLA (cf. *supra*, n. 11), p. 201,1-21 (cf. H.U. VON BALTHASAR, *Kosmische Liturgie. Maximus der Bekenner: Höhe und Krise des griechischen Weltbildes*, Einsiedeln 1961, p. 604; NADAL CAÑELLAS, "Gregorio Akindinos" [cf. *supra*, n. 41], p. 306, n. 135). This passage played an important role in the Palamite controversy.

ὑπερεξήρηται) than the latter.<sup>47</sup> Making such a bold statement amounted to *e limine* cancelling any possibility of coherently expressing the distinction at hand.<sup>48</sup>

So Palamas, at first sight, opted for a Stoic rather than Plotinian interpretation of Basil's text (see *supra*, pp. 265-266), which implies a "distinctio realis" between God *per se* and His 'energies'. Still, he did so in a Procline way, which sharpened this conceptual Stoic distinction so much that he substantivised it.

### 3. THE LENIENCE OF GREGORY PALAMAS' DISTINCTION BETWEEN 'ESSENCE' AND 'ENERGIES' BY HIS BYZANTINE ADHERENTS

Surprisingly, Palamas' attitude towards the Greek Patristic distinction *κατ' ἐπίνοιαν* does not foreshadow the relevant stand of Palamite thinkers either during his lifetime or afterwards. *Ἐπίνοια*, though practically absent from Palamas' writings, occupies a central place in the works of almost all the authors of the Palamite party during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It is in this sense that, as I said in the beginning (p. 264), most Byzantine Palamists in fact fall under what E. Ivánka called "Neo-Palamism".

47. See, for instance, GREGORY PALAMAS' *Triads* III,2, 7; 8; 21; III,3,14, ed. CHRESTOU (cf. *supra*, n. 24), pp. 662,18-19; 663,26-27; 673,8-11; 692,19-23; *Περὶ θεῶν ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τῆς κατ' αὐτὰς μεθέξεως* 41, ed. MANTZARIDES (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 127,9-10; *Διάλεξις ὀρθοδόξου μετὰ Βαλααμίτου* 24, ed. MANTZARIDES, *op. cit.* (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 186,26-27; *Epistle to Arsenios* 8, ed. MATSOUKAS (cf. *supra*, n. 24), pp. 320,30-321,2; *Epistle to John Gabras* 5, ed. MATSOUKAS, *op. cit.*, p. 332,12-13. I shall not defend here my interpretation of Maximus' passage under discussion; the reader should simply recall that Palamas' interpretation was not the only one and that, as we will see, an anti-Palamite interpretation was shared by some of the Palamites, too. A discussion of the way Palamas and Acindynos construed this passage is offered by J. VAN ROSSUM, *Palamism and Church Tradition: Palamism, Its Use of Patristic Tradition, and Its Relationship With Thomistic Thought* (type-written Doct. Diss., Theological Faculty of Fordham University), New York 1985, pp. 68-80; my thanks to Prof. Dr. John Monfasani for providing me a copy of this dissertation.

48. This accounts for the difficulties Palamas faced in treating the problem of the logical status of this distinction. To save God's simplicity, Palamas took from time to time (and from work to work) refuge in three different views of the ontological weight of accidents: *i*) no accident makes *eo ipso* its substance composite; *ii*) no 'natural accident', i.e., *proprium*, makes its substance composite; and *iii*) in the created world, all accidents, in so far as they are by definition transient, make their substances composite; this, however, does not hold true for God's quasi-accidents, because He is by nature simple and immutable; see DEMETRACOPOULOS, *Αὐγουστῖνος* (cf. *supra*, n. 28), pp. 55-63.

3.1. *The Patristic Line: David Dishypatos and Matthaios Blastaris*

During Palamas' own lifetime and, most probably, before Nicephoros Gregoras' involvement in the Palamite quarrel (1351), two minor theologians, David Dishypatos (ob. 1347) and Matthaios Blastaris (ca. 1290-ca. 1350), took pains to compose some tracts in support of Palamas. Dishypatos reproduced Palamas' rough analogical argument that, just as distinguishing between the persons of the Holy Trinity does not entail composition in God, distinguishing between God's essence and energies leaves God's unity untouched.<sup>49</sup> Dishypatos also explicitly reproduced Basil of Caesarea's anti-Eunomean use of ἐπίνοια (cf. *supra*, pp. 265-266). His intention was to present the Christian postulate that the various "divine names", for all the simplicity of the subject they are predicated of, should not be confused with each other or with their subject as logically acceptable.<sup>50</sup>

Matthaios Blastaris pleaded for Palamas' case by taking recourse to some theological tenets of the Christology of Cyril of Alexandria. Cyril, in his effort to refute the Arianistic background of those who denied the full divinity of the divine nature of Christ, distinguished between God's essence and His properties (such as His being 'ungenerated') by calling the latter ones "naturally adjacent properties" or "quasi-accidents" and apologized for not using philosophically more accurate terms by appealing to the impossibility for man's language to describe adequately what lies above his realm.<sup>51</sup> As we have seen (p. 274), this is how Palamas himself had described God's 'energies': by nature inherent yet really distinct from His 'essence'; and Cyril was one of his declared sources. It sounds plausible that Blastaris knew of Palamas' Cyrilian debt and defended his theology by following the

49. DAVID DISHYPATOS, *Ἱστορία διὰ βραχέων ὅπως τὴν ἀρχὴν συνέστη ἢ κατὰ τὸν Βαβλαῶν καὶ Ἀζινδόνον πονηρὰ αἵρεσις*, ll. 77-86, ed. M. CANDAL, "Origen ideológico del palamismo en un documento de David Disípato", in: *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 15 (1949), pp. 85-125, esp. 120.

50. DAVID DISHYPATOS, *Λόγος κατὰ Βαβλαῶν καὶ Ἀζινδόνον πρὸς Νικόλαον Καβάσιλαν*, ed. TSAMES (cf. *supra*, n. 13), pp. 44,23-45,13 (cf. BASIL OF CAESAREA, *Adversus Eunomium* I,8,19-22; edd. SESBOÜÉ et al. [cf. *supra*, n. 5], p. 194). Cf. JOSEPH CALOTHETOS' (ob. post 1355) *Oration IV (Λόγος ἀντιθετικὸς πρὸς τοὺς Βαβλααμίτας)*, 26-31, ll. 512-680, ed. D.G. TSAMES, *Ἰωσήφ Καλοθέτου Λόγοι (Ἀριστοτέλειον Πανεπιστήμιον Θεσσαλονίκης. Ἐπιστημονικὴ Ἐπετηρὶς Θεολογικῆς Σχολῆς. Παράρτημα ἀρ. 19 τοῦ 10' τόμου)*, Thessaloniki 1975, pp. 137-142.

51. CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA, *Thesaurus* XXXI (PG 75: 448D-449A).

same line—with the one, albeit remarkable, difference that Blastaris<sup>52</sup> even reproduced Cyril’s idea that God’s “adjacent qualities” should be construed as differing from God’s essence only “κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν”, which Palamas had preferred to leave out.

Dishypatos and Blastaris did not add anything of their own to the speculative aspect of the Palamite quarrel. Still, their initiative to involve Basil of Caesarea’s theological use of ἐπίνοια in this quarrel and to subscribe to Cyril of Alexandria’s theological use of ἐπίνοια paved a distinct way for Byzantine and post-Byzantine Palamites to come.

### 3.2. *Appealing to Basil of Caesarea’s “Conceptual” yet Real Distinction between the Persons of the Holy Trinity*

**Philotheos Kokkinos** (1295/97-1379), the biographer of Palamas, Patriarch of Constantinople (1353-54; 1364-77) and the principal agent of the establishment of Palamas’ theology as officially sanctioned as well as of Palamas himself as a saint,<sup>53</sup> was assigned the task of officially expressing Palamas’ theological doctrine. In the *Synodal Tome of 1351*,<sup>54</sup> which came from his pen as well as Neilos Cabasi-

52. MATTHAEUS BLASTARIS, *Περὶ τῆς θείας χάριτος ἢ περὶ τοῦ θείου φωτός* (probably 1346/47), ll. 577-601, ed. P.V. PASCHOS, “Ὁ Ματθαῖος Βλάσταρης περὶ τῆς θείας χάριτος ἢ περὶ τοῦ θείου φωτός”, in: *Ἀντίφωνον τῷ μητροπολίτῃ Μεσσηνίας Χρυσόστομῳ Θέμελι*, Vol. II, Kalamata 2006, pp. 291-326 (text on pp. 295-326; the edition is full of mistakes and defective in almost every respect), in particular 310-311. Blastaris abridged the passage from Cyril referred to in the preceding note.

53. See A. RIGO, “La canonizzazione di Gregorio Palama (1368) ed alcune altre questioni”, in: *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Neellenici* 30 (1993), pp. 155-202 (esp. 163-164; 170-172; 176-178; 202).

54. *Synodal Tome of 1351*, 27: “...Τῶ λογισμῶ χωρίζειν ταῦτα... Τῶ μὲν γὰρ “οὐκ ἐκ τῆς παρ’ ἡμῶν θέσεως συνίστασθαι” φάναι, “ἀλλ’ αὐτῇ τῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθῆσαι συμβαίνειν”, ἐξ ἀφύκτου καὶ πολλῆς καὶ φυσικῆς ἀνάγκης καὶ λαμπρῆς ἀληθείας ἔδειξεν οὐσαν τὴν ἐν τῇ τάξει ταύτῃ διαφορὰν τῶν αἰτιατῶν τε καὶ τῶν αἰτίων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν μηδέποτε ἐγχωροῦσαν, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ τοῦτοις ἀναγκαιῶς αὐτὴν ἐνθεωρουμένην· τῶ δὲ “μὴ διαστήματι, ἀλλὰ τῶ λογισμῶ χωρίζειν ταῦτα” (BASIL OF CAESAREA, *Adversus Eunomium* I,20,27-28; edd. SESBOÜÉ et al. [cf. *supra*, n. 5], p. 246) ἐπενεγκεῖν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῶ πρώτῳ καὶ δευτέρῳ διαφορὰν μόνῳ τῶ νῶ θεωρεῖν φαίνεται δῆπου τὸ τῆς ἐνώσεως πρᾶγμα σφόδρα κατησφαλισμένον” (PG 151: 737B-C; 739A-B = I.N. KARMIREs, *Τὰ δογματικά καὶ συμβολικά μνημεῖα τῆς Ὁρθοδόξου Καθολικῆς Ἐκκλησίας*, vol. I, Athens 1952, pp. 325-326; 327).

55. See MERCATI, *Notizie* (cf. *supra*, n. 21), p. 246. Cf. D.A. TSENTIKOPOULOS, *Φιλόθεος Κόκκινος: βίος καὶ ἔργο. Διδακτορικὴ διατριβὴ ὑποβληθεῖσα στὸ Τμήμα Ποιμαντικῆς καὶ Κοινωνικῆς Θεολογίας τοῦ Ἀριστοτελείου Πανεπιστημίου Θεσσαλονίκης*, Thessaloniki 2001, p. 161; G. NIGGL, *Prolegomena zu den Werken des Patriarchen Philotheos von Konstantinopel (1353-1354 und 1364-1376). Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der Philosophischen Fakultät der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität zu München*, 1955, p. 40.

las',<sup>55</sup> Kokkinos explicitly described the distinction between God's 'essence' and 'energies' as acceptable if drawn "by reason alone" (μόνον τῷ λογισμῷ) or "only mentally" (μόνον τῷ νῷ).<sup>56</sup> At the same time, however, he refrained from referring to Basil of Caesarea's *Adversus Eunomium* I,6-8, which contains an elaborate framework for a doctrine of the 'divine names'. Instead, he preferred to adopt a passage from *Adversus Eunomium* I,20, where it is stated that distinguishing between Father (cause) and Son (result) reflects a real difference within the Trinity, even if God's unity is not thereby harmed, since this distinction does not reflect a separation. Kokkinos applies this sort of distinction to God's 'essence' (taken as cause) and 'energies' (taken as result). This way of pleading for Palamas' distinction was somewhat close to Palamas' analogical appeal to the distinction between the Persons of the Holy Trinity (v. *supra*, pp. 273-274).

This is also the spirit of a relevant passage from Kokkinos' unedited *Fourteen Chapters against Barlaam and Acindynos*, which was probably written no later than 1351<sup>57</sup> (which means that Philotheos' writing belongs to the pre-Thomistic phase of the Palamite quarrel):

To see that essence and energy are not in every aspect one and the same thing, but are united and inseparable and yet are distinguished only conceptually, pay attention to how the saints state that these things are two and testify both to their unity and distinctiveness. ... Hence we do not state that there are two deities or Gods, as they [sc. the anti-Palamites] slander us; instead, what we state on the basis of what we have learnt from the saints is that this Deity, which is participated in by those who are deified, is not a proper essence or substance, but a natural power and energy present within God Himself, the Holy Trinity, absolutely inseparable and indivisible [from Him], the difference [between them] being only conceptual... The holy Fathers and Doctors, as we have already said, even if they say that God's essence is one thing and His energy is another thing, conceive of the energy—and they write thus—as inseparable and indivisible from the essence, as proceeding

56. Palamites of the mid-14<sup>th</sup> century, such as Kokkinos and Neilos Cabasilas, applied to their own concerns the concept of ἐπίνοια as used in the Trinitarian and Christological debates of the 4<sup>th</sup> (and 5<sup>th</sup>) century; see VAN ROSSUM, *Palamism and Church Tradition* (cf. *supra*, n. 47), pp. 100-102.

57. In ch. 7 (*Aithon. Laur. 1932*, f. 124<sup>v</sup>2-5), a passage from the *Synodal Tome of 1351* (45; PG 151: 753C = KARMIRIS, *Tὰ δογματικά* [cf. *supra*, n. 54], p. 337; cf. PHILOTHEOS KOKKINOS, *Against Gregoras* VI,551-553; ed. KAIMAKES [cf. *supra*, n. 13], p. 183) is cited and the target of Kokkinos' attack is not Gregoras (1293-1361), who got involved in the Palamite quarrel in 1351, but the two previous major anti-Palamites, i.e., Gregory Acindynos and, to an extent, Barlaam, who both died in 1348.

from it and as having existence and being present only in this very essence, since the separation (or, better, the difference) is construed only conceptually. Thus, in the case of those things which have their existence in other things, but do not subsist or exist autonomously in themselves, one does not speak of composition, as we have said.<sup>58</sup>

Some years later, however, Kokkinos, instigated by Nicephoros Gregoras' harsh attack on Palamas' theology, shifted somewhat the tenor of his Palamism: "According to the theologians and the Fathers, the divine essence and the divine energy are two things in the sense that it is proclaimed that they differ from each other not really, but conceptually, and that these two things are one thing, their unity in its turn being taken and proclaimed as existent not conceptually but really".<sup>59</sup>

58. PHILOTHEOS KOKKINOS, *Κεφάλαια τῆς αἰρέσεως Ἀκινδόνου καὶ Βαυλαῶν - Συντετμημένος καὶ σαφῆς ἔλεγχος τῆς κακοδοξίας Βαυλαῶν καὶ Ἀκινδόνου*, ἄπειρ ὁ Βαυλαῶν καὶ ὁ Ἀκινδόνος ἐφρόνησαν καὶ συνεγράψαντο αἰρετικά καὶ βλάσφημα δόγματα τὰ ἀνωτέρω γραφέντα τεσσαρακαίδεκα, 4; 8; 9: "Ὅτι δὲ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὐκ εἰσὶ κατὰ πάντα ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλὰ εἰσὶ μὲν ἡνωμένοι καὶ ἀχώριστοι, χωρίζονται δὲ ἐπινοία μόνῃ κατὰ διαφόρους λόγους, ἄκουσον πῶς λέγουσιν οἱ ἄγιοι ὅτι [καὶ] δύο εἰσὶ καὶ μαρτυροῦσι καὶ τὴν ἑνωσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ διακεκριμένον. ... Ἐντεῦθεν οὐδὲ δύο θεότητας ἢ Θεοὺς λέγομεν, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι συκοφαντοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν θεότητα ταύτην τὴν μετεχομένην ὑπὸ τῶν Θεουμένων λέγομεν, παρὰ τῶν ἁγίων μαθόντες, οὐκ ἴδιαν οὐσίαν τινὰ ἢ ὑπόστασιν, ἀλλὰ δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν φυσικὴν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ Θεῷ, τῇ ἁγίᾳ Τριάδι, θεωρουμένην, ἀχώριστον πάντῃ καὶ ἀδιάσπαστον, ἐπινοία μόνῃ καὶ τάξει νοοῦντες τὴν διαφοράν. . . Οἱ δὲ ἄγιοι Πατέρες καὶ διδάσκαλοι, καθὰ καὶ ἤδη εἶπομεν, εἰ καὶ ἄλλο λέγουσι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ ἄλλο τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀχώριστον καὶ ἀδιάσπαστον νοοῦσι καὶ γράφουσιν, ὡς εἴρηται, τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς οὐσίας, ἐκ ταύτης οὐσαν καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχουσαν καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ θεωρουμένην, τῆς διαίρεσεως (μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς) κατ' ἐπινοίαν μόνῃ θεωρουμένης. Ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις γοῦν, 'τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἐν ἑτέρῳ τὸ εἶναι' [sc. in the case of the *accidentia*]; JOHN OF DAMASCUS, *Dialectica; recensio fusior*, 40,3-6 = *recensio brevior*, 23,3-6, ed. KOTTER (cf. *supra*, n. 10), p. 106], ἀλλὰ μὴ συνεστῶσι μηδὲ ὄσιν ἰδίᾳ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, οὐδέποτε λέγεται σύνθεσις, ὡς προείπομεν" (*Athon. Laur.* 1932, ff. 121<sup>r</sup>; 127<sup>r</sup>; 128<sup>v</sup>-129<sup>r</sup>; on the manuscript tradition of this writing see two unpublished Doct. Diss.: NIGGL, *Prolegomena* [cf. *supra*, n. 55], pp. 28-31; TSENTIKOPOULOS, *Φιλόθεος Κόκκινος* [cf. *supra*, n. 55], pp. 238-240). Speaking of a conceptual distinction between the persons of the Holy Trinity in contrast with the real unity of the divine essence was by then quite normal; see, e.g., MACARIOS CHRYSOCEPHALOS, *Oratio panegyrica XIII (In transfigurationem Christi)*: "Μία οὐσία θεωρεῖται, ἀπλῆ καὶ ἀσύνθετος, καὶ μία γνωρίζεται θεότης, ἢ Τριάς. . . , πράγματι τὴν ἑνωσιν ἔχουσα καὶ ἐπινοία τὴν διαίρεσιν δεχομένη"; *Μακαρίου τοῦ Χρυσσοκεφάλου, ἀρχιεπισκόπου Φιλαδελφείας, λόγοι πανηγυρικοὶ* ἰδ'. *Εἰσαγωγή Εἰρ.* Αὐληθῆμον, Thessaloniki <sup>2</sup>1989, p. 401.

59. PHILOTHEOS KOKKINOS, *Πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν φιλόσοφον Γρηγορῶν λόγος ἀντιρωτικὸς πέμπτος περὶ ἡνωμένης καὶ διακεκριμένης θεολογίας καὶ περὶ διαφορᾶς ἰδικῶς αἰθις θείας οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας καὶ διὰ καὶ περὶ τοῦ αὐτῶν ἡνωμένου, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἑνωσις αὐτῶν πράγματι θεωρεῖται κατὰ τοὺς θεολόγους, ἡ δὲ διαφορὰ ἐπινοία* (a.D. 1354-55), ll. 1320-1324: "Δύο, ἦτοι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, εἰσὶν ἢ θεία οὐσία καὶ ἢ ἐνέργεια, οὐ πράγματι κατὰ τοὺς

Obviously enough, what is stressed here is unity; and this is done at the expense of diversity, in a way that would hardly be acceptable for Palamas, who had constantly posed unity and diversity on equal terms, if not in terms more favourable to the latter.

Kokkinos' early predilection for Basil of Caesarea's *Adversus Eunomium* I,20 was shared by Philotheos of Selybria (*ante* 1325/31-*post* 1389),<sup>60</sup> who reproduced this patristic passage along with the famous Athanasian Trinitarian simile of the fire and its light,<sup>61</sup> the forerunner

θεολόγους Πατέρας, ἀλλ' ἐπινοία τῆς διαφορᾶς αὐτῶν νοουμένης ἕμα καὶ λεγομένης, καὶ ἔν εἰσιν αὐθις αἱ αὐταί, οὐκ ἐπινοία, ἀλλὰ πράγματι τῆς ἐνώσεως αὐτῶν θεωρουμένης καὶ λεγομένης"; ed. KAIMAKES (cf. *supra*, 13), pp. 164-165. More passages from Philotheos' *œuvre* where the distinction under discussion is described as drawn "κατ' ἐπινοίαν" were collected by K.E. LIAKOURAS (*Ἡ περὶ τῶν ἀκρίστον θεῶν ἐνεργειῶν διδασκαλία τοῦ ἁγίου Φιλοθέου Κοκκίνου, Πατριάρχου Κωνσταντινουπόλεως*, Athens 1999, pp. 49-52; 93), who, however, fails to find a consistent way of surpassing the shock he suffered at the very fact that Philotheos' Palamism was expressed by means of ἐπινοία. Indeed, on the one hand, he tends to construe this term as implying the Neo-Palamite interpretation of the distinction between essence and energies as the result of the inherent incapacity of the human mind to grasp God; on the other, he states that this distinction reflects an objective reality in God's being; things are left so, and the only explanation offered for this antinomy is that Philotheos' use of ἐπινοία occurs "just some times" in his writings. Even Philotheos' reproduction of long relevant passages from BASIL OF CAESAREA'S *Adversus Eunomium* I and II passes unnoticed.

60. PHILOTHEOS OF SELYBRIA, *Διάλογος περὶ θεολογίας δογματικῆς* (a.D. ca. 1366), ll. 1571-1574; 2036-2045 (Gregory Palamas' *persona* is speaking); ll. 2555-2557 (Philotheos' *persona* is speaking); ed. M.C. VAKALOPOULOU, *Φιλόθεος Σηλυβρίας. Βίος καὶ συγγραμμικὸ ἔργο. Διδακτορική διατριβή*, Athens 1992, pp. 239; 258; 282: "...τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ἀμεθέ- κτου παντάπασιν οὐσης, μεθεκτῆς δὲ τῆς ἐνεργείας, ὑπονοήσιε τις ὅπως οὖν καὶ διαφορὰν τῆ ἐπινοία κατὰ τὸ αἴτιον, ὡς αἰτία αὐτῆ ταύτης. ... Οὕτω (sc. in accordance with Athanasius of Alexandria's Trinitarian simile of the fire and its light) καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς θείας φύσεως καὶ τῆς ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐνεργείας φυσικῶς καὶ οὐσιωδῶς προΐούσης τὸ 'ἔν' καὶ τὸ 'διάφορον' ἡμῖν ἐκκληπτέον, τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸ ἠνωμένον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὴ τοῦ αἰτίου. "Πρότερον" γὰρ "τὸ αἴτιον λέγομεν, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ αἰτιατόν, οὐ διαστήματι χωρίζοντες ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τῷ λογισμῷ" καὶ τῆ ἐπινοία "τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ προεπινοοῦντες τὸ αἴτιον" (BASIL OF CAESAREA, *Adversus Eunomium* I,20,26-29; edd. B. SESBOUË et al. [cf. *supra*, n. 5], p. 246). Καὶ ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς Τριάδος τῷ αἰτίῳ φαιμέν ὑπερέχειν τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸν Πατέρα, οὕτω καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς φυσικῆς αὐτῆς ἐνεργείας ὑπερκεῖσθαι ἀποφαίνεται τὰ θεῖα λόγια. ... Ὑπέρεχεται ἡ οὐσία τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆ ἐπινοία ὡς αἰτία αὐτῆ ταύτης καὶ οἶονεὶ ῥίζα καὶ πηγῆ" (cf. *Synodal Tome of 1351*, 27-28; PG 151: 737B-739A = KARMIRES, *Τὰ δογματικὰ* [cf. *supra*, n. 54], pp. 326-327).

61. PS.-ATHANASIUS OF ALEXANDRIA, *Oratio quarta contra Arianos*, 10 (PG 26: 472C-D); passage quoted in the *Synodal Tome of 1351*, 27 (PG 151: 737D-738A = KARMIRES, *Τὰ δογματικὰ* [cf. *supra*, n. 54], p. 326) (cf. PS.-ATHANASIUS OF ALEXANDRIA, *op. cit.* 2; PG 26: 469C). The simile occurs in the genuine Athanasian writing *De decretis Nicaenae Synodi* 23-24, ed. H.G. OPITZ, *Athanasius Werke*, Vol. 2,1, Berlin 1940, pp. 19,10-20,29 = PG 27: 456C-457B). Cf. PS.-ATHANASIUS OF ALEXANDRIA'S *Quaestiones aliae* (PG 28: 776B-777C). This is a simile ultimately inspired by Hebr. 3,2.

of Basil of Caesarea's 'conceptual' distinction between Father as cause and Son as His result.

This predilection was also shared by **Neilos Cabasilas** (ca. 1295-1363), the successor of Palamas on the archiepiscopal throne of Thessaloniki till his death. For it is this Basilian passage which lies behind Cabasilas' statement that

number implies difference, not division, in the sense that reason divides some things which in reality are inseparable. That substance is one thing whereas hypostasis is another does not entail that substance exists in separation from hypostasis; nor does the fact that essence and energy are not the same entail that the divine energy is separated from the divine essence; on the contrary, the distinction between them is conceptual, whereas their unity is real and indivisible.<sup>62</sup>

This line of defence of Palamas' theology is in keeping with what Neilos had stated as the co-author (along with Kokkinos) of the *Synodal Tome of 1351* (v. *supra*, p. 282).<sup>63</sup>

62. NILUS CABASILAS, *Oratio brevis de Gregorii Nysseni dicto; "Increatum nihil nisi..."*, 12: "Ὁ ἀριθμὸς διαφορὰν εἰσάγει, οὐ διαίρεσιν, τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ δηλαδὴ "τοῦ λόγου χωρίζοντος τὰ ἀχώριστα" (GREGORY NAZIANZEN, *Oratio XXIII*, 11, PG 35: 1164A; cf. PS.-BASIL OF CAESAREA, *Adversus Eunomium* V, PG 29: 737B). Οὐ γὰρ διότι ἄλλο ἢ οὐσία καὶ ἕτερον ἢ ὑπόστασις, χωρὶς ἂν εἴη ἡ οὐσία τῆς ὑποστάσεως, οὐδὲ διότι οὐ ταῦτὸν οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια, διέστη (cf. BASIL OF CAESAREA'S qualification: "οὐ διαστήματι χωρίζοντες ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τῷ λογισμῷ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ προεπινοοῦντες τὸ αἷτιον"; cf. *supra*, n. 60) τῆς θείας οὐσίας ἢ θεία ἐνέργεια, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν διάκρισις ἐπινοία, ἡ δὲ ἔνωσις πραγματική, ἀχώριστος [ἀν πράγματι καὶ ἀχώριστος?]; ed. M. CANDAL, "La Regla teológica (Λόγος σύντομος) de Nilo Cabásila", in: *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 23 (1957), pp. 240-257, esp. 254,25-256,1. Cf. NILUS CABASILAS' *Against the Acindynists' Interpretation of St. Cyril's Dictum*, II. 21-30: "Ὁὐ γὰρ τὸ ἡνωμένον τῆς θεολογίας τῷ διακεκριμένῳ πόλεμον (ex edit. πόλεων corr.) φέρει. ... Τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἕτερον μὲν εἶναι τὸν Θεόν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ Πνεῦμα τῇ οὐσίᾳ δῶσομεν, φυλάττομεν δὲ κατὰ τὰς ὑποστάσεις τὴν ἑτερότητα. ... Τῆς οὐσίας τῆς θείας καὶ τῆς ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐνεργείας... κατ' ἄλλο μὲν τὸ 'ἐν' ἐκλαμβάνων, κατ' ἄλλο δὲ τὸ 'μὴ ἐν' τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκτίστου καὶ ἀπεριγράπτου καὶ ἀχωρήτου καὶ συμφουῶς, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰτίου καὶ τοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ μετεχομένου"; ed. T. KISLAS, *Nil Cabasilas et son traité sur le Saint-Esprit. Introduction, édition critique, traduction et notes* (thèse de doctorat, Université de Strasbourg-II) (unpublished), 1998, pp. 699-700.

63. VAN ROSSUM, *Palamism and Church Tradition* (cf. *supra*, n. 47), pp. 34-38, describes Neilos Cabasilas (along with the Byzantine *princeps Thomistarum*, Scholarios!) as "a latent Palamite Thomist", establishing his non-anti-Thomism on his non-mentioning of Aquinas in his main pro-Palamite writing, the *Regula theologica*, and trying to show his pro-Thomism by appealing to his "being inclined to philosophical speculation". The latter argument, apart from being insufficiently based on two theological passages deserving no special philosophical praise, falsely assumes that "being inclined to philosophical speculation" in matters of theology is a mark of Thomism. This is false not only as far as Thomas' theological methodology is concerned, but also, up to an extent, as far as Neilos' view of



**Joseph Bryennios** (ca. 1350-ca. 1431) is a case very similar to Neilos Cabasilas. In an oration devoted to the nature of the Tabor light, probably written in 1418,<sup>64</sup> Bryennios defends the Palamite distinction against the objection that it clashes with God's simplicity by quoting tacitly yet verbatim a passage from Gregory Palamas himself:

If 'essence' and 'energy' fully coincide as far as God is concerned, then one of these names is just a *nomen nudum*, whose meaning does not correspond to a distinct concept. ...

It is not true that the beings we see they are characterized by diversity and distinction are *eo ipso* composite; for every substance has also

Thomas' theological methodology is concerned; for Neilos himself cites some passages from Thomas in order to show that using syllogisms in theological matters is far from safe. As for the former, it can easily be explained not only in terms of the fact that it was by then just optional for a polemicist to mention his target but also in terms of the fact that it would be quite improper for Neilos to mention Aquinas in his defence of Palamism; as the *Summa contra Gentiles* was translated in 1354, the *Summa theologiae* probably in 1358, and the *De potentia* and the *De articulis fidei* some time before 1359/61 (all of them cited by Neilos in his anti-Latin pieces; cf. *infra*, p. 313, n. 140, not one single anti-Palamite writing in a Thomist spirit (such as those by Demetrios Cydones, Prochoros Cydones, John Cyparissiotis, and Manuel Calecas) had been, in all probability, produced as yet. Besides, the issue of the proper place of syllogism in theology has nothing to do with the essence-energies problem, which, contrary to the former (rather ineptly and opportunistically treated by Palamas), is the speculative core of Palamas' doctrine. Incidentally, A. GOLTSOU's position (*Νείλον Καβάσιλα Κατὰ Ἰταλῶν πρόχειρον*. Post-Graduate Diss., Theological Faculty of the University of Thessaloniki, 1988, p. 17) that Neilos Cabasilas knew Latin and read Aquinas in the original is based on a tendentious interpretation of Demetrios Cydones' report of his passing of Aquinas' writings to his former mentor Neilos and Neilos' reactions (cf. *infra*, p. 325, n. 185).

64. JOSEPH BRYENNIOS, *Λόγος διδασκαλικαῖς χρήσεσι καὶ Γραφικαῖς ῥήσεσι παριστῶν ὄτι καὶ ἡ θεία ἐνεργεῖα καὶ τοῖς ἀξίοις θεωρουμένη ἔλλαμψις καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ Θαβωρίῳ παραδειχθεῖσα χάρις ἄκτιστος περὶ θείας ἐνεργείας*. As far as I know, no date has ever been proposed for this *Oration*. If one takes for granted R.J. LOENERTZ's suggestion, "Pour la chronologie des œuvres de Joseph Bryennios", in: *Revue des Études Byzantines* 7 (1949), pp. 12-32, esp. 30, that Bryennios' 2<sup>nd</sup> *Oration on the Annunciation of the Virgin Mary* and 2<sup>nd</sup> *Oration on the Crucifixion* were delivered on 24 and 25 March 1418, one would guess that an *Oration* on the nature of the Tabor light that precedes in order the above *Orations* and presents itself as a succinct exposition of the Church's doctrine elaborated for the Orthodox' sake against someone's errors ("...σύνοψιν ἀκριβῆ τῶς ὀρθοδόξοις ὑμῖν διεξέλωμεν"; ed. BOULGARIS, Vol. II [cf. *supra*, n. 13], p. 98,14) was delivered on the occasion of the Feast of Orthodoxy of the same year, celebrated shortly before the Annunciation of the Virgin Mary (25 March). The latter of the two *Orations* that precede these is on the Good Friday (9 April 1417), which means that an *Oration* on the Tabor light, since it is presumably attached to the Feast of Orthodoxy, cannot form part of the set of the orations of 1417, but of the set of the orations of 1418.

potency as well as energy, even if it is simple, and we will not say that the simple nature is composite... for the reason that potency is conceptually distinguished from substance and substance, in its turn, is conceptually distinguished from energy; for even so, a substance is one and simple. How would one dare speak about the truly simple and non-composite nature as being composed of its natural energies or of its hypostatic properties? ... This obviously holds true for the case of our soul; indeed, "if someone of us is astronomer and musician, and let it be assumed that this same person is a geometer as well..., should his soul be taken as composite because of this?...".<sup>65</sup>

Obviously, Bryennios draws the essence-energy distinction in terms of the Greek patristic 'conceptual' distinction used by David Dishypatos (cf. *supra*, p. 281), Neilos Cabasilas (cf. *supra*, p. 286), and Philotheos Kokkinos (cf. *supra*, pp. 282-285), which stands midway

65. JOSEPH BRYENNIOS, *Λόγος περὶ θείας ἐνεργείας*, ed. BOULGARIS, Vol. II (cf. *supra*, n. 13), pp. 105-106: "Εἰ γὰρ ἀδιάφορα παντάπασιν ἐπὶ Θεοῦ 'οὐσία' καὶ 'ἐνέργεια', δυοῖν θάτερον "διάκενός" ἐστὶ "ψόφος" ὀνόματος (GREGORY OF NYSSA, *Contra Eunomium* III, 5,28; 9,4, ed. W. JAEGER, *Gregorii Nysseni opera. Vol. II: Contra Eunomium liber III - Refutatio Confessionis Eunomii*, Leiden 1960, pp. 170,11-12; 265,17-18) κατ' οὐδεμιᾶς ἰδίαις ἐνοσίαις τὸ σημαίνονμενον ἔχοντος" (GREGORY PALAMAS, *Περὶ θείων ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τῆς κατ' αὐτὰς μεθέξεως* 6, ed. MANTZARIDES [cf. *supra*, n. 13], p. 101,4-7). ... Οὐδ' ἐπὶ πάντων [ex editionis πάντα correxī; cf. ed. BOULGARIS, Vol. II (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 105,7], ἐν οἷς θεωρεῖται ποικιλία τε καὶ διάκρισις, ἤδη καὶ σύνθεσις παρεισάγεται: πᾶσα γὰρ οὐσία ἔχει καὶ δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ἀπλῆ τις εἶη, καὶ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο σύνθετον ἐροῦμεν πάντως καὶ τὴν ἀπλῆν..., ὅτι τῷ λόγῳ διακρίεται τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ἢ δύναιμις, τῆς δὲ δυνάμεως ἢ ἐνεργείαι: μία γὰρ καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἀπλῆ οὐσία. Πῶς ἂν τις ἐπὶ τῆς ἀπλῆς τῶντι καὶ ἀσυνθέτου φύσεως τολμήσῃ λέγειν ὅτι σύνθεσις ἐκ τῶν φυσικῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἢ ὑποστατικῶν ἰδιότητων εἰσάγεται; ... Καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο πρόδηλον: "εἰ γὰρ τις ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἀστρονόμος καὶ μουσικός, ὁ δ' αὐτὸς οὗτος καὶ γεωμέτρης..., σύνθετος διὰ τοῦτο ἢ ψυχῇ λογισθήσεται;..." (verbatim citation from GREGORY OF NYSSA'S *Contra Eunomium* II,501-503, ed. JAEGER [cf. *supra*, n. 10], p. 372,16-373,8). This line of argument derives from Gregory Palamas; see DEMETRACOPOULOS, *Αὐγουστίνος* (cf. *supra*, n. 28), pp. 60-62; cf. GREGORY PALAMAS, *Against Acindynos* II,19,96, edd. CONTOYIANNES-PHANOURGAKES (cf. *supra*, n. 24), p. 153,6-29; *Θεοφάνης ἢ περὶ θεότητος καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν ἀμετέκτου καὶ μετεκτοῦ* 26, ed. MANTZARIDES (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 253,9-12. Bryennios cites the full passage from Gregory of Nyssa in his *Λόγος Α' περὶ τῆς ὑπερθέου Τριᾶδος*, ed. E. BOULGARIS, *Ἰωσήφ Βρυεννίου τὰ ἐρρηθέντα*, Vol. I, Leipzig 1768; repr., with an Introduction by EIR. DELEDEMOS, Thessaloniki 1990, p. 38,21-34, written in 1420/21; N.B. TOMADAKES, "Ἰωσήφ Βρυέννιος", in: IDEM, *Σύλλαβος βυζαντινῶν μελετῶν καὶ κειμένων*, Athens 1961, pp. 491-611, esp. 585, in the context of his explication of the multiplicity of God (*op. cit.*, pp. 33,20-40,24), where the passages just cited are parts of some longer ones fully reproduced in both *Orations* (Vol. I, pp. 37,36-38,13 = Vol. II, pp. 104,33-105,12; Vol. I, pp. 38,20-34 = Vol. II, pp. 105,36-106,4; Vol. I, pp. 39,9-23 = Vol. II, pp. 105,10-24; the longer version is that in the *Λόγος Α' περὶ τῆς ὑπερθέου Τριᾶδος*).

between Palamas' *distinctio realis* and the purely mental distinction applied to the essence-energy problem by several anti-Palamites.

Interestingly enough, Bryennios elsewhere, in his *Διάλεξις Α' περὶ τῆς ἐκπορεύσεως τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος*, which was written in 1399/1401,<sup>66</sup> attacked Thomas Aquinas for identifying what he said in the above passage one should clearly and fearlessly distinguish, namely, God's essence, His potency or power and His energy or operation:<sup>67</sup>

To my view, Thomas [Aquinas] falls short of the right in many an issue...; for instance, he declares that in God 'essence', 'potency' and 'act' are the same...

Further, q. 26 of his [*Summa theologiae*] reads: "in God there is not a potency or act other than His essence".

Bryennios does not reject Aquinas' theology *en bloc*; besides, his attack was launched in the context of his argument against appealing to Aquinas as an authority on the *Filioque* by remarking that Aquinas is not infallible. Still, the fact that he establishes Aquinas' fallibility by enumerating seven serious erroneous theological teachings of his,<sup>68</sup>

66. LOENERTZ, "Pour la chronologie des œuvres" (cf. *supra*, n. 64), p. 30.

67. JOSEPH BRYENNIOS, *Διάλεξις Α' περὶ τῆς ἐκπορεύσεως τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος*, ed. BOULGARIS, Vol. I (cf. *supra*, n. 65), p. 355,9-26: "Ἐγὼ τὸν Θεοῦ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις μὲν πολλοῖς ὁρῶ τοῦ δέοντος διαπίπτοντα... καὶ ταῦτόν εἶναι ἐπὶ Θεοῦ οὐσίαν, δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν... ἀποφάνεται (THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles* II,8-9)... 'Ἐν δὲ τῷ κατ' τῶν αὐτοῦ: "ἐν τῷ Θεῷ οὐκ ἔστι τις δύναμις ἢ ἐνέργεια παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ" (THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I,77,2 co.: "Ἐν δὲ τῷ Θεῷ οὐκ ἔστι τις δύναμις ἢ ἐνέργεια παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ"; *Vat. gr.* 609, f. 101!)"

68. JOSEPH BRYENNIOS, *Διάλεξις Α' περὶ τῆς ἐκπορεύσεως τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος*: "Ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ δωδεκάτῳ ζητήματι τοῦ πρώτου τῶν αὐτοῦ Θεολογικῶν (sc. *Summa theologiae*, I) οὕτω δίδεισι: "τὸ τιθέναι μόνον διὰ τινος ἐλλάμψεως τῆς αὐτοῦ λαμπρότητος τὸν Θεὸν ὁρᾶσθαι, ἄντικρυς ἐστὶ μὴ τιθέναι τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐσίαν ὁρᾶσθαι: ἡμεῖς δὲ τὴν θείαν οὐσίαν τοῖς ἀξίοις ὁρᾶσθαι πιστεύομεν" (paraphrasis of 12,5 arg. 2, co. and ad 2; *Vat. gr.* 609, f. 26"). Καὶ πάλιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ: "ἀνάγκη ἐν τῷ θείῳ ἢ τιθέναι ἰδέας πάντων τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ γνωσκομένων" (15,3 s.c. and co.; f. 36"). 'Ἐν δὲ τῷ ἕκτῳ καὶ εἰκοστῷ τῶν αὐτοῦ: "ἐν τῷ Θεῷ οὐκ ἔστι τις δύναμις ἢ ἐνέργεια παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ" (77,2 co.; f. 101!). Καὶ ἐν τῷ τριακοστῷ τῶν αὐτοῦ: "ἐν τοῖς θείοις ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἢ τε οὐσία καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον" (39,1 co.; f. 60"). Καὶ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ αὐτοῦ καὶ τριακοστῷ: "πέντε γνωρίσματα ἐν τοῖς θείοις: ἀγεννησία, πατρότης, υἰότης, κοινὴ πρόβεςις καὶ ἐκπόρευσις. Τοῦτων δὲ τέσσαρες μόνον εἰσὶν ἀναφοραὶ (ἢ γὰρ ἀγεννησία οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναφορά) καὶ τέσσαρες μόνον ἰδιότητες (ἢ γὰρ κοινὴ πρόβεςις οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδιότης, δυσὶν ἐφαρμόζουσα προσώποις), τρία δὲ εἰσι γνωρίσματα προσωπικά, τοῦτέστι καθ' ἃ συνίσταται τὰ πρόσωπα, πατρότης δηλαδή, υἰότης καὶ ἐκπόρευσις (ἢ γὰρ κοινὴ πρόβεςις καὶ ἢ ἀγεννησία γνωρίσματα λέγονται τῶν προσώπων, οὐ μέντοι προσωπικά)" (32,3 co.; f. 55"). Καὶ ἐν τῷ ἕκτῳ καὶ τριακοστῷ: "εὐρίσκεται τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀμέσως ἐκπορευόμενον, καθ' ὅσον ἔστιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ, καὶ

which “no Orthodox should pay any attention to”,<sup>69</sup> shows that he was not prepared to draw on any material from Thomas to articulate and formulate his own Palamism; indeed, he goes so far as to say that Thomas “is guilty of blasphemy”.<sup>70</sup>

On the other hand, if my tentative dating of Bryennios’ *Oration on the Divine Energy* (cf. *supra*, n. 64) is true, then this *Oration* as well as the *First Oration on the Holy Trinity*, where a conceptual distinction (“λόγῳ”) between essence and energy is accepted, were probably composed almost two decades after Bryennios’ severe critique of Aquinas. Thus, just in case, one should consider the possibility that Bryennios changed his mind on Aquinas’ doctrine of God’s simplicity, especially in view of the fact that Aquinas, in the chapters of the *Summa contra Gentiles* negatively referred to in the earlier of Bryennios’ writings, accepts that a conceptual distinction (“διαφόροις νοήσεσιν”; “τὸν κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν τρόπον”; “τῷ λόγῳ”) between essence, potency, and act can

ἐμμέσως, καθ’ ὅσον ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ Ὑιοῦ” (36,3 ad 1; f. 60<sup>r</sup>). Καὶ πάλιν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ: “τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον μὴ ἐκπορεύεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ Ὑιοῦ πρῶτον ὑπὸ τῶν Νεστοριανῶν εἰσενήγεται· ταύτη δὲ τῇ αἰρέσει ἠκολούθησεν ὁ Νεστοριανὸς Θεοδώρητος καὶ πλείονες ἄλλοι μετ’ αὐτοῦ, ἐν οἷς ἦν καὶ ὁ Δαμασκηνός” (36,2 ad 3; f. 58<sup>r</sup>); ed. BOULGARIS, *op. cit.*, pp. 355,19-356,4; as one can see, Bryennios’ references are not always exact, not to mention his distortion of Thomas’ thought by the method of extraction. See also JOSEPH BRYENNIOS’ *Λόγος ΙΖ’ περὶ τῆς Ἁγίας Τριάδος* (*op. cit.*, p. 283,8-10).

69. JOSEPH BRYENNIOS, *Διάλεξις Α’ περὶ τῆς ἐκπορεύσεως τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος*, ed. BOULGARIS, *op. cit.*, p. 356,5-6.

70. JOSEPH BRYENNIOS, *Διάλεξις Α’ περὶ τῆς ἐκπορεύσεως τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος*, ed. BOULGARIS, *op. cit.*, p. 355,12: “βλασφημίας ἀλίσκεται”. Bryennios refers to Aquinas in a positive spirit only twice, in *Λόγος ΙΒ’ περὶ τῆς Ἁγίας Τριάδος* and *Λόγος ΙΖ’ περὶ τῆς Ἁγίας Τριάδος*, ed. BOULGARIS, *op. cit.*, pp. 207,31-34; 280,14-20. To these explicit references one can add two implicit cases in *Λόγος Β’ περὶ τῆς Ἁγίας Τριάδος*, ed. BOULGARIS, *op. cit.*, pp. 58,27-59,3, and *Λόγος Ε’ περὶ τῆς Ἁγίας Τριάδος*, ed. BOULGARIS, *op. cit.*, p. 101,26-30, which reflect Aquinas’ conception of the proper relation of theology to philosophy as expounded in the *Summa contra Gentiles* I,1,2 and *Summa theologiae*, I,1,5 ad 2; see a non-critical edition of these passages from Demetrios Cydonēs’ translation in: J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, *Plethon and Thomas Aquinas* (in *Modern Greek: Πλήθων καὶ Θωμάς Ἀζωνιάτης: ἀπὸ τῆν ἱστορία τοῦ βυζαντινοῦ θωμισμοῦ*) (Greek Byzantium and the Latin West: Philosophy - Studies, vol. 2), Athens 2004, pp. 175; 197. Still, Bryennios might well have been inspired by NEILOS CABASILAS’ *De processione Spiritus sancti* III,2,40-41, ed. E. CANDAL, *Nilus Cabasilas et theologia S. Thomae de processione Spiritus sancti* (Studi e Testi, vol. 116), Vatican City 1945, pp. 216,14-19; 218,11-17, which reflects the Thomist position on the issue; see J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, “*Paradoxi Nili Cabasilae Continuatio: Joseph Bryennios’ Borrowings from Neilos Cabasilas’ De processione Spiritus Sancti, Barlaam the Calabrian’s Contra Latinos, and Thomas Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles and Summa Theologiae*”; forthcoming in the *Archiv für mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur*.

be drawn—which *prima facie* seems to be close to Bryennios' statement that these things are distinguished "λόγω". Does this appearance correspond to reality? There is no reason for replying in the affirmative. Bryennios was aware that there are many ontological degrees of what is called a 'conceptual' distinction and he was able to see that the Greek patristic distinction between various real aspects of a being is stronger than what Aquinas describes as the mental act of ascribing 'act' to God only *ex parte creaturae*.

So, to conclude, Bryennios' appeal to Gregory of Nyssa to show that the *distinctio rationis* does not entail composition and his traditional, non-sophisticated appeal to the plurality introduced in God by the Trinity, along with his explicit rejection of Aquinas' identification of *essentia*, *potentia*, and *actus* in God, suggest that he was (in contrast, e.g., to Callistos Angelicoudes) clear-minded enough to see that Aquinas' conceptual distinction of these divine names is not identical with the Greek patristic one. Given that he lived after a rather long chain of Thomistic Palamites, Bryennios marks a unique and consistent and, to that extent, remarkable return to the pre-Thomistic vindication of Palamas' distinction, which was based exclusively on Greek patristic grounds. Although he knew Aquinas' *Summae* and the Thomistic Palamism of the second half of the fourteenth century, he rejected both of them.

Regardless of the different nuances in the thought of the above Palamite theologians, they obviously have some points in common. They all hold that God's unity is more "real" (πράγματι) than the distinction between God's 'essence' and 'substance' which is drawn "κατ' ἐπινοίαν" or "ἐπινοίᾳ". 'Essence' and 'energy' are not two separate entities, in the way two 'primary substances' or two different 'secondary substances' are; to that extent, a *distinctio realis major* in God is not acceptable for them (as it was not for Palamas either). On the other hand, they do accept that 'essence' and 'energy' are two truly different things in God (as a pencil and its colour or its trace on a paper); to that extent, they do accept a *distinctio realis minor*, which, although it does not threaten God's unity, can hardly be reconciled with God's simplicity. To them, only "real separation" (χωρίζειν) would harm God's unity; instead, "separating in the mind" or "distinguishing" (διακρίνειν) is a theologically acceptable notion. This

interpretation of Palamas' distinction was based solely on Greek patristic theology. Still, it seems that the above official promulgators of Palamism went further than Palamas himself would have been prepared to go, because they constantly used *ἐπίνοια* as a means of clarifying the nature and the degree of the difference between God's 'essence' and 'energies', a term which Palamas himself systematically avoided, not because it was prone to misunderstanding (for example, he felt free to use the terms of "lower" and "higher deity"), but, most probably, because he deemed it as undermining the real character of his metaphysical distinction.

#### 4. THOMISTIC PALAMISM

##### 4.1. *John VI Cantacouzenos*: analogia entis

The official victory of Palamite theology in the Byzantine Church was gained not only thanks to the efforts of Patriarch Philotheos Kokkinos but also thanks to an emperor (1347-54) who was a friend of Palamas and who also had a strong affection for the monastic life, namely, John VI Cantacouzenos (ca. 1292-1383). Cantacouzenos was also a man with some literary taste and an author himself. He produced his own elaboration of the Palamite distinction between God's 'essence' and 'energies' after being challenged by Paul, Latin Patriarch of Constantinople (1366-70),<sup>71</sup> who, after the condemnation of Prochoros Cydones by the *Synodal Tome of 1368*,<sup>72</sup> was troubled by the way the Orthodox Church officially stated that there is a "real distinction" between God's 'essence' and 'energies'. Paul asked Cantacouzenos to clear up the issue:

Granted that everything that differs in reality from something else differs from it conceptually as well, but not vice versa, please make it clear to us whether essence and energy differ from each other both in reality

71. Cf. V. GRUMEL, *Bibliothèque Byzantine. La Chronologie* (Traité d'études byzantines, vol. 1), Paris 1958, p. 440.

72. See the recent edition of the *Tome* by A. RIGO, "Il monte Athos e la controversia palamitica dal concilio del 1351 al *Tomo sinodale* del 1368: Giacomo Trikanas, Procoro Cidone e Filoteo Kokkinos", in: IDEM (ed.), *Gregorio Palamas e oltre. Studi e documenti sulle controversie teologiche del XIV secolo bizantino* (Orientalia Venetiana, vol. XVI), Florence 2004, pp. 1-177.

and conceptually or only conceptually, namely, only according to the mode of our mind.<sup>73</sup>

Cantacouzenos' reply reads:

We believe that God's essence has energy, which emanates indivisibly from it and does not lie at a local distance from it, but just differs from it conceptually, in the manner that heat differs from fire and shine from light, to use the examples put forward by the theologians, e.g., by Cyril (of Alexandria) and Basil (of Caesarea), who have verbatim as just mentioned.<sup>74</sup>

In so replying, Cantacouzenos placed himself in what I called in the previous paragraph "the Patristic line" of vindicating Palamas' theology.

This was not, however, his only word on the issue. Cantacouzenos was a friend not only of Palamas but also of Demetrios Cydones, who was also a close collaborator of Cantacouzenos in administration. Enthused by the theological (especially the apologetic) vigor of the *Summa contra Gentiles* of Thomas Aquinas, Cantacouzenos proved to be the main instigator and the first propagator of Demetrios Cydones' translation of this writing, evaluated by the translator himself to be the best of Aquinas' writings.<sup>75</sup> It is then no surprise that, as we will see presently, Cantacouzenos, in a subsequent letter to Paul, interpreted Palamas' doctrine in the spirit of Thomas' *analogia entis* and turned it into something substantially different from what Palamas had stated on the issue:

Τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐσίαν καὶ ἐνέργειαν... οὕτε πάντῃ ταυτὸν [1] νομίζω οὕτε πάντῃ οὐ ταυτὸν, οὐ μὴν τῶ αὐτῶ λόγῳ [2] (οὐ [2a] γὰρ δύναται τι εἶναι

73. PAUL, LATIN PATRIARCH OF CONSTANTINOPLE, *First Epistle to the Emperor John VI Cantacouzenos*, ll. 19-23: "Ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ πράγματι διαφέρειν καὶ ἐπινοίᾳ διαφέρει, οὐ μὴν τὸ ἀνάπαλιν, ἀρεσάτω διακαθᾶραι, εἴπερ ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια διαφέρουσιν ἢ πράγματι καὶ ἐπινοίᾳ ἢ ἐπινοίᾳ μόνῃ, ἤγουν κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἡμετέρας νοήσεως τρόπον μόνον"; edd. E. VOORDECKERS and F. TINNEFELD, *Ioannis Cantacuzeni Refutationes duae Prochori Cydonii et Disputatio cum Paulo patriarcha Latino epistulis septem tradita* (CCSG 16), Turnhout 1987, p. 190.

74. JOHANNES VI CANTACOUZENOS, *First Epistle to Paul*, 1,13-18: "Πιστεύομεν ἐπὶ Θεοῦ οὐσίαν, ἐνέργειαν ἔχουσαν ἀδιαιρέτως ἐξ αὐτῆς προοῦσαν, οὐ δισταμένην, ἀλλ' ὡς διαφέρουσιν ἐπινοίᾳ, ὡσπερ τοῦ πυρὸς ἡ θερμὴ καὶ τοῦ φωτὸς ἡ λαμπρότης, κατὰ τὰ περὶ τούτων παραδείγματα τῶν θεολόγων, τοῦ τε Κυρίλλου καὶ Βασιλείου, οὕτως ἐπὶ λέξεως ἔχοντα"; edd. VOORDECKERS-TINNEFELD (cf. *supra*, n. 73), p. 188.

75. DEMETRIOS CYDONES, *Apologia I*, ed. MERCATI (cf. *supra*, n. 21), p. 362,5-6.

κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον [2b] καὶ ταυτὸν καὶ οὐ ταυτὸν), ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ἔνωσιν καὶ τὸ ἀχώριστον καὶ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον [3a] τῷ πράγματι [3b], τὴν διάκρισιν δὲ μόνῃ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ [4]. Ἐπινοία [4] δὲ οὐ “ψευδεῖ” [5] τινι “ἀναπλασμῷ” [6] συνισταμένῳ κατὰ μόνον τὸν νοῦν [7], ἀλλ’ ἀληθεῖα [8].... “Ὁ γὰρ “ὁ ἡμέτερος” [7a] νοεῖ [9] “νοῦς” [7b]..., καὶ ἀληθές [8] ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ [10]. Οὐ μὴν νοεῖται [9] παρ’ ἡμῶν, ὡς ἐστὶν [11] ἐν τῷ Θεῷ [10] (τοῦτο γὰρ “ἀδύνατον” [12a] “πάσῃ γεννητῇ φύσει” [12b]), ἀλλ’ ὅσον [13a] ἡμῶν ἐφικτόν [13b]: ὁ δ’ ὅπερ ἀμηγέπη [14] παρ’ ἡμῶν νοεῖται [9], ἀληθῶς [8] ἐστὶ καὶ προαιωνίως ἐν τῷ Θεῷ [10]. ...

...“Ὅσα παρ’ ἡμῶν [7a], ἐπὶ Θεοῦ [10] νοοῦνται [9], οὐκ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ [7] μόνον ἔχουσι τὸ εἶναι (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ᾔσαν “ἀναπλάσματα [6] ψευδῆ” [5]), ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ [10] τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσι προαιωνίως...<sup>76</sup>

The first lines of this passage show that this is an explanatory comment on Gregory Palamas’ *Περὶ θεῶν ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τῆς κατ’ αὐτὰς μεθέξεως* 4-8, where it is stated, in the context of his reluctant acceptance (in fact, an implicit rejection) of Ps.-Basil of Caesarea’s remark that “in the case of the simple and incorporeal nature [i.e., God], ‘energy’ admits of the same definition as ‘essence’”,<sup>77</sup> that the essence and the energy of God are both “the same” and “not the same”.<sup>78</sup> To offer his explanation, Cantacouzenos reproduces the central idea as well as some characteristic phrases of the subsequent two passages from Gregory Nazianzen’s *Oratio XXVIII*:

“Θεὸν νοῆσαι μὲν χαλεπὸν, φράσαι δὲ ἀδύνατον”, ὡς τις τῶν παρ’ Ἑλλήσι θεολόγων ἐφιλοσόφησεν.<sup>79</sup>... Τὸ δὲ τοσοῦτον {11} πρᾶγμα (sc. God) [3b]

76. JOHN VI CANTACOUZENOS, *Third Epistle to Paul*, 5,19-27; 7,29-32, edd. VOORDECKERS-TINNEFELD (cf. *supra*, n. 73), pp. 196; 200 (“In my opinion, the essence and energy of God are neither fully identical nor non-identical with each other, yet not from the same aspect (for nothing can be both identical and non-identical in the same respect), but unity and inseparability stand in reality, whereas distinction stands in conception. Still, by conception I do not mean a fictitious image existing merely in the mind, but a conception of a real thing. ... What our mind conceives of also truly exists in God. Yet, it is not conceived by us as it is in God (for this is impossible for every created nature), but to the extent that we are capable of reaching it; but, in any case, whatever is conceived by us, is truly and eternally in God. ... All things conceived by us in respect with God do not have existence merely in the mind (for in such case they would have been fictitious images), but have existence in God eternally...”). Numbers within brackets [1, 2, 3...] refer to identical wording; numbers within hooks {1, 2, 3...} refer to identical meaning.

77. “Ἐπὶ ἀπλῆς καὶ ἀσωμάτου φύσεως τὸν αὐτὸν τῆς ‘οὐσίας’ λόγον ἐπιδέχεται ἡ ‘ἐνεργεια’” (PS.-BASIL OF CAESAREA, *Adversus Eunomium* V, PG 29: 716C) (not BASIL OF CAESAREA’S *Epistle* 189, 8, as indicated by the editor of Palamas’ text).

78. Ed. MANTZARIDES (cf. *supra*, n. 13), pp. 99,4-103,4 (esp. 100,20-21).

79. As J. PÉPIN, “Grégoire de Nazianze lecteur de la littérature hermétique”, in: *Vigiliae Christianae* 36 (1982), pp. 251-260, has found, this is a quotation from PS.-HERMES



τῆ διανοία περιλαβεῖν [15] πάντως ἀδύνατον [12a] καὶ ἀμήχανον {12a}... ὁμοίως πάση γεννητῇ φύσει<sup>80</sup> [12b]<sup>81</sup>...

Οὕτω κάμνει ἐκβῆναι τὰ σωματικὰ ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς [7a/b] καὶ γυμνοῖς ὁμιλῆσαι τοῖς ἀσωμάτοις, ἕως σκοπεῖ μετὰ τῆς ἰδίας ἀσθενείας {12a} τὰ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν [12a]. Ἐπει εἴφεται μὲν πᾶσα λογικῆ φύσις Θεοῦ καὶ τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας, καταλαβεῖν [15] δ' ἀδυνατεῖ [12a] δι' ἃς εἶπον αἰτίας. Κάμνουσα δὲ τῷ πῶθω καὶ οἶον σφαδάζουσα καὶ τὴν ζημίαν οὐ φέρουσα “δεύτερον” ποιεῖται “πλοῦν”<sup>82</sup>..., πρὸς... διὰ τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὁρωμένων {16} (Rom. 1,20; Sap. 13,1) καὶ τῆς εὐταξίας Θεὸν γνωρίζουσι [17] καὶ ὁδηγῶ τῆ ὄψει τῶν ὑπὲρ τὴν ὄψιν χρήσασθαι...,<sup>83</sup> ἀλλὰ μὴ ζημιωθῆναι Θεὸν διὰ τῆς μεγαλοπρεπείας τῶν ὁρωμένων {16}.<sup>84</sup> ...

TRISMEGISTUS' *Ad Tat, Corpus Hermeticum*, fr. 1 (JOHN STOBÆUS, *Eclogae* II,1,26), ll. 1-2; ed. A.D. NOCK, *Corpus Hermeticum. Texte établi par A.D. NOCK et traduit par A.-J. FESTUGIÈRE. Tome III. Fragments: extraits de Stobée, 1-22*, Paris 1954 (repr. 1972), p. 1, which goes back to PLATO's *Timaeus* 28c. Cf. ORIGEN, *Contra Celsum* VII,42, ed. M. BORRET, *Origène. Contre Celse. Tome IV: livres VII-VIII. Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes* (Sources chrétiennes, vol. 150), Paris 1969, pp. 110-112; CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, *Stromata* V,12,78,1, edd. O. STÄHLIN, L. FRÜCHTEL, U. TREU, *Clement Alexandrinus. Zweiter Band. Stromata Buch I-VI*, Berlin 1985, p. 377,25-26. “The whole” Hermetic “passage” “is based on the Platonic contrast between τὸ νοητὸν and τὸ αἰσθητὸν, which is dealt with in the preceding sentences of *Timaeus* (27D-28B)”; W. SCOTT, *Hermetica. The Ancient Greek and Latin Writings Which Contain Religious or Philosophic Teachings Ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus. Edited With English Translation and Notes. Vol. III*, Boston 1985, p. 302. This holds true for Nazianzen's and Cantacouzenos' passages as well as for Aquinas' account of the limits of man's knowledge of God *in statu viae*.

80. For this phrase cf. ORIGEN, *Fragmenta ex Commentariis in "Epistulam ad Ephesios" in catenis* 15, 19; ed. J.A.F. GREGG, “Documents: The Commentary of Origen upon the *Epistle to the Ephesians*”, in: *Journal of Theological Studies* 3 (1902), pp. 233-244, 398-420, 554-576, esp. p. 411.

81. GREGORY NAZIANZEN, *Oratio XXVIII*, 4,1-3; 8-12, edd. GALLAY-JOURJON (cf. *supra*, n. 30), pp. 106-108.

82. PLATO, *Phaedo* 99c.

83. Gregory combines various phrases from some or all of the following passages: CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, *Stromata* V,1,6,2, edd. STÄHLIN et al. (cf. *supra*, n. 79), p. 329,16-17; PLOTINUS, *Enneads* III,2,13,18-19; EUSEBIUS OF CAESAREA, *Demonstratio Evangelica* IV,8,2, ed. I.A. HEIKEL, *Eusebius Werke. Sechster Band. Die Demonstratio Evangelica* (Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller, vol. 23), Leipzig 1913, p. 161, 23-26; ATHANASIUS OF ALEXANDRIA, *Expositiones in Psalmos*, ad 18,4 (pg 27: 557A); BASIL OF CAESAREA, *Homiliae in Hexaemeron* I,11, edd. E.A. DE MENDIETA and S.Y. RUDBERG, *Basiliius von Caesarea. Homilien zum Hexaemeron* (Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte. Neue Folge, vol. 2), Berlin 1997, p. 20,4-5.

84. GREGORY NAZIANZEN, *Oratio XXVIII*, 13,23-34, edd. GALLAY-JOURJON (cf. *supra*, n. 30), p. 128: “It is difficult to conceive God, but to define Him in words is an impossibility”, as one of the Greek Doctors of Divinity taught... But to comprehend the whole of so great a Subject as this is quite impossible and impracticable... for every created nature... Thus our mind faints to transcend corporeal things, to consort with the Incorporeal, stripped of all clothing of corporeal ideas, as long as it has to look with its inherent weakness at things above its strength. For every rational nature longs for God and for

Cantacouzenos also borrowed from Basil of Caesarea's *Adversus Eunomium* I,6,11-12 the phrase "...ψευδῶν παντελῶς καὶ διακένων ἀναπλασμῶν...".<sup>85</sup>

And yet, Cantacouzenos combined these Greek Patristic authorities with the central idea as well as with some identical or similar expressions from Demetrios Cydones' translation of Aquinas' *Summa contra Gentiles* and of the *Prima Pars* of the *Summa theologiae*, where the question that Patriarch Paul addressed to Cantacouzenos was explicitly posed and answered. Let us see what Cantacouzenos could have read in these Thomistic texts:

...Εἰ καὶ τὰ περὶ Θεοῦ [10] λεγόμενα ὀνόματα τὸ αὐτὸ [1] σημαίνουσι πράγμα [3b], ὅμως οὐκ ἔστι πολυώνυμα, ἐπειδὴ οὐ [2a] σημαίνουσι τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον [2b]. "Ὡσπερ γὰρ τὰ διάφορα πράγματα ἐνὶ ἀπλῶ {3a} πράγματι [3b], τῷ Θεῷ δηλαδὴ, ὁμοιοῦνται κατὰ διάφορα εἶδη, οὕτως ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς [7a/b] κατὰ διαφόρους νοήσεις {4} ἀμυγέπη [14] τοῦτω ἕξομοιοῦται, καθόσον [13a] διαφόροις τελειότησι τῶν κτισμάτων [16] πρὸς τὸ γινώσκειν [15] αὐτὸν ἐφικνεῖται [13b]. Κάντεῦθεν ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς [7a/b] περὶ ἐνὸς πλείω περιλαμβάνων [15] οὐκ ἔστι ψευδῆς [5] οὔτε μάταιος, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἔκεῖνο καὶ θεῖον εἶναι {3} τοιοῦτον ἐστίν, ὥστ' αὐτῷ τινα ἕξομοιοῦσθαι δύνασθαι κατὰ παντοδαπὰ εἶδη... Κατὰ διαφόρους τοίνυν νοήσεις {4} ὁ νοῦς [7] διάφορα εὕρισκεῖ ὀνόματα, ἅτινα τῷ Θεῷ ἀποδίδωσι. Καὶ οὕτως, ἐπειδὴ οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον [2a/b] ἀποδίδωσι ταῦτα, συμβαίνει αὐτὰ μὴ εἶναι πολυώνυμα, εἰ καὶ πράγμα [2b] σημαίνει πάντη ἕν: οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ αὐτὴ "τοῦ ὀνόματος" σημασία, ὅταν τὸ "ὄνομα" "πρότερον" τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον ὑπὸ "τοῦ νοῦ" σημαίνῃ ἢ τὸ νοούμενον "πράγμα".<sup>86,87</sup>

the First Cause, but is unable to grasp Him, for the reasons I have mentioned. Faint therefore with the desire, and as it were restive and impatient of the disability, it tries "a second course"... through the beauty and order of visible things to attain that which is above sight; but not to suffer the loss of God through the magnificence of visible things" (translation by C.G. BROWN and J.E. SWALLOW, in: PH. SCHAFF and H. WACE (ausp.), *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church. Second Series. Translated into English with Prolegomena and Explanatory Notes. Vol. 7: S. Cyril of Jerusalem (by H. WACE) / S. Gregory Nazianzen*, New York 1894, pp. 561; 567-568, with some slight changes; the translation contained in *Faith Gives Fullness to Reasoning. The Five Theological Orations of Gregory Nazianzen. Introduction and Commentary by F.W. NORRIS. Translation by L. WICKHAM & F. WILLIAMS* (Supplements to the *Vigiliae Christianae*, vol. XIII), Leiden-New York-Copenhagen 1991, pp. 226; 231-232, is full of mistakes).

85. EDD. SESBOÛÉ et al. (cf. *supra*, n. 5), p. 184. In the same epistle, CANTACOUZENOS (*Third Epistle to Paul*, 6,9-96; edd. VOORDECKERS-TINNEFELD [cf. *supra*, n. 73], pp. 197-199) quotes almost fully chapters 6-8 of Book I of BASIL OF CAESAREA'S *Adversus Eunomium*.

86. ARISTOTLE, *De interpretatione* I, 16a3-7 (thought stands mediate between names and things).

87. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles* I,35 (Quod plura nomina dicta de Deo non sunt synonyma / "Οτι τὰ πολλὰ ὀνόματα τὰ περὶ Θεοῦ λεγόμενα οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνουσι

...Ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς [7a/b] περὶ τοῦ ἀπλουστάτου Θεοῦ οὐ μάτην ἀποφάνσεις εἰδοποιεῖ τῷ συντιθέναι καὶ διαρεῖν, εἰ καὶ ὁ Θεὸς πάντῃ ἐστὶν ἀπλοῦς. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ διαφόροις νοήσεσιν {4} εἰς τὴν θείαν ἀνάγεται γινώσιν [17] ὁ νοῦς ἡμῶν [7a/b], τὸ ἐκ πάντων μέντοι νοούμενον πάντῃ [1a] ἐστὶν ἓν {1b}. Ὁ γὰρ νοῦς οὐ καὶ τὸν τρόπον, ὃν νοεῖ, τοῖς νοουμένοις ἀποδίδωσι πράγμασιν... Οὕτω καὶ ὅταν λέγῃ ὅτι 'ὁ Θεὸς ἐστὶν ἀγαθός' ἢ 'ἀγαθότης', ἢ ἐν τῇ συνθέσει ταύτῃ ποικιλία πρὸς τὸν νοῦν [7b] ἀναφέρεται, ἢ δὲ ἐνότης πρὸς τὸ νοούμενον πρᾶγμα [3]. Ὁμοίως καὶ ὅταν λέγῃ ὅτι 'ἀγαθότης ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ'· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἢ μὲν διπλόη τῶν τοιούτων ἁγῶν ἀρμόζει τῷ νῷ [7b], ἢ δὲ ἐνότης πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα [3b] ἀναφέρεται.<sup>88</sup>

...Οὕτω γὰρ σημαίνει τὰ ὀνόματα τὸν Θεόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς [7a/b] τοῦτον γινώσκει [15]. Ὁ δὲ ἡμέτερος νοῦς [7a/b], τὸν Θεόν γινώσκων [17] ἐκ τῶν κτισμάτων {16}, οὕτως αὐτὸν γινώσκει [17], ὥσπερ αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ κτίσματα {16} παριστᾷ<sup>89</sup>. ...

...Τὸν Θεόν... ἐκ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὰ κτιστὰ ὄντα<sup>90</sup> {16} προϋουσῶν τελειότητων γινώσκομεν [17]· αἱ δὲ τελειότητες καθ' ὑπερέχοντα τινὰ τρόπον ἐνεῖσι [10a] τῷ Θεῷ [10b] ἢ ἐν τοῖς κτίσμασιν [16]. Ὁ δ' ἡμέτερος

πρᾶγμα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον); *Vat. gr. 610*, ff. 41<sup>r</sup>-42<sup>r</sup> ("Though the names predicated of God signify the same thing, still they are not synonymous, because they do not signify the same point of view. For just as diverse realities are by diverse forms assimilated to the one simple reality, which is God, so our mind by diverse concepts is in some sort assimilated to Him, inasmuch as, by several different points of view, taken from the perfections of creatures, it is brought to the knowledge of Him. And therefore our mind is not at fault in forming many concepts of one thing; because that simple divine being is such that things can be assimilated to it in many diverse forms. According to these diverse conceptions the mind invents diverse names, and assigns them to God..."; translation from J. RICKABY, *An Annotated Translation (With Some Abridgment) of the "Summa contra Gentiles" of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, London 1905; <http://www2.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/gc/htm>, modified in accordance with the Byzantine translation).

88. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles* I,36 (Qualiter intellectus noster de Deo propositionem format / "Ὅτι αἱ προτάσεις, ἅς περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ ἡμέτερος εἰδοποιεῖ νοῦς, οὐκ εἰσι μάταιοι); *Vat. gr. 610*, ff. 41<sup>v</sup>-42<sup>r</sup> ("...For all the absolute simplicity of God, our mind does not form propositions, concerning God in vain, putting together and putting asunder. For though our mind arrives by way of diverse concepts to the knowledge of God..., still what it understands from all those concepts is absolutely one; for our mind does not attribute the manner of its understanding to the objects understood... On the same principle, sometimes our mind forms a statement about God with some mark of diversity by inserting a preposition, as when it is said, 'goodness is in God'; herein is marked a diversity, proper to the mind, and a unity, which should be attributed to the thing" (*ibid.*; translation modified).

89. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae* I,13,2 Resp.; *Vat. gr. 609*, f. 29<sup>r</sup> ("Names signify God according to the way in which our mind knows Him. But when our mind knows God from creatures, it knows Him according to the way in which creatures represent Him"; translation by A.J. FREDDOSO, *New English Translation of St. Thomas Aquinas's "Summa Theologiae" ("Summa Theologica")*, Notre Dame 2009; <http://www.nd.edu/~afreddoso/summa-translation/TOC.htm>, adapted to the Byzantine translation).

90. Haec verba litteris confusis in codice scripta sunt.

νοῦς [7a/b] τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ταύτας καταλαμβάνει [15], ὅν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς κτίσμασι [16]· καὶ ὥσπερ ταύτας καταλαμβάνει, οὕτω καὶ διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων σημαίνει. Δύο τοίνυν ἔστι θεωρῆσαι ἐν τοῖς ἀποδιδομένοις ὀνόμασι τῷ Θεῷ, αὐτάς τὰς σημαινομένας τελειότητας, οἷον τὴν ἀγαθότητα, τὴν ζωὴν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια, καὶ τὸν τῆς σημασίας τρόπον. Ὅσον μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ δηλούμενον ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἰδίως τῷ Θεῷ ταῦτα ἀρμόζουσι καὶ ἰδιαίτερον ἢ τοῖς κτίσμασι, καὶ πρότερον περὶ Θεοῦ λέγονται. Ὅσον δὲ πρὸς τὸν τῆς σημασίας τρόπον, οὐ λέγονται ἰδίως τοῦτον γὰρ ἔχουσι τῆς σημασίας τὸν τρόπον, ὅς ἀρμόζει τοῖς κτίσμασι.<sup>91</sup>

Ὁ δὲ ἡμέτερος νοῦς [7a/b], ἐκ τῶν κτισμάτων [16] γινώσκων [15] τὸν Θεόν, πρὸς τὸ νοεῖν αὐτὸν νοήσεις {4} οἰκείας ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ προοιούσαις εἰς τὰ κτίσματα τελειότησιν ἀνατυποῖ· αἱ δὲ τελειότητες ἐνιαίως καὶ ἀπλῶς προϋφαστᾶσιν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ [10a/b]. Ὡσπερ τοίνυν ταῖς διαφορῶν τελειότησιν τῶν κτισμάτων ἀρχὴ ἀπλή καὶ μία ἀνταποκρίνεται, ἦν αἱ διάφοροι αὐταὶ τελειότητες ποικίλως καὶ πολλαχῶς παριστῶσιν, οὕτω πολλαῖς καὶ διαφορῶν νοήσεσι {4} τοῦ ἡμετέρου νοῦ [7a/b] ἐν {3a} ἀνταποκρίνεται πάντῃ ἀπλοῦν {3a}.<sup>92</sup>

...Τῆ μὲν οὖν κατὰ λόγον [1] διαφορᾶ τὸ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου καὶ ὑποκειμένου πλήθος ἀνταποκρίνεται, τὴν δὲ ταυτότητα [1] τοῦ πράγματος [3b] δι' αὐτῆς τῆς συνθέσεως<sup>93</sup> ὁ νοῦς [7b] σημαίνει. Ὁ Θεὸς δέ, καθ' αὐτὸν {11} θεωρούμενος, παντάπασιν [1a] ἔστιν εἰς καὶ ἀπλοῦς {1b}· ἀλλ' ὅμως ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς [7a/b] κατὰ διαφορῶν ἐννοίας {4} αὐτὸν γινώσκει [15], διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι [12a] αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτὸν {11} θεωρεῖν. Ἄλλ' εἰ καὶ διαφορῶν ἐννοίας {4} αὐτὸν νοεῖ [9], νοεῖ<sup>94</sup> [9] μὲντοι πάσαις

91. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae* I,13,3 Resp.; *Vat. gr.* 609, f. 29<sup>r</sup> ("...We know God... from the perfections that proceed from Him to creatures. To be sure, these perfections exist in God in a more eminent manner than in creatures. However, our mind apprehends them in the way in which they exist in creatures, and it signifies them by names in accordance with how it apprehends them. Therefore, there are two things to consider regarding the names we attribute to God, viz., the perfections that are signified, e.g., 'goodness', 'life' etc., and the mode of signifying. With regard to what is denoted by names of this sort, these perfections belong properly to God — indeed, they belong more properly to Him than to the creatures themselves, and they are said of God in the primary sense. On the other hand, as regards the mode of signifying, these names are not said of God properly, since they have a mode of signifying that belongs to creatures" (translation by A.J. FREDDOSO, slightly modified; cf. *supra*, n. 89).

92. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae* I,13,4 Resp.; *Vat. gr.* 609, f. 29<sup>v</sup> ("But our mind, since it knows God from creatures, in order to understand God forms concepts proportioned to the perfections that proceed from God to creatures. These perfections preexist in God in a simple and unified way. Therefore, just as to the diverse perfections of the creatures a unified and altogether simple principle corresponds, which these diverse perfections represent variously and in many ways, so to the several diverse concepts of our mind corresponds a single and absolutely simple being" (translation by A.J. FREDDOSO, adapted; cf. *supra*, n. 89). Cf. this article cited in full *infra*, pp. 302-303, n. 103.

93. Cf. ARISTOTLE, *De Interpretatione* 1, 16a2 et al.

ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐννοίαις {4} ἀνταποκρινόμενον ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν [1] καὶ ἀπλοῦν {3a} πρᾶγμα [3b]. Τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον {4} πλῆθος τὸ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου καὶ ὑποκειμένου πλῆθος παριστᾷ, ἡ δὲ σύνθεσις παρίστησι τὴν ἐνότητα.<sup>95</sup>

...Ὅταν τι τελειότητος ὄνομα περὶ κτίσματος {16} λέγεται, σημαίνει τὴν τελειότητα ταύτην ὡς διακεκριμένην τῶν ἄλλων· οἷον, ὅταν τὸ 'σοφός' λέγωμεν περὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, σημαίνομεν τινὰ τελειότητα διακεκριμένην τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου οὐσίας καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι αὐτοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων. Ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα λέγωμεν ἐπὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ [10], οὐ βουλόμεθα σημῆναί τι διακεκριμένον τῆς οὐσίας ἢ τῆς δυνάμεως ἢ τοῦ εἶναι αὐτοῦ. Καὶ οὕτως, ὅταν μὲν τὸ 'σοφός' ὄνομα ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λέγεται, περιγράφει τρόπον τινὰ καὶ περιλαμβάνει [15] τὸ σημαίνονμενον πρᾶγμα [3b], οὐ μὲν ὅταν λέγεται ἐπὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ [10], ἀλλὰ καταλαμβάνει τὸ σημαίνονμενον πρᾶγμα [3b] ὥσπερ ἀπερίληπτον καὶ ὑπερεκτεινόμενον τῆς τοῦ ὀνόματος σημασίας. Ὅθεν δῆλον ὡς οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον [2a/b] τὸ 'σοφός' ὄνομα τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται. Ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ὄνομα συνωνύμως τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τῶν κτισμάτων {16} κατηγορεῖται. Οὐ μὲν οὐδ' ἄντικρυς ὁμωνύμως, ὅπερ τινὲς βούλονται. Οὕτω γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκ τῶν κτισμάτων [16] δυνατὸν ἦν γινώσκεισθαι [17] ἢ ἀποδείκνυσθαι περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ [10], ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ταύτωνυμίαν σόφισμα<sup>96</sup> συνέπιπτεν ἂν. Τοῦτο δὲ ἐναντίον ἐστὶ... τῷ Ἀποστόλῳ λέγοντι ἐν τῷ α' τῆς Πρὸς Ῥωμαίους: "τὰ ἀόρατα τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῖς ποιήμασι {16} νοούμενα [6] καθορᾶται" (Rom. 1,20). Δεῖ ἄρα λέγειν ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνόματα κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἐπὶ τε τοῦ Θεοῦ [10] καὶ τῆς κτίσεως {16} λέγονται. ... Καὶ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος μέσος ἐστὶ τῶν τε καθαρῶς ὁμωνύμων καὶ τῶν συνωνύμων ἀπλῶς.<sup>97</sup>

94. In textu Latino "cognoscit" legis, quod prout 'γινώσκει' in versione Graeca reddi expectares.

95. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae* I,13,12 Resp.; *Vat. gr.* 609, ff. 31<sup>v</sup>-32<sup>r</sup> ("...And the plurality of subject and predicate corresponds to this conceptual diversity, whereas the mind signifies the identity of the thing through the very composition of subject and predicate. Now God, considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple. But our mind knows Him by means of diverse conceptions, because it is unable to see Him as He is in Himself. Still, even though it understands Him under diverse concepts, it nonetheless knows that one and same reality, absolutely speaking, corresponds to all these conceptions. Therefore, the mind represents the conceptual plurality by means of the plurality of subject and predicate, whereas it represents the unity by means of the composition of predicate and subject"; translation by A.J. FREDOSO; cf. *supra*, n. 89).

96. ARISTOTLE, *Sophistici elenchi* 4 (165b30-a6); 7 (169a22-27).

97. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I,13,5 Resp.; *Vat. gr.* 609, f. 29<sup>r-v</sup> ("...When a name pertaining to perfection is said of creature, it signifies that perfection as something distinct from other perfections. ... By contrast, when we predicate this name of God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence or from His power or from His *esse*. And so when the name 'wise' is said of a man, it in some sense circumscribes and comprehends the thing that is signified. But this not the case when 'wise' is said of God; instead, the thing signified is left as something that is incomprehended and that exceeds

Numbers 12a/b and 7a/b show that Cantacouzenos had read Nazianzen's passages. Numbers 7a/b and 15, along with Rom. 1,20, which are common in Gregory and Thomas, made Cantacouzenos recall Thomas Aquinas' passages; and numbers 13a/b and 14 (along with 7a/b) demonstrate that Cantacouzenos did read them. True, 13a/b ("ὅσον ἡμῖν ἐφικτόν", in the sense of "to the extent that the human nature is able to reach") does occur a few times in Gregory Nazianzen, Basil of Caesarea, and Gregory of Nyssa. Still, in contrast with Aquinas' phrase ("ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς..., καθόσον... ἐφικνεῖται"), none of these occurrences forms part of a discussion of the question of the 'divine names'. Further, Cantacouzenos and Aquinas (but not the Cappadocians) attach this sentence to two roughly synonymous verbs, i.e., "νοεῖν" (Cantacouzenos) and "γινώσκειν" (Aquinas). Furthermore, both Cantacouzenos' and Aquinas', but not Gregory's employment of this sentence is accompanied by the usage of the rare word "ἀμνηγέπη" [14] ("aliqua", a word rather common in Aquinas) to denote the limited character of man's knowledge of God.

The fact that Cantacouzenos, when writing his passage, had in mind Basil of Caesarea's *Adversus Eunomium* I, and the passage from his first letter to Paul cited in the above, where he refers to the way Cyril of Alexandria and Basil of Caesarea explained the distinction between the persons of the Holy Trinity (see *supra*, p. 293), suggest that Cantacouzenos was thinking of the Greek patristic line of defence of Palamas' distinction between God's essence and energies as pretty admitting of being transcribed in terms of Thomistic theology.

In fact, taking Aquinas' theological epistemology as compatible with the theological epistemology of the Greek Fathers was just as reasonable for him. Cantacouzenos, prescinding from Barlaam the Calabrian's fiercely pejorative treatment of Aquinas as a "possessed" 'rationalist'<sup>98</sup> and drawing, instead, upon Neilos Cabasilas' appeal to

the signification of the name. ... Hence, no name is predicated univocally of God and creatures. But neither are such names predicated in a purely equivocal way... For if this were so, then it would be impossible to know or demonstrate anything about God from creatures... And this is contrary... to the Apostle, who says in the *Epistle to Romans* (1,20) that "the invisible things of God... are clearly seen, being understood by the created things". Therefore, one should say that names of the sort in question are said of God and creatures analogically. ... This mode falls between pure equivocation and simple univocity"; translation by A.J. FREDDOSO; cf. *supra*, n. 89).

98. BARLAAM THE CALABRIAN, *Contra Latinos A IV*, 11, ll. 93-94, ed. A. FYRIGOS, *Barlaam Calabro. Opere contro i Latini. Introduzione, storia dei testi, edizione critica*,

some Thomistic passages where the limits of human reason are clearly and emphatically shown,<sup>99</sup> cited some of these same passages,<sup>100</sup> immediately after some Greek patristic ones (just like Neilos), to refute Prochoros Cydonos' strong determination to use syllogisms in theology. Gregory, Thomas, and John all say the same thing. Man, because of his very nature as well as his bodily condition in this life, is unable to fully or directly know God. He only can do so, and this up to an extent, by following a bypass, i.e., by knowing what is reflected from God in his creature. This is a middle state of things. What man knows of God by this path is true, for the beauty and order of nature, which are conceived by our mind, are both real and due to God. Yet, it is not equal to the object known; for this process, being mediate, does not produce an image of what God is *per se* (§11): Cantacouzenos: "ὥς ἔστιν"; Thomas Aquinas: "καθ' ἑαυτόν"). An inevitable consequence of this process is the assimilation of the only absolutely simple being, i.e., God, as multiple, inasmuch as the knower, i.e., man, as well as the beings man uses to grasp God, are multiple.

*traduzione e indici*, Vol. II (Studi e Testi, vol. 348), Vatican City 1998, p. 562; cf. J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, "Further Evidence on the Ancient, Patristic, and Byzantine Sources of Barlaam the Calabrian's *Contra Latinos*", in: *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 96/2 (2003), pp. 83-122, esp. pp. 111-112, N° 96iii. Cantacouzenos seems rather negatively disposed toward Barlaam's views of the relation between faith and reason in general; for example, I have the impression that Cantacouzenos' *Refutationes duae Prochori Cydonii* I,17,38-40, "Πᾶσα ἡ τῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφία λέγεται μὲν οὐτῶ, σοφία, ἔκτος δὲ 'σοφία' παρ' ἡμῶν τῶν πιστῶν ὀνομάζεται", edd. VOORDECKERS-TINNEFELD (cf. *supra*, n. 73), pp. 25-26, is an implicit yet deliberate rejection of Barlaam's highly positive evaluation of heathen philosophy in his *Greek Epistle V*, 6, ll. 40-41: "Ἡ πρὸς ἡμῶν μὲν ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία λεγομένη, πρὸς δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ Παύλου [I Cor. 1,21] 'σοφία Θεοῦ' κεκλημένη..."; ed. A. FYRIGOS, *Dalla controversia palamitica alla polemica esicastica. Con un'edizione critica delle epistole greche di Barlaam*, Pontificia Università Antoniana (Medioevo, vol. 11), Rome 2005, p. 380.

99. NEILOS CABASILAS, Ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι Λατίνοις, συλλογισμοῖς χρωμένοις, ἀποδειξά τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐκπορευόμενον III,2, §§12; 13; 14; 15; 17; 18; 19; 29; 33; 40; 41; 47; 64; 65; 66; 69, ed. CANDAL (cf. *supra*, n. 70), pp. 194-242 *passim*. Neilos cites from THOMAS AQUINAS' *Summa contra Gentiles* I, 3-9 and 30; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 5, 6, and 8; *De rationibus fidei ad cantorem Antiochenum* 2 (few passages have escaped the editor's attention).

100. JOHN VI CANTACOUZENOS, *Refutatio I Prochori Cydonii* 16, edd. VOORDECKERS-TINNEFELD (cf. *supra*, n. 73), pp. 22-24. Cantacouzenos cites verbatim *Summa contra Gentiles* I,9,1-6; see a provisional, non-critical edition of Demetrios Cydonos' translation of *Summa contra Gentiles* I,1-9 in DEMETRACOPOULOS, *Πλήθρον* (cf. *supra*, n. 70), pp. 188-189.

In Aquinas, this theological epistemology has a metaphysical background commonly known as “*analogia entis*”.<sup>101</sup> Cantacouzenos did not use this term. Still, the phrases and ideas he picked up from Aquinas are so closely connected with this concept that the way he contrasts “ὡς ἐστίν” with “ὅσον ἡμῖν ἐφικτόν” can be seen as a philosophically unelaborated yet proper subscription to the Thomistic *analogia entis*. Cantacouzenos could also see this notion in its two-fold dimension, i.e., the ontological and the epistemological one, applied to the angelical knowledge (“κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς τάξεως”) by Gregory Nazianzen in the continuation of the passage from his *Oratio XXVIII* cited above (pp. 294-295).<sup>102</sup>

Returning to the beginning of Cantacouzenos’ passage (v. *supra*, pp. 293-294), one can clearly see that his saying that he should avoid taking the divine names of ‘essence’ and ‘energy’ both as “in every respect the same” (πάντη ταυτόν) and as “absolutely different” (πάντη οὐ ταυτόν), but rather as something in between, is a latent reproduction of Aquinas’ doctrine that one should avoid taking the divine names both as “synonyma” and as “univoca”. In the *Summa theologiae*, I<sup>a</sup>, q. 13, a. 4, arg. 1, “synonyma nomina” are defined as those which “omnino idem significant”. In Demetrios Cydones’ translation: “...παντάπασι τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνει”.<sup>103</sup> Cf. also Aquinas’ *De potentia*,

101. Of the Thomistic works available to Cantacouzenos in Greek translation, the subsequent passages contain Thomas’ concept of *analogia* and his application of this concept to the problem of the “nomina divina”: *Summa theologiae*, I,4,3 co. and ad 3; 13,5 co.; 44,3 co.; 45,8 ad 3; 93,1 ad 3; I<sup>a</sup>II<sup>ae</sup>, 20,3 ad 3; *Summa contra Gentiles* II,15,2; III, 24,7 and 80,16; *De potentia* 7,7 Resp. The last passage was almost fully reproduced in PROCHOROS CYDONES’ *Πραγματεία εἰς τὸ περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας ζήτημα*, II,27, edd. J. FILOVSKI and M.D. PETRUSEVSKI, “Γρηγορίου τοῦ Ἀκινδύνου πραγματεία εἰς τὸ περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας ζήτημα”, *Ziva antika* 23 (1973) (Part I), pp. 317-367, esp. 359-363, which had been refuted by Cantacouzenos; so he had certainly paid some attention to it. In Prochoros’ writing, this Thomistic concept is reproduced several times.

102. GREGORY NAZIANZEN, *Oratio XXVIII*, 4,12-19, edd. GALLAY-JOURJON (cf. *supra*, n. 30), p. 198 (“...both to the beings impeded by the darkness of this world and the thick covering of the flesh to the full understanding of the truth and, I would say, for the higher natures and purer Intelligences which because of their nearness to God, and because they are illumined with all His Light, may possibly see, if not the whole, at any rate more perfectly and distinctly than we do; some perhaps more, some less than others, in proportion to their rank”; translation by BROWN-SWALLOW, in: *Select Library* (cf. *supra*, n. 84), p. 561, with some changes).

103. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae* I,13,4 (Utrum nomina dicta de Deo sint nomina synonyma): “Πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ Θεοῦ λεγόμενα ὀνόματα δόξαιεν ἂν ταῦτὸ σημαίνειν.



q. 7, a. 6 (“Πότερον ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματά εἰσι συνώνυμα”): “Συνώνυμα γὰρ ὀνόματα λέγονται ἃ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντη σημαίνουσι”.<sup>104</sup> Avoiding both

1. Παντάπασι γὰρ ταῦτὸ σημαίνει τὰ ἐπὶ Θεοῦ λεγόμενα. Ἡ γὰρ ἀγαθότης τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἐστίν (I,6,3), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ σοφία (I,3,6; 4,2). Ταῦτὸν ἄρα ταῦτα πάντα σημαίνει.

2. Εἰ δὲ λέγοιτο ἐν μὲν σημαίνειν ταυτὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, κατὰ διαφόρους δὲ λόγους, εἰς τὸναντίον εἰρήσεται ὅτι ὁ λόγος, ᾧ μὴδὲν ἀνταποκρίνεται πρᾶγμα, κενὸς ἐστίν. Εἰ τοίνυν οἱ μὲν λόγοι οὗτοι εἰσι πολλοί, πρᾶγμα δὲ ἓν, δόξειεν ἂν ματαίους εἶναι τοὺς λόγους τούτους.

3. “Ἐτι, μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἐν τὸ καὶ τῷ πράγματι καὶ τῷ λόγῳ ἐν ὃν ἡ τὸ ἐν μὲν τῷ πράγματι, πολλαπλοῦν δὲ τῷ λόγῳ. Ὁ δὲ Θεὸς μάλιστα ἐστὶν ἐν. Ὡστ’ ἀνάγκη μὴ ἐν μὲν εἶναι τῷ πράγματι, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ ποικίλον. Καὶ οὕτω τὰ ἐπὶ Θεοῦ λεγόμενα ὀνόματα οὐ διαφόρους σημαίνουσι λόγους ὥστε ταῦτὸν σημαίνειν.

Ἄλλὰ τὸναντίον τὰ ταῦτὸ σημαίνοντα ὀνόματα ἀλλήλοις συναπτόμενα ταυτολογίαν ποιεῖ ὥσπερ εἰ λέγοιτο “λόπιον καὶ ἰμάτιον” (ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics* IV,4,14, 1006b25-27; *Topics* I,7, 103a9-10). Εἰ τοίνυν ταῦτὸ σημαίνει πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ Θεοῦ λεγόμενα ὀνόματα, οὐκ ἂν ἰδίως ἀγαθὸς ἦ τι τοιούτων ὁ Θεὸς ἠδύνατο λέγεσθαι· καίτοι γέγραπται ἐν τῷ λγ’ τοῦ Ἱεροσίου: “ἰσχυρότατος, μέγας, δυνατός, Κύριος τῶν δυνάμεων ὀνομά σοι” (Jer. 39,18-19).

Ἀπολογουμένους ῥητέον ἂν εἶη ὅτι τὰ οὕτω περὶ Θεοῦ λεγόμενα ὀνόματα οὐ ταῦτὸν σημαίνει. Ὁ δὲ ῥᾶδιον ἂν ἦν συνιδεῖν, εἰ ἐλέγομεν τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνόματα παρεισαχθῆναι πρὸς τὸ ἀναρεῖν ἢ σημαίνειν τὴν πρὸς τὰ κτίσματα σχέσιν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν διάφοροι λόγοι τούτων τῶν ὀνομάτων, διαφόρων ὄντων τῶν ἀποφασκομένων ἢ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων τῶν ἅμα τῷ Θεῷ σημαίνοντων. Ἄλλ’, ὥσπερ εἴρηται (I,13,1), τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνόματα τὴν θεϊκὴν οὐσίαν σημαίνει, εἰ καὶ ἀτελῶς. Ὅθεν δῆλον ὅτι διαφόρους ἔχουσι λόγους κατὰ τὰ προειρημένα (I,13,1; 2). Ὁ γὰρ λόγος, ὃν σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα, ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ἐστὶ σύλληψις, ἣν λαμβάνει περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, ὃ γὰρ σημαίνεται διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος. Ὁ δὲ ἡμέτερος νοῦς, ἐκ τῶν κτισμάτων γινώσκων τὸν Θεόν, πρὸς τὸ νοεῖν αὐτὸν νοήσεις οικείας ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ προοιούσας εἰς τὰ κτίσματα τελειότητιν ἀνατυοῖ· αἱ δὲ τελειότητες ἐνιαίως καὶ ἀπλῶς προῦφεσάσιν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ (cf. PS.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITE, *De divinis nominibus* I,4, ed. SUCHLA [cf. *supra*, n. 11], p. 115,6-11). Ὡσπερ τοίνυν ταῖς διαφόροις τελειότησι τῶν κτισμάτων ἀρχὴ ἀπλῆ καὶ μία ἀνταποκρίνεται, ἣν αἱ διάφοροι αὐταὶ τελειότητες ποικίλως καὶ πολλαχῶς παριστώσιν, οὕτω πολλαῖς καὶ διαφόροις νοήσεσι τοῦ ἡμέτερου νοῦ ἐν ἀνταποκρίνεται πάντη ἀπλοῦν. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ ἀποδιδόμενα τῷ Θεῷ ὀνόματα, εἰ καὶ ἐν πρᾶγμα σημαίνει, διὰ μέντοι τὸ πολλοῖς καὶ διαφόροις λόγοις τοῦτο σημαίνειν οὐκ εἰσι ταυτοσήμαντα.

Ἐντεῦθεν δῆλη καὶ ἡ πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον λύσις. Ταῦτὸν γὰρ σημαίνοντα ὀνόματα λέγονται, ἅπερ ἐν πρᾶγμα καθ’ ἓνα λόγον σημαίνει. Τὰ γὰρ διαφόρους ἐνὸς πράγματος σημαίνοντα λόγους οὐ πρῶτως οὐδὲ καθ’ αὐτὰ ἐν σημαίνει· ἐπεὶ, ὥσπερ εἴρηται (I,13,1), μεσιτευούσης τῆς τοῦ νοῦ συλλήψεως ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος τὸ πρᾶγμα σημαίνεται.

Πρὸς τὸ δεῦτερον. Οἱ πλείους λόγοι τούτων τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ εἰσὶν ἄκυροι καὶ κενοί· ἐπεὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ἀνταποκρίνεται ἐν τι καὶ παντάπασιν ἀπλοῦν, διὰ πάντων τούτων πολλαχῶς καὶ ἀτελῶς ἐκφαινόμενον.

Πρὸς τὸ τρίτον. Τῆς τελείας ἐστὶν τοῦτο τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐνόητος, τὰ πολλαχῶς καὶ διηρημένως ἐνόητα τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν αὐτῷ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἐνιαίως ὑπάρχειν. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου συμβαίνει ἓνα μὲν εἶναι τῷ πράγματι, πλείω δὲ κατὰ τὸν λόγον· ὁ γὰρ ἡμέτερος νοῦς οὕτως πολλαχῶς τοῦτον καταλαμβάνει, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐν τῇ ὕλη παριστώσιν αὐτόν” (*Vat. gr. 609, f. 29*).

104. *Coisl. gr. 96, f. 187*<sup>v</sup> (“Synonyma enim nomina dicuntur quae omnino idem significant”).

univocal and equivocal predication leaves, for Aquinas, no other way of predication than analogy—which is, as is evident now, what Cantacouzenos implicitly subscribed to.

Obviously enough, what E. von Ivánka called “Neo-Palamism” (cf. *supra*, p. 263) is in fact just a Byzantine version of Palamism introduced by John Cantacouzenos, which can properly be called “Thomistic Palamism”. The compromised character of this sort of Palamism becomes more clear in view of its blatant similarity with Gregory Acindynos’ idea, strongly opposed by Palamas, that we grasp God by means of diverse concepts not because their multiplicity has a *fundamentum in re*, but because using many concepts is unavoidable for human beings to grasp anything (cf. *supra*, p. 275).

After this reply by Cantacouzenos, Paul reported to Pope Urban V as follows:

Because it was related to our Lord, Pope Urban V, and his cardinals that the Emperor [John VI] Cantacouzenos and the Church of the Greeks accept that there are many divinities, superior and inferior, because they teach that God’s properties differ (from each other) in reality (διαφέρειν πραγματικῶς) and that each of them is a distinct deity that lies at an infinite distance from the divine essence, the aforesaid emperor contacted me to discuss this issue. So, whereas at the beginning he seemed (to me) to hold a wrong belief, since I discerned from what he said that he held a real distinction (πραγματικὴν διάκρισιν) (between God’s properties), after some days he said that he does not hold a real distinction between God’s properties, but just a conceptual one (μόνον λόγῳ καὶ ἐπινοίᾳ).<sup>105</sup>

One might guess that Paul discerned the Thomistic background and tenor of the emperor’s statement and was content with it. In the last resort, one of the passages in *Summa contra Gentiles* that inspired Cantacouzenos, i.e., Book I, ch. 35 (v. *supra*, p. 296), was included in Prochoros Cydones’ writing that was supposedly refuted by Cantacouzenos, i.e., in the *De essentia et operatione Dei* (Book III, ch. 26).<sup>106</sup> True, given that Cantacouzenos’ discussion of the nature of Palamas’ distinction was produced on the occasion of an official report to the pope, one might even suspect that Cantacouzenos was eager to expound before the Latins a theological doctrine acceptable

105. PAUL, LATIN PATRIARCH OF CONSTANTINOPLE, *Epistle to the Most Blessed Pope (Urban V) and His Cardinals* (PG 154: 836A-837B).

106. Edd. FILOVSKI-PETRUSEVSKI (cf. *supra*, n. 101), pp. 355-356.

to them. In any case, the fact remains that John VI Cantacouzenos inaugurated a new (and milder than the former one) version of Palamism, i.e., Thomistic Palamism.<sup>107</sup>

#### 4.2. *Theophanes of Nicaea: Weaving between the Basilian and the Thomist ἐπίνοια*

Besides John VI Cantacouzenos, Theophanes of Nicaea, too, wrote in 1369/71 a reply to the Latin Patriarch Paul of Constantinople.<sup>108</sup> At first glance, Theophanes' reply looks like a mere repetition of the patristic solution towards Palamas' direction of the *distinctio realis*. Theophanes cites the famous Basilian example of "grain" and says, just as Palamas had said (v. *supra*, p. 274), that God's 'essence' and 'energy' are two "things" ("πράγματα"). Since, however, they cannot actually be separated from each other, they are not different "really" (πραγματικῶς); they are rather distinguished (as Palamas had not said; v. *supra*, pp. 278-279) only "conceptually" (ἐπινοίᾳ). In distinguishing between "πρᾶγμα" and "πραγματικῶς", Theophanes split what Basil of Caesarea had described as "conceptual distinction" into two cases: *i*) distinguishing between various external aspects of one and the same thing (what in ancient Greek logic were called 'heteronyms'; v. *supra*, p. 266) — a distinction of low ontological weight, which cannot be taken as a distinction between two "things" in any sense of the term; and *ii*) distinguishing between a substance and its attributes, which is of higher ontological weight, since attributes,

107. As far as I know, H.C. BARBOUR (*The Byzantine Thomism of Gennadios Scholarios and His Translation of the Commentary of Armandus de Bellovisu on the "De ente et essentia" of Thomas Aquinas*, Città del Vaticano ["Studi Tomistici" 53], 1993, pp. 32-39) was the first to speak of "Thomism" in regard to the theological thought of John VI Cantacouzenos. Still, he confined this Thomism to the reason – Revelation problem (cf. *supra*, n. 74) and explicitly stated that "the Essence – energies dispute was clearly a point where Palamas and Aquinas can only with greatest difficulty be reconciled" (*op. cit.*, p. 37). Further, the way BARBOUR depicted Byzantine Aristotelianism (*op. cit.*, pp. 15-32, esp. 27; 29) in order to integrate into it his description of the Thomism of Cantacouzenos is highly questionable.

108. On the historical setting of the exchange of letters between John VI Cantacouzenos, Paul, and Theophanes of Nicaea, see I.D. POLEMIS, *Theophanes of Nicaea. His Life and Works* (Wiener Byzantinistischen Studien, vol. XX), Vienna 1996, pp. 62-68, where it is plausibly argued (p. 63) that Theophanes' epistle is a reply to a lost epistle of Paul sent to Cantacouzenos after the two extant ones edited by VOORDECKERS-TINNEFELD (cf. *supra*, n. 73).

although forming a unity with their bearer and requiring its existence, are in no way identical with it and should, therefore, be taken as various “things” different from it. Case *ii* is also clearly different from distinguishing between, e.g., two primary substances (say, two men) (case *iii*). Putting ‘essence’ and ‘energy’ in this framework, one should say that they are not one thing (case *i*), but two “πράγματα” (case *ii*), even though they do not differ “πραγματικῶς” (case *iii*). Thus they are both different from and united with each other. Let us see Theophanes’ argument in full:<sup>109</sup>

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἐπινοίᾳ ἢ πράγματι τὴν διαφορὰν εἶναι οἶεσθαι τῆς θείας οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας, τοῦτο ἡμῖν δοκεῖ, ὅτι ἡ ‘ἐπινοία’ διπλῆν ἔνοιαν ἔχει κατὰ τε τὸν μέγαν Βασίλειον<sup>110</sup> καὶ τὸν ἐκ Δαμασκοῦ θεῖον Ἰωάννην.<sup>111</sup> Λέγεται γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν “ἀναπλασμάτων” μόνων ὄντων τῆς ἡμετέρας “διανοίας”, μηδαμῶς δὲ ὑφεστῶτων,<sup>112</sup> ὡσπερ ἡ μυθοποιία τερατεύεται τοὺς “ἵπποκονταύρους” καὶ τὰς “Χιμαίρας”. ἥτις καὶ “ψιλλὴ ἐπινοία” εἰκότως προσαγορεύεται. Λέγεται καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συνεπτηγμένων καὶ “πρώταις ἐντεύξεσι” μονοειδῶν “δοκούντων”<sup>113</sup> οἷον ἀνάπτυξις καὶ διαστολὴ κατὰ δianoίαν γινομένη.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν<sup>114</sup> τοῦ προτέρου νοήματος καὶ τῆς “ψιλλῆς ἐπινοίας” οὐδεὶς ἡμῖν λόγος (τί γὰρ κοινὸν θεολογία τε καὶ “μυθοπλαστική”;<sup>115</sup>), ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑτέρῳ πάντως ἐπὶ τῶν θείων χρηστέον.

“Ἐτι, ἕτερόν ἐστι ‘διαφορὰ’ καὶ ‘ἑτερότης’ καὶ ἕτερον ‘διαίρεσις’ εἶθουν ‘διάστασις’ ἠνωμένων τινῶν, ὥστε ἰδίᾳ καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ χωρὶς<sup>116</sup> θεωρεῖσθαι. Ὁρᾶται τοίνυν καὶ τὰ διαφέροντα καὶ τὰ διεστῶτα ἰδίᾳ καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ<sup>117</sup> καὶ ἐπινοίᾳ καὶ πράγματι. Καὶ τὰ μὲν διάφορα τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ,

109. THEOPHANES OF NICAIA, *Ἐπιστολὴ ἐν ἐπιτομῇ δηλοῦσα τίνα δόξαν ἔχει ἡ καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἐκκλησία περὶ τῶν παρὰ Παύλον προσηνεργημένων ζητήσεων, συγγραφεῖσα ὡς ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ βασιλέως*. I used *Oxon. Barocc. gr.* 193 (= O), ff. 85<sup>v</sup>-86<sup>r</sup>, and *Met. S. Sepulchri* 352 (= M), f. 6<sup>r-v</sup>; on the manuscript tradition of this work see POLEMIS, *Theophanes* (cf. *supra*, n. 108), pp. 31-32. My sincere thanks to Dr. Christos Triantafyllopoulos (London) for transcribing M for my sake.

110. BASIL OF CAESAREA, *Adversus Eunomium* I,6 *passim*, edd. SESBOÛÉ et al. (cf. *supra*, n. 5), pp. 182-186.

111. Cf. *supra*, p. 266.

112. Palamas had already rejected (by using these words) taking the energies of God as “vain concepts”; GREGORY PALAMAS, *Περὶ θείας καὶ θεοποιῶν μεθέξεως ἢ περὶ τῆς θείας καὶ ὑπερφανῆς ἀπλότητος* 7; ed. MANTZARIDES (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 161,10-11.

113. BASIL OF CAESAREA, *Adversus Eunomium* I,6 (cf. *supra*, n. 5).

114. οὖν om. O.

115. JOHN OF DAMASCUS’ *Dialectica* 65,92-93, ed. KOTTER (cf. *supra*, n. 10), p. 135.

116. χωρὶς om. M.

117. θεωρεῖσθαι usque καθ’ ἑαυτὰ om. O.

“ὡς ὅταν λέγωμεν τὸν σῆτον καὶ ‘σπέρμα’ καὶ ‘καρπὸν’”.<sup>118</sup> οὐ γὰρ διαφέρει ταῦτα πραγματικῶς: “ἐν” γὰρ ἐστὶ “τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ”, καθ’ οὗ καὶ ἄμφω κατηγορεῖται τὰ εἰρημένα. Πράγματι δὲ διαφέρει τὰ διαφέροντα, ὡσπερ ἡ ἐν “τῷ κύκῳ” “λευκότης” τοῦ “κύκλου”. πράγματα<sup>119</sup> γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ “κύκλος” καὶ ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ “λευκότης” διάφορα.<sup>120</sup> Ὡσαύτως τὰ διαιρούμενα ἰδίᾳ καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ ποτὲ μὲν ἐπινοία διίσταται, ποτὲ δὲ πράγματι: ἐπινοία μὲν, ἡνίκα τὴν ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θέρμην τοῦ πυρὸς διακρίνομεν ἰδίᾳ ἐκάτερον, κατὰ διάνοιαν μόνον ἀναπλάττοντες τοῦτο. Πραγματικῇ δὲ διαιρέσεις ἐστὶν ἡ ἐκ “τῆς μιᾶς φύσεως” “τῶν ἀνθρώπων” “Πέτρου” καὶ “Παύλου” ὑποστατικῇ διαίρεσις: πράγματι γὰρ ὁ Πέτρος τοῦ Παύλου διακρίεται κατὰ “τὰς ὑποστάσεις”.<sup>121</sup>

Ἡ οὖν θεία ἐνέργεια, ἡ “φυσικὴ καὶ οὐσιώδης” κατὰ τοὺς θεοὺς Πατέρας,<sup>122</sup> πρᾶγμα ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ “ἀνάπλασμα διανοίας”. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἶη φυσικόν τε καὶ οὐσιώδες, καὶ ταῦτα θεῖον, ἀνύπαρκτον;

Πάλιν δὲ πῶς ἂν εἶη αὐτὸ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἐπεὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς λέγεται προῦναι παρὰ τῶν θείων Πατέρων τῶν τε τῆς ἑκτῆς οἰκουμενικῆς<sup>123</sup> συνόδου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων; Πῶς γὰρ ἂν αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ προαγάγοι; Ἡ πῶς ἂν ἐπὶ τοῦ πάντῃ ταῦτοῦ καὶ ἐνὸς τὸ ‘ἐκάτερον’ λεχθῆι; Ἀλλ’ ὁ θεῖος Ἀναστάσιος οὕτω φησὶν: “ἐνθα ἂν ἡ ἐνέργεια φανῆ, συνθεωρεῖται ταύτῃ καὶ ἡ οὐσία, ἐξ ἧς προέρχεται: ἐκάτερον γὰρ ἀπερίγραπτον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο παντελῶς ἀλλήλων ἀχώριστα”.<sup>124</sup> Ὡς μὲν οὖν<sup>125</sup> “ἐκότερα” ταῦτα, πάντως ἔτερον ἡ ἐνέργεια παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν· ὡς δὲ καὶ τοῦτο “ἀπερίγραπτον”, πάντως καὶ ὑφ’ ἑστώς καὶ ἄκτιστον· πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἶη τὸ “ἀπερίγραπτον” κτιστὸν καὶ μὴ ὑφ’ ἑστώς;

Διαφέρει τοίνυν ἀλλήλων ἡ θεία οὐσία τε καὶ ἐνέργεια πράγματι, ἐπεὶ πράγματ’ ἐστίν, ὡς δέδεικται ἱκανῶς, καὶ ἄμφω· διαρεῖται δὲ καὶ χωρίζεται ἐκάτερα ἐκότερας ἐπινοία μόνῃ καὶ οὐ πράγματι: “ἀχώριστα” γὰρ ἐστὶν “ἀλλήλων” κατὰ τὸν θεῖον Ἀναστάσιον,<sup>126</sup> ὡσπερ ἡ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ

118. BASIL OF CAESAREA, *Adversus Eunomium* I,7 *verbatim* (cf. *supra*, n. 5).

119. πράγματι M.

120. ARISTOTLE, *Topics* IV,1, 120b38-39; *Sophistici elenchi* 6, 168b29-31. Cf. ANONYMUS’ *In Aristotelis librum “Posteriorum Analyticorum” commentarium*, ed. M. HAYDUCK, *Eustratii in Analyticorum Posteriorum librum secundum commentarium* (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, vol. XXI,1), Berlin 1907, p. xv,34-36.

121. JOHN OF DAMASCUS, *Expositio fidei* 8,223-237, ed. KOTTER (cf. *supra*, n. 16), p. 28. It should be added to the apparatus fontium of KOTTER’s edition that II. 223-297 of ch. 8 is but a full reproduction of PS.-CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA’S *De Trinitate* X, PG 77: 1141B-1145B.

122. See, e.g., CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA, *Thesaurus* 32; 33; 34 (PG 75: 497C; 521C; 580A; 593D); *Commentarii in “Johannem”* V,1, ed. PUSEY (cf. *supra*, n. 16), Vol. II, p. 52.

123. οἰκουμενικῆς ἑκτῆς O.

124. ANASTASIOS I OF ANTIOCHIA, *De orthodoxa fide* II,5, ed. J.B. PITRA, *Anastasia*, Rome 1866, p. 76 = ed. S. SAKKOS (an K. SIAMAKES?), *Ἀναστασίου Α’ Ἀντιοχείας ἅπαντα τὰ σωζόμενα γνήσια ἔργα*, Thessaloniki 1976, p. 43 = PG 89: 1332A-B.

125. Ἀλλ’ ὡς μὲν O; Ὡς μὲν οὖν M.

126. Cf. *supra*, n. 124.

θέρμη τοῦ πυρός καὶ τὸ ἡλιακὸν φῶς τοῦ ἡλίου. Μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἀπὸ μέρους ἐστὶν ἀλλήλοις ἠνωμένα (τὸ γὰρ ἡλιακὸν φῶς μέρει τινὶ συνάπτεται τῷ δίσκῳ καὶ τῇ ἰδίᾳ πηγῇ, τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον τοῖς τοῦ κόσμου πέρασιν συνεκτείνεται), ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς θείας οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας οὐκ ἀπὸ μέρους ἢ συνάφεια θεωρεῖται, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ περ "ἐκότερον" τούτων "ἀπερίγραφτον" ἐστίν, ὅλον ἐν ὅλῳ ἐστί.

As far as the question whether we [sc. the Orthodox] regard the difference between the divine essence and the divine energy as conceptual or real, our position runs as follows. According to both Basil the Great and John of Damascus, 'epinoia' has two meanings. It refers to those things which are just "fictional entities of our mind" and do not subsist at all; for instance, mythology speaks of such monstrous entities as "hippocentaurs" and "Chimaeras". This sort of 'epinoia' is rightly called "bare epinoia". On the other hand, 'epinoia' refers to the mental process of the development and analysis of compact things which at first sight look simple.

Now the former meaning of the term, i.e., the "bare epinoia", will not concern us here at all; for what is common between speaking of God and concocting myths? On the contrary, it is obviously the latter that we should apply to things divine.

Furthermore, 'difference' or 'alterity' (1) is one thing, and 'division' of or 'separation' between (2) some things united with each other in such a way that they are seen as singular entities or beings *per se* is another. Thus, both the things different from each other and the things separated in such a way that they are singular entities or beings *per se* are viewed either as really being so (a) or as being so in the conceptual manner (b). Things are conceptually different (1b) "in cases such as 'grain', which is also called 'seed' and 'fruit'". These things do not differ from each other really, for "they are one in regard to their subject" [sc. insofar as they are grain], which these things [sc. seed and fruit] are predicated of. On the contrary, things different from each other differ really (1a) in cases such as a swan and the whiteness that exists in a swan; for both a swan and its whiteness are things different from each other. Likewise, things divided properly and *per se* sometimes are distinguished conceptually (2b), whereas in other cases they are distinguished really (2a). Things are distinguished conceptually in cases such as our distinguishing the heat inherent in the fire from the fire as a separate entity, imagining this only in our mind. On the other hand, real division consists in the hypostatic division of two individuals belonging to "the same nature", e.g., of "Peter" and "Paul" belonging to "humanity"; for Peter is really distinct from Paul in terms of their being two "individuals".

Now, according to the godly Fathers, the divine energy, which is called 'natural' and 'inherent to' God's 'essence', is a real thing, not a fiction of the mind. Indeed, how can it be natural and inherent to essence (not to mention be divine), if it is non-existent?

On the other hand, how can the energy be God's essence itself, given that it is described by the Fathers both of the Sixth Ecumenical Council and the other ones as proceeding from the essence? How would it be possible for a thing to produce itself? Further, how would it be possible that the phrase 'each of the two' be applied to a thing absolutely identical with itself and one? Contrary to such an approach, St Anastasius speaks this way: "wherever energy exhibits itself, the essence whence the energy springs is conceived, too. For each of these two is incircumscribable and, for this reason, they are absolutely indivisible from each other". Since, therefore, these things are called "each of these two", energy is obviously different from essence; and since this [energy] is "incircumscribable", it is obviously subsistent and uncreated; for how could the "undescrivable" be created and non-subsistent?

So, the divine essence and energy differ from each other in reality, because, as has been sufficiently shown, they are both real things; on the other hand, they are divided and separated from one another only conceptually, not really; for, according to the divine Anastasius, "they cannot be separated from each other", just like the heatness in the fire cannot be separated from the fire and the sunlight from the sun. Even more, these things form a unity only partially (indeed, the sunlight is connected with the disk and its source only as far as some part of it, whereas its largest part runs through the end of the world), whereas in the case of the divine essence and energy the connection is not regarded as partial, but, since each of them is "incircumscribable", exists in each other in its totality.

Obviously, Theophanes' elaboration of Basil's conception of *ἐπίνοια* does not deviate from what Basil had said; rather, it is just a development of it<sup>127</sup> by means of the fourfold scheme "real difference" vs. "conceptual difference" and "real separation" vs. "conceptual separation".

127. See also THEOPHANES OF NICAIA's *De luce Thaborica* I,5, ll. 202-203: "...ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας κατ' ἐπίνοιαν διακρίνεται..."; phrase put in the mouth of the Palamites by the *persona* of an hypothetical objector to Theophanes' view of the Tabor light and silently accepted by Theophanes as theologically correct; ed. G.T. ZACHAROPOULOS, *Θεοφάνης Νικαίας (? - ±1380/1): ὁ βίος καὶ τὸ συγγραφικὸν τοῦ ἔργου* (Βυζαντινὰ κείμενα καὶ μελέται, vol. 35) (ad legendum magna cum cautela), Thessaloniki 2003, p. 135 = ed. C. SOTEROPOULOS, *Θεοφάνους Γ' ἐπισκόπου Νικαίας Περὶ Θαβωρίων φωτὸς λόγος πέντε τὸ πρῶτον νῦν ἐκδιδόμενοι. Εἰσαγωγή - κείμενον*, Athens 1990, p. 181, ll. 214-215; *Epistle I* (a.D. 1364): "...οὔτοι (sc. the anti-Palamites), τὸ ἀπλοῦν τῆς θείας φύσεως προβαλλόμενοι καὶ ταύτῃ μορμολύττειν τοὺς ἀπλουστέρους οὐόμενοι, τὴν τῆς θείας οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας διαφορὰν ἀναίρειν ὅλως ἐπιχειροῦσιν, ἐνέργειαν ὅλως λέγοντες τὸν Θεόν, ἤγγουν ζῶν καὶ σοφίαν καὶ δύναμιν, ἣ μηδαμῶς ἔχειν, ἣ, εἴπερ ἔχει, κτιστὴν εἶναι, πρὸς ἑαυτὸν στασιάζειν ἄντικρυς αὐτὸν λέγοντες καὶ τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἐκείνου τὴν ἑαυτῆς διάκρισιν μὴ δεχόμενοι, μηδαμῶς εἰς κοινωσίαν τῆς δόξης, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰ κτίσματα παραπέμπουσαν" (PG 150: 300A).

To him, God's essence and energy are both "really different" and "conceptually separate" from each other, even if these logical concepts, deriving from the realm of creation, fail to do justice to the supreme unity of essence and energy.

Still, using the rare term *πραγματικῶς* in the sense Theophanes does is quite unusual for a Greek author. Thus, it seems that Theophanes echoes here Demetrios Cydones' translation of Aquinas' *Summa contra Gentiles*, book II, ch. 12-13, where this term occurs in a context similar to that of Theophanes' text.<sup>128</sup> That Theophanes had read these Thomistic lines is certain, since, as has been firmly established,<sup>129</sup> he was a reader and eclectic user of Thomas Aquinas — a fact quite natural for a close collaborator of John VI Cantacouzenos. In these Thomistic lines, Theophanes would even have been able to find the idea that the relations between God and creature are "conceptual" in nature. Still, in the passage under discussion, Theophanes did not concede to Aquinas too much. For Theophanes,

128. "Ὅτι αἱ προειρημέναι ἀναφοραὶ οὐκ εἰσὶ πραγματικῶς ἐν τῷ Θεῷ"; "Ὅδδὲ δύναται λεχθῆναι ὡς αἱ προειρημέναι ἀναφοραὶ ὑφ' ἐστῆμασιν ἕξω ὥσπερ τινὰ πράγματα ἐκτὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ. ... Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ εἰσὶ καὶ οὐ λέγονται κατ' αὐτοῦ πραγματικῶς, λείπεται ἀποδόσθαι αὐτῷ ταύτας κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπινοίας" (cf. *supra*, p. 270, n. 19).

129. See I.D. POLEMIS, *Theophanes* (cf. *supra*, n. 108), pp. 68-70; 87-109; 122-126; IDEM, *Θεοφάνους Νικαίας, Ἀπόδειξις ὅτι ἐδύνατο ἕξ αἰδίου γεγενῆσθαι τὰ ὄντα καὶ ἀνατροπὴ ταύτης. Editio princeps. Εἰσαγωγή, κείμενο, μετάφραση, ἐνδετήρια* (Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi: Philosophi Byzantini, vol. 10), Athens 2000, pp. 42-46. With only one exception (THEOPHANES OF NICAIA, *De luce Thaborica* II,11, ll. 657-658; ed. ZACHAROPOULOS, *Θεοφάνους Νικαίας* [cf. *supra*, n. 127], p. 182; cf. POLEMIS, *Theophanes*, p. 107), ZACHAROPOULOS' fierce reaction (*op. cit.*, pp. 32-33; 320) to Polemis' evidence for Theophanes' dependence on Aquinas is not accompanied by sufficient supporting material, but is merely instigated by confessional motives. True, Theophanes' Thomism is an eclectic one. To mention just one of the cases that have thus far passed unnoticed, Theophanes, in ch. 36 of his *Ἀπόδειξις δι' ἐπιβολῶν τινῶν ἀναγκαίων νομιζομένων ὅτι ἐδύνατο ἕξ αἰδίου γεγενῆσθαι τὰ ὄντα καὶ ἀνατροπὴ ταύτης* (ed. POLEMIS, *op. cit.*, p. 39,1-9), uses unawededly many of Thomas' characteristic terms, which are quite unusual in Greek (e.g., "εἰδοποιὸν εἶδος" / "species informans" or "species specifica"; see, e.g., *Summa contra Gentiles* III,51,3 and 105,12; cf. *Vat. gr.* 616, ff. 56<sup>r</sup>; 122<sup>v</sup>), and subscribes to the Thomistic doctrine that the angels are pure (i.e., non-enmattered) forms (see, e.g., *Summa theologiae* I,50,1; cf. *Vat. gr.* 609, f. 73<sup>v</sup>; *Summa contra Gentiles* II,50-51; cf. *Vat. gr.* 610, ff. 152<sup>v</sup>-153<sup>v</sup>); yet he does so in order to establish the non-Thomistic doctrine (see, e.g., *Summa theologiae* I,61,3; cf. *Vat. gr.* 609, f. 83<sup>v</sup>; *De potentia*, 3,18; cf. *Coisl. gr.* 96, ff. 92<sup>v</sup>-93<sup>v</sup>) that the angels were created before the material world. Theophanes tacitly cites JOHN OF DAMASCUS' *Expositio fidei* 26,2-4; ed. KOTTER (cf. *supra*, n. 10), p. 75 (cf. *op. cit.* 17,75-81; ed. B. KOTTER, *op. cit.*, p. 48), referred to by AQUINAS, too, in *De potentia*, 3,8, arg. 2.



contrary to Aquinas, who, in saying that these relations are just “conceptual”, meant that their real basis should be placed only on the side of creatures, stresses that this “ἐπίνοια” corresponds to something real in God. Indeed, Theophanes, in a properly Palamite way, declares that God is not “in every aspect identical with Himself and one” (πάντη ταύτων καὶ ἓν). In so doing, he reproduces Palamas’ metaphysical statement that no being whatsoever can be ‘simple’ in the sense his enemies would like to take this term, for all beings by nature have some sort of natural or innate energy.<sup>130</sup>

And yet, this was not Theophanes’ last word on the issue. In his scholastically structured treatise *A Chain of Arguments for the Possibility that the World Could Have Been Created ab Aeterno, Deemed by Some as Conclusive - A Refutation of Them* (Ἀπόδειξις δι’ ἐπιβολῶν τινῶν ἀναγκαίων νομιζομένων ὅτι ἐδύνατο ἐξ αἰδίου γεγενῆσθαι τὰ ὄντα καὶ ἀνατροπὴ ταύτης), in particular in the context of the refutation of the first of nine arguments for the contrary position,<sup>131</sup> Theophanes explores the nature of the relation of God the Creator with His creature — a relation called “κτίσις”. Theophanes<sup>132</sup> mistakes John of Damascus’ statement that “γένεσις... κτιστή ἐστὶ”<sup>133</sup> for “the genesis of beings is something created” (“ἡ... γένεσις τῶν ὄντων κτιστή ἐστὶν”)<sup>134</sup> and sets out to qualify the createdness of God’s energy called “κτίσις” or “κτίζειν” (creating). To him,<sup>135</sup> “κτίζειν” and its passive correlate, “κτίζεσθαι”, are different things (“ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον”); still, “they are one in subject, differing only aspectually; for it is [a sort of] making, which, seen with respect to the maker, refers to him as to its principle, whereas viewed with respect to the thing

130. GREGORY PALAMAS, *Triads III,1*, 24: “Ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ εἰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ταύτην τῆς μιᾶς ἐκείνης οὐσίας φαίμεν ἀχώριστον, σύνθετος ἢ ὑπερουσίτης ἐκείνη παρὰ τοῦτο ἐστὶ. Ἡ γὰρ ἂν οὐδεμία ἦν ἀπλή οὐσία, εἴ γε τοῦτο ἦν οὐσίαν γὰρ φυσικῆς ἄνευ ἐνεργείας οὐδ’ ἠγνοῦν ἂν ἴδοις”; ed. CHRESTOU (cf. *supra*, n. 24), p. 637,3-7. Palamas made this statement many times by appealing to some Patristic authorities; see DEMETRACOPOULOS, *Αὐγουστίνος* (cf. *supra*, n. 28), pp. 55-56.

131. Par. 36 in POLEMIS’ edition (cf. *supra*, n. 129), pp. 30-42.

132. Ed. POLEMIS (cf. *supra*, n. 129), p. 35,19-20 (cf. app. font.).

133. “The term ‘genesis’ refers to the realm of creature” [in contrast with ‘γέννησις’, which refers to the divine realm]” (JOHN OF DAMASCUS, *Expositio fidei* 80,12-13, ed. KOTTER [cf. *supra*, n. 16], p. 179).

134. See also *op. cit.*: “...τὸ κτίζειν κτιστὸν δέδεικται εἶναι, σχέσις οὐσα τινῶν”; ed. POLEMIS (cf. *supra*, n. 129), p. 36,13-14.

135. *Op. cit.*, ed. POLEMIS (cf. *supra*, n. 129), p. 36,13-18.

made, it refers to it as result".<sup>136</sup> This is the first of the three kinds of distinction mentioned in his *Epistle to Paul* which he deemed inappropriate to be applied to the energies of God (v. *supra*, p. 306). This kind of distinction, which is a *distinctio rationis sine fundamento in re*, is the one Aquinas accepts as applicable to *Deus creator* in the passage from the *Summa contra Gentiles* II,13 just cited (p. 310, n. 128).

That Theophanes here has Aquinas in mind is indicated by the fact that he introduces the final elaboration of his opinion on the nature of God's relation with creation by using an argument against construing this relation as a real entity which Aquinas produces in the same chapter. The argument runs that, if this relation were taken as created, it would require postulating another creature, and so on in infinity, which is absurd. Let us see the passages themselves:

Theophanes: Εἰ γὰρ διὰ μέσου κτίσματος ἡ κτίσις παράγοιτο, κάκεινο πάλιν ἑτέρου γ' ἂν δεηθείη τοῦ μεσιτεύοντος πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γένεσιν· καὶ τοῦτο ἐπ' ἄπειρον.<sup>137</sup>

Thomas Aquinas: Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ ἔσχατον ἀγαθόν, ἀνάγκη ἂν ᾖ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀναφορὰς ἐκείνας τὰς πράγματα οὕσας ἀναφορὰς πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἑτέρας εὐρεῖν· καὶ εἰ κάκεινα πάλιν πράγματα εἶεν, ἀνάγκη πάλιν τρίτας σχέσεις εὐρεῖν· καὶ οὕτως ἐπ' ἄπειρον. Οὐκ ἄρα αἱ σχέσεις, αἷς ὁ Θεὸς πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἀνάγεται πράγματα, εἰσὶ τινὰ πράγματα ἔξω τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑφ' ἑστώτα.<sup>138</sup>

136. "Ταυτόν ἐστι τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, τῇ διαθέσει δὲ διενήνοχε· πόησις γὰρ ἐστὶν, ἥτις πρὸς μὲν τὸν ποιοῦντα ὡς εἰς ἀρχὴν ἀνάγεται, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ποιούμενον ὡς ἀποτελεσμα" (*ibid.*).

137. *Op. cit.*, ed. POLEMIS (cf. *supra*, n. 129), p. 36,20-22 ("If one supposes that creation was produced by means of a created being, then this being would also stand in need of being produced by another, and so on to infinity").

138. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles* II,13 ("Ὅτι αἱ σχέσεις, αἷς ὁ Θεὸς πρὸς τινὰ πράγματα λέγεται, οὐκ εἰσὶ πράγματα ἐκτὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑφ' ἑστώτα" or "Πῶς ἂν αἱ προειρημένα ἀναφορὰ περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ λέγοιτο"; "That the relations whereby God has a relation to some beings are not things existing outside of God", or "How the aforesaid relations are predicated of God"), par. 2; *Vat. gr. 610*, f. 106"). POLEMIS (*op. cit.*, p. 36,20-22, app. font. ad loc.) plausibly recalls a strikingly similar passage from GREGORY PALAMAS' *Against Gregoras* I,35: "Εἰ κτισταὶ εἰσὶν αἱ τοιαῦται ἐνέργειαι καὶ κτίσμα τὸ δημιουργεῖν ἐστὶν, ἑτέρας ἐδεῖτο τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας, ὥστε δημιουργηθῆναι, κάκεινη πάλιν ἑτέρας, καὶ τοῦτο ἐπ' ἄπειρον"; ed. CHRESTOU (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 258,3-6. That Theophanes had read Palamas' writings is certain. However, what crossed my mind as a tantalising suspicion is that Palamas' passage is a direct echo of that of Aquinas. This is historically possible; the translation of the *Summa contra Gentiles* was completed in late 1354, and Palamas' *Against Gregoras* was written in 1355/57; see R.E. SINKEWICZ, "Gregory Palamas", in: CONTICELLO-CONTICELLO (eds.) (cf. *supra*, n. 34), pp. 137; 145, N° 20. True, a similar argument occurs in some of Palamas' previous writings; *Περὶ θείας καὶ θεοποιῶ*

The editor of the text has shown that, in facing this issue, Theophanes was considerably influenced by Aquinas.<sup>139</sup> What I would like to add is that Theophanes may also have taken into account the recent translation (by Prochoros Cydones) of Thomas' *De potentia*,<sup>140</sup> especially q. 3, a. 3 (Utrum creatio sit aliquid realiter in creatura, et si est, quid sit), q. 7, a. 8 (Utrum sit aliqua relatio inter Deum et creaturam),

μεθέξεως ἢ περὶ τῆς θείας καὶ ὑπερφανῆς ἀπλότητος 12, ed. MANTZARIDES (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 77,28-31; *Epistle to John Gabras* 4, ed. MATSOUKAS (cf. *supra*, n. 12), p. 330,19-27. Still, the wording in these writings (θεῖον, ὄντα, and μετοχή) differs from that in Aquinas and Palamas' *Against Gregoras*; for a passage specifically similar to the earlier Palamite ones see MARCOS EUGENICOS, *Πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν εἰρημένων Μανουὴλ τῷ Καλέμα κατὰ τοῦ "Συνοδικοῦ τόμου" ἀντιρρητικὸς πρῶτος, ἢ περὶ διαζήσεως θείας οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας*; ed. M. PILAVAKIS, *Markos Eugenikos' "First Antirrhetic against Manuel Calecas about the Essence and Energy"*. *Editio Princeps with Introduction and Commentary* (unpublished Doct. Diss., King's College, University of London), 1987, p. 198,13-15. What makes this hypothesis more intriguing is that, should it be true, it entails the possibility that Theophanes of Nicaea as well as John VI Cantacouzenos, who felt free to produce a version of Thomistic Palamism, did so because they were aware of Palamas' use of this Thomistic passage. This hypothesis can be tested only after the edition of Demetrios Cydones' translation of the *Summa contra Gentiles*, which will enable us to compare it with what Palamas wrote after December 1354 till his death in late 1357 (as well as with what Nicephoros Gregoras wrote from late 1354 till his death in 1361). In any case, Theophanes, John VI Cantacouzenos, and the other Palamites were able to notice the objective similarity between Palamas' and Aquinas' arguments.

139. I.D. POLEMIS, *Theophanes* (cf. *supra*, n. 108), pp. 123-124. For all the objections raised by ZACHAROPOULOS, *Θεοφάνης* (cf. *supra*, n. 127), pp. 63-64, Polemis is right in stating that Theophanes asserts the createdness of the creative activity of God.

140. See S.G. PAPADOPOULOS, *Ἑλληνικαὶ μεταφράσεις ὁμοιωτικῶν ἔργων: φιλοθωμιστὰ καὶ ἀντιθωμιστὰ ἐν Βυζαντίῳ. Συμβολὴ εἰς τὴν ἱστορίαν τῆς βυζαντινῆς θεολογίας*, Athens 1967, pp. 55-56. The *De potentia* was translated not just before 1367/68, i.e., before the date of composition of Prochoros Cydones' *De essentia et operatione Dei*, where several lengthy chapters from it are contained (see a list in my forthcoming: "Prochoros Cydones"; ch. VII,2, par. 2 in: G. KAPRIEV [ed.], *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Begründet von F. ÜBERWEG. Die Philosophie des Mittelalters. Band 1/1: Jüdische und byzantinische Philosophie. Bandteil: Byzantinische Philosophie*, Basel), but even before 1359/61, since some passages from it are contained in NEILOS CABASILAS' *De processione Spiritus sancti* (V,41,1-14 = *De potentia*, 10,4 ad 24; ed. T. KISLAS, *Nil Cabasilas et la procession du Saint-Esprit. Introduction, édition critique, traduction et notes*, Paris 2001, p. 414; cf. p. 436), which was written around 1359/61, as well as in the same author's *Λόσεις τῶν προτάσεων τῶν Λατίνων, ἐξ ὧν συνάγειν οἴονται τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐκπροεῦεσθαι* XII,6,6-13 (= *De potentia*, q. 10, a. 4 ad 14; ed. KISLAS [cf. *supra*, n. 62], p. 575; cf. p. 760; cf. A. SPOURLAKOU-EUTYCHIADOU, "Τὰ 49 κεφάλαια ὑπὲρ τοῦ *Filioque* στὸ ἔργο τοῦ Νείλου Καβάσιλα", in: N. PANAGIOTAKES [ed.], *Ἄθνη χαρίτων. Μελετήματα ἐόρτια συγγραφέντα ἐπὶ τῶν ἐποτρόφων τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἰνστιτούτου Βυζαντινῶν καὶ Μεταβυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν τῆς Βενετίας ἐπὶ τῇ πεντακοσιετηρίδι ἀπὸ τῆς ιδρύσεως τῆς ἐλληνορθόδοξου κοινότητος Βενετίας, ἔτι δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ τεσσαρακονταετηρίδι ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνάρξεως τῆς λειτουργίας τοῦ Ἰνστιτούτου*, Venice 1998, pp. 661-695, esp. p. 693, note 146) (on the date of Neilos' anti-Latin writings, see KISLAS, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-87).

a. 9 (Utrum hujusmodi relationes, quae sunt inter creaturas et Deum, sint realiter in ipsis creaturis), a. 10 (Utrum Deus realiter referatur ad creaturam, ita quod ipsa relatio sit res aliqua in Deo), and a. 11 (Utrum istae relationes temporales sint in Deo secundum rationem),<sup>141</sup> where Aquinas produces at length the argument succinctly expounded in the *Summa contra Gentiles*. Especially the two last articles are quite close to the core of the Palamite controversy, and they would hardly escape one's attention — indeed, their direct relevance to the Palamite controversy along with Aquinas' reference to the *Filioque* (q. 8; q. 10, a. 4) can account for Prochoros Cydones' very decision to produce a translation of the *De potentia*. In these articles, Aquinas argues that *creatio* or *creare* should not be taken as a reality pertaining to God, but as a “sort of creature”. This is a summary of Aquinas' thought (*De potentia*, q. 3, a. 3, resp. ad 2):<sup>142</sup>

Ῥητέον ὅτι τινὲς ἔφασαν τὴν κτίσιν εἶναι τι ἐν τῇ τῶν ὄντων φύσει μέσον τοῦ κτίστου καὶ τῶν κτιστῶν. Καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ μέσον οὐδέτερον τῶν ἄκρων ἐστὶ, συνέβαινε τὴν κτίσιν μὴτε κτίστην εἶναι μὴτε κτιστόν. Τοῦτο δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν διδασκάλων<sup>143</sup> πλάνη τις εἶναι ἀποπέφανται. Ἐπεὶ πᾶν ὄν ὁπωδιῆποτε τρόπῳ ὑφ' ἑστώσ οὐκ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι εἰ μὴ παρὰ Θεοῦ, καὶ διατοῦτο ἐστὶ κτιστόν. Διὸ δὴ ἕτεροι ἔφασαν ὅτι αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις οὐ τίθησι πράγμα τι τῶν γε τῶν κτιστῶν μέρει. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο δοκεῖ ἀπεισιχός. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν ἅπασιν ὅσα πρὸς ἄλλα ἀναφέρεται, ὧν θάτερον θατέρον ἐξήρηται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνάπαλιν, ἐν τῷ πραγματωδῶς ἐξηρητημένῳ ἀναφορὰ πρᾶγματι εὐρίσκειται, ἐν δὲ θατέρῳ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν μόνον ὡσπερ δὴ καθορᾶται ἐν τε τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῷ ἐπιστητῷ, ὡς φησιν ὁ Φιλόσοφος ἐν τῷ ε' τῶν *Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*.<sup>144</sup> Τὰ κτίσματα δὲ ἐνεκά γε τοῦ ὀνόματος ἀναφέρεται ὑπὸ τῶν κτίστη. Καὶ ἐξήρηται αὐτὰ μὲν τούτου, οὐκ ἀνάπαλιν δέ. Ὅθεν χρὴ τὴν ἀναφορὰν, ἣ τὰ κτίσματα πρὸς τὸν κτίστην ἀναφέρεται, εἶναι πρᾶγματι ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἐν δὲ τῷ Θεῷ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν μόνον. Καὶ τοῦτο διαρρήδη ὁ Διδάσκαλος λέγει ἐν τῷ α' τῶν *Ἀξιωματικῶν*.<sup>145</sup> Καὶ διατοῦτο ῤητέον ὅτι

141. *Coisl. gr.* 96, ff. 33<sup>v</sup>-35<sup>v</sup>; 193<sup>f</sup>-201<sup>v</sup>. 3,3: “Πότερον ἢ κτίσις ἐστὶ τι χρῆμα ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἢ οὐ καὶ, εἴ ἐστι, τί ἐστὶ”; 7,8: “Πότερον ἐστι τις ἀναφορὰ μεταξὺ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τῶν δημιουργημάτων ἢ οὐ”; 7,9: “Πότερον αἰ τοιαῦται ἀναφοραὶ αἰ οὖσαι ἐν τῷ Θεῷ καὶ τῇ κτίσει εἰσὶ πρᾶγματι ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κτίσμασιν ἢ οὐ”; 7,10: “Πότερον ὁ Θεὸς πρᾶγματι ἀναφέρεται πρὸς τὴν κτίσιν, οὕτως ὥστε αὐτὴν τὴν ἀναφορὰν εἶναι τι πρᾶγμα ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, ἢ οὐ”; and 7,11: “Πότερον αὐταὶ αἰ ἐκ χρόνου ἀναφοραὶ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Θεῷ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν ἢ οὐ”.

142. *Coisl. gr.* 96, ff. 34<sup>r</sup>-35<sup>r</sup>.

143. Cf., e.g., GREGORY NAZIANZEN, *Oratio XXXI*, 6,13-17, edd. GALLAY-JOURJON (cf. *supra*, n. 30), p. 286.

144. ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics* V,15,9, 1021a29-30; cf. X,6,7, 1056b36-37.

145. PETER LOMBARD, *Sententiae*, I, dist. 30, cap. 1, ed. I. BRADY, Grottaferrata 1971, p. 220, 6-7.

ἡ 'κτίσις' δύναται λαμβάνεσθαι ἐνεργητικῶς τε καὶ παθητικῶς. Εἰ δὲ οὖν ληφθεῖ ἐνεργητικῶς, ταύτη μὲν ἐμφαίνει Θεοῦ ἐνέργειαν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, σὺν γέ τιμι ἀναφορᾷ πρὸς τὰ κτιστά· ἥτις δὲ ἀναφορὰ οὐκ ἔστι πράγματι, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν μόνον. Εἰ δὲ παθητικῶς ληφθεῖ, ἐπεὶ ἡ κτίσις, ὡς ἀνωτέρω εἴρηται (q. 3, a. 2), ἰδίως ὀνομάζουσιν οὐκ ἔστιν μεταβολή, οὐδ' οἶόν τε λέγεσθαι εἶναι τι ἐν τῷ τοῦ πάθους γένει, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ τῆς ἀναφορᾶς τελεῖ γένος. ... Αὕτη δὲ ἡ ἀναφορὰ κτίσμα τί ἐστι, ληφθέντος κοινῶς τοῦ τοῦ 'κτίσματος' ὀνόματος κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ ὄντος ἐκ Θεοῦ. Οὐ δεῖ δὲ προιέναι ἐπ' ἄπειρον, ὅτι ἡ τῆς 'κτίσεως' ἀναφορὰ οὐκ ἀναφέρεται εἰς τὸν Θεὸν ἐτέρᾳ ἀναφορᾷ ἐνυπάρκτω, ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτήν· "οὐδεμία γὰρ ἀναφορὰ δι' ἀναφορᾶς ἀνάγεται", ὡς ὁ Ἀβίκωνός φησιν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ *Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*.<sup>146</sup> Εἰ δέ γε τὸ τοῦ 'κτίσματος' ὄνομα ληψόμεθα ἰδιαίτερον ἐπὶ τοῦτου μόνον, ὃ ὑφέστηκεν (ὃ καὶ ἰδίως γίνεται καὶ κτίζεται, ὡσπερ ἰδίως ἔχει καὶ τὸ εἶναι), τηρικαῦτα δὲ ἡ προειρημένη ἀναφορὰ οὐκ ἔστι τι κτιστόν, ἀλλὰ συνεκτισμένον, ὡσπερ μηδέ ἐστιν ὃν ἰδίως ὀνομάζουσιν, ἀλλὰ προσπεφυκός. Τὸ δ' ὅμοιον καὶ περὶ πάντων τῶν συμβεβηκότων.<sup>147</sup>

146. AVICENNA, *Metaphysica* III,10 (ed. S. VAN RIET, Avicenna Latinus. *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*. I-IV. *Édition critique de la traduction latine médiévale. Introduction doctrinale* par G. VERBEKE, Louvain-Leiden 1977, pp. 180-181).

147. "I answer that some have said that creation is something real among beings between the Creator and the creature. And since the mean is neither of the extremes, it would follow that creation is neither the Creator nor the creature. But the Masters judged this to savour of error, since everything that in any way exists has its existence not otherwise than from God, and consequently is a creature. Wherefore others said that creation itself does not posit anything real, at least on the part of the created beings. But this would also seem unreasonable. Because in all those things that are referred the one to the other, the one depending on the other but not conversely, there is a real relation in the one that is dependent, and in the other there is a conceptual relation, as in the case of 'knowledge' and the 'thing known', as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics*, V. Now the creature by its very name is referred to the Creator: and depends on the Creator who does not depend on it. Wherefore the relation whereby the creature is referred to the Creator must be a real relation, while in God it is only a conceptual relation. The Master says this expressly in the *Sentences*, Book I. We must accordingly say that 'creation' may be taken actively or passively. Taken actively it denotes the act of God, which is his essence, together with a relation to the creature: and this is not a real but only a conceptual relation. But taken passively, since, as we have already said, it is not properly speaking a change, it must be said to belong, not to the genus of passion, but to that of relation. ... Now this relation is a kind of creature, taking 'creature' in a broad sense for anything that comes from God. Nor is it necessary to proceed to infinity, since the relation of creation is not referred to God by another real relation but by itself: because "no relation is related by another relation", as Avicenna says in his *Metaphysics*. If, however, we take 'creature' in a stricter sense for that only which subsists (which properly speaking is made and created, even as properly speaking it has being), then the aforesaid relation is not a created thing, but is concreated; even as properly speaking it is not a being, but something inherent. The same applies to all accidents" (*Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei (On the Power of God) by Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the English Dominican Fathers, Westminster, Maryland 1932 (repr. 1952); html edition by J. KENNY (http://www.op-stjoseph.org/Students/study/thomas/QDdePotentia.htm, modified in accordance with the Byzantine translation).*

All the salient elements of Theophanes' argument are contained in this Thomistic passage — the rather unfamiliar use of *κτίσις* (normally meaning the sum of the created beings<sup>148</sup>) in the sense of *κτιζειν*; the equally strange description of *κτίσις* as a kind of *κτίσιμα*; and the position that this kind of being should not be placed in an ontological *intervallum* between God's essence and the creature (as Palamas did), but in the realm of created beings, taken as a "passive movement" of theirs.<sup>149</sup>

Further, Theophanes would be content to see in q. 7, a. 9 (resp.) that Aquinas describes the ontological status of God's relations with the world in terms strikingly similar to Basil of Caesarea's description of the relative 'divine names' (at least in the way Prochoros Cydones rendered this article):<sup>150</sup>

Ῥητέον ὅτι ἡ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἀναφορά ἐστὶ πρᾶγμα τι ἐν τῇ κτίσει. Οὐ πρὸς ἐνάργειαν ἐπιστητέον ἂν εἶη ὅτι, ὡς φησι τὸ Ὑπόμνημα ἐν τῷ ια' τῶν Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά,<sup>151</sup> τὸ εἶναι τῶν πρὸς τι ἀδρανέστερόν ἐστι πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας. Διὸ καὶ τινες ᾤθησαν εἶναι ἐκ τῶν δευτέρων ἐπινοῶν. Τὰ γὰρ πρῶτα νοητὰ εἰσι πράγματα ἕξω τῆς ψυχῆς, εἰς ἃ πρῶτον ὁ νοῦς ἐφ' ᾧ νοῆσαι φέρεται. Δεύτερα δὲ νοητὰ λέγονται αἱ τῷ τοῦ νοεῖν τρόπῳ ἐπόμεναι ἐπιβολαί· ταῦτα γὰρ ὁ νοῦς δεύτερον νοεῖ, ἐφόσον εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνακάμπτει, νοῶν ἑαυτὸν νοοῦντα καὶ τὸν τρόπον, ᾧ νοεῖ. Κατὰ ταύτην τοίνυν τὴν θέσιν ἔψεται πρὸς τι μὴ εἶναι ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἕξω τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐν μόνῳ τῷ νῷ· ὡσπερ ἡ τοῦ γένους καὶ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπίνοια ἢ τῆς διαφορᾶς. Τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι οὐχ οἶόν τε. Ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ γὰρ κατηγορίᾳ γίνεται τι, εἰ μὴ τι ὃν εἶη ἕξω τῆς ψυχῆς ὑφ' ἑστώς. Τὸ γὰρ ἐν ἐπινοίᾳ ὃν ἀντιδιακρίνεται πρὸς τὸ ὄν τὸ ταῖς δέκα κατανενημημένον κατηγορίαις, ὡς φαίνεται ἐν τῷ ε' τῶν Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά.<sup>152</sup> Εἰ τοίνυν τὰ πρὸς τι μὴ εἶη ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἕξω τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἂν τίθιοτο εἷς τι γένος ἐν κατηγορίας.<sup>153</sup>

148. Cf. JOHN OF DAMASCUS' relevant lexical qualification; *Expositio fidei* 59,10-12; ed. KOTTER (cf. *supra*, n. 16), p. 144.

149. Let it be noted also that even the argument from the impossibility of a *regressus ad infinitum* is contained, too (cf. *supra*, pp. 312-313, n. 138).

150. *Coisl. gr.* 96, ff. 195<sup>v</sup>-196<sup>r</sup>.

151. AVERROES, *Metaphysica* XII,19. *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois Commentariis*. Vol. VIII. *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in eisdem Commentariis, et Epitome. Theophrasti Metaphysicorum liber...*, Venetiis 1562 (repr. Frankfurt am Main 1962), fol. 306B4-5.

152. ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics* V,7,4 (1017a23-27).

153. "I answer that relation to God is something real in the creature. To make this clear we must observe that, as the Commentator says in *Metaphysics* XI, of all the predicaments 'relation' has the least ontological weight. That is why some have thought that it should be reckoned among the second-rank concepts; for, indeed, the first-rank concepts are beings existent outside of the soul and the first things to be understood by the mind: whereas the second-rank concepts are certain 'intentions' consequent to our mode of

The obvious similarity of this passage to Basil's *Adversus Eunomium* I ("ἐπιβολαί" of "νοῦς"; "ἐπίνοιαι"; "ἐπίνοιαι" as concepts corresponding to real things in the being perceived and classified according to Aristotle's categories; cf. *supra*, p. 265, n. 5) established, both in Theophanes' consciousness and, probably, in the eyes of his Byzantine readership, a degree of continuity between what he had officially said in his *Letter to Paul* by plainly referring to Basil's text (cf. *supra*, p. 296) and what he argued in a more sophisticated way and on the basis of Aquinas' *De potentia* in his treatise on the non-eternity of the world.

Theophanes had also good reasons to be content with seeing that Aquinas, in accordance with the above, regarded the relation of creation with God as not merely conceptual ("intentio secunda" or "secundum intellectum" / "δευτέρα ἐπίνοια" or "δεύτερον νοητόν") but real ("intentio prima" or "primum intellectum" / "πρώτη ἐπίνοια" or "πρώτον νοητόν"). Aquinas concluded:<sup>154</sup>

Οὕτω τοίνυν χρεῶν τὰ πρὸς τι τάξιν ἔχοντα πράγματα πραγματικῶς ἀναφέρεσθαι πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ τὴν ἀναφορὰν εἶναι τι χρεῖμα ἐν αὐτοῖς. Πάντα δὲ τὰ ὄντα ἀναφέρονται πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἀρχὴν καὶ ὡς πρὸς τέλος. ... Ὅθεν ἐχρῆν τὰ ὄντα πραγματικῶς πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἀναφέρεσθαι καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀναφορὰν εἶναι τι χρεῖμα ἐν τοῖς κτίσμασιν.<sup>155</sup>

Indeed, this view of the ontological status of *create* seemed to put a demarcation line between what Theophanes and some anti-Palamites

understanding: the mind grasps them in a second stage, inasmuch as it reflects on itself and knows both the fact that it understands and the manner of its understanding. According then to this view it would follow that 'relation' has no objective reality, but exists only in the mind, even as the notion of genus or species and of second substances. But this is impossible: because nothing is assigned to a predicament unless it has objective reality: since conceptual being is divided against the being that is divided by the ten predicaments, as is apparent in *Metaphysics*, V. If, therefore, the relatives do not belong to the beings existing outside of the soul, it would not be assigned a place of its own among the predicaments" (translation by the English Dominican Fathers (cf. *supra*, n. 147), modified according to the Byzantine translation).

154. *Coisl. gr.* 96, f. 196<sup>r</sup>.

155. "Accordingly things that are ordered to something must be really related to it, and this relation must be some real thing in them. Now all creatures are ordered to God both as to their beginning and as to their end. ... Therefore beings must be really related to God, and this relation must be something real in the creatures" (translation by the English Dominican Fathers, slightly modified; cf. *supra*, n. 147). See also THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae* I, 45,3: "Utrum creatio sit aliquid in creatura". Cf. M.M. ROSSI, "Creatio in creatura non est nisi relatio quaedam": riflessioni su *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 45, a. 3", in: D. LORENZ (ed.), *Istituto San Tommaso. Studi* 1996, Rome 1996, pp. 153-181, esp. p. 170 sqq.

thought on this issue, the latter holding a view that turned the energies of God into purely mental entities and thus made them vanish into thin air. Still, borrowing theological ideas from the *De potentia* was just as risky for the borrower's fidelity to Palamism, for in q. 7, a. 10 (resp.) Theophanes could see Aquinas plainly stating that

ὁ... Θεὸς οὐ ποιεῖ δι' ἐνεργείας μεσιτευούσης, ἣ νοοῖτο ἂν ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ προϋούσα καὶ εἰς τὴν κτίσιν τελευτῶσα, ἀλλ' ἡ αὐτοῦ ἐνέργεια ἐστὶν ἡ αὐτοῦ οὐσία· καὶ ὅ,τι ποτε ἐν αὐτῷ ἔστιν, ἔστιν ἔξω πάντῃ τοῦ γένους τοῦ κτιστοῦ εἶναι, δι' οὗ ἡ κτίσις ἀναφέρεται πρὸς αὐτόν.<sup>156</sup>

Even Aquinas' idea that *actio*, taken as a case of *relatio*, contrary to the categories of quality and quantity, does not entail composition or mutation for its bearer, although it stands in line with a similar statement by Gregory Nazianzen (cf. *supra*, p. 276, n. 34) and sounds compatible with Palamism (cf. *supra*, pp. 275-276), is quite anti-Palamite. For Aquinas does not take God's *actio* as a sort of being adjacent to God's being, but just as an abusive way of expressing a fact regarding the created world.<sup>157</sup>

What makes things even more complicated is that the passages from Aquinas' *De potentia* which inspired Theophanes (see *supra*, pp. 313-317) had been included in Prochoros Cydones' *De essentia et operatione Dei*, supposedly refuted by John VI Cantacouzenos and Theophanes. In detail, ch. IV,<sup>158</sup> coincides with *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 3, and ch. V,6-9<sup>159</sup> coincides with *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 8-11.

Further, what makes Theophanes' dependence on Aquinas' text even more impressive is the affectionate way he introduces the exposition of 'his' ideas: "Each person, to the degree that this is granted to him by God's grace, to the extent of his intellectual power to grasp such things, and to the extent of his literary skill, might think of this or that solution. As far as I am concerned, I think that one should

156. *Coisl. gr.* 96, f. 199<sup>v</sup>: "Now God does not work by an intermediary action to be regarded as issuing from God and terminating in the creature: but his action is His substance; and whatever exists in Him is wholly outside the genus of created being whereby the creature is related to him" (translation by the English Dominican Fathers; cf. *supra*, n. 147).

157. THOMAS AQUINAS, *De potentia*, 7,8: "Ὁ δὲ ἀποδίδοται τινι ὡς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ εἰς ἄλλο προϋόν, οὐ ποιεῖ σύνθεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ· ὡσπερ οὐδὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια σύνθεσιν ποιεῖ μετὰ τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος. ... Οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μεταβολὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, εἰ μὴ μεταφορικῶς καὶ καταχρηστικῶς" (*Coisl. gr.* 96, f. 193<sup>v</sup>).

158. Edd. FILOVSKI-PETRUSEVSKI (cf. *supra*, n. 101), pp. 169-172.

159. *Art. cit.*, pp. 179-192.



not despise the following solution to the question, namely, that..."<sup>160</sup> These lines suggest that Theophanes had in mind a concrete solution offered by a particular author and he privileged this solution against all the others he was aware of; and this solution was that offered in Aquinas' *De potentia*.

Given the Thomistic origins of his argument, it comes as a surprise that Theophanes concludes by describing God's energy as *actus purus*: "μόνον ἀχραιφνής τις ἐνέργεια".<sup>161</sup> True, he immediately draws a distinction between this energy and God's "nature" (φύσις), whence this energy emanates;<sup>162</sup> and he also distinguishes between the nature of God, His eternal power or absolute (non-relative) energy, and His relative (i.e., *ad extra* or activated) energy.<sup>163</sup> Should these distinctions be seen in the light of what he said in his *Epistle to the Archbishop Paul* (cf. *supra*, pp. 307; 310), i.e., as *πραγματική* (not merely conceptual), or in the light of what he says in the treatise under discussion? I would vote for the latter. These distinctions form part of this treatise. Further, they can perfectly be placed in Theophanes' Thomist doctrine of *creare* as, properly speaking, a concomitant quality of the created beings and only conceptually having to do with God. Thus it seems that Theophanes construed these distinctions in the sense that Thomas himself allowed them to be drawn, i.e., "κατ' ἐπίνοιαν":

God is the first measure of all beings. He is to them as the object is to our knowledge, that is to say, its measure. Though the object is spoken of in relation to the knowledge of it, nevertheless the relation really is not in the object known, but only in the knowledge of it. The object is said to be in the relation, not because it is itself related, but because something else is related to it.<sup>164</sup> ... Since then it has been shown that

160. *Op. cit.* 36, ed. POLEMIS (cf. *supra*, n. 129), p. 37,1-4.

161. *Ibid.* (*op. cit.*, p. 42,18).

162. *Ibid.* (*op. cit.*, p. 42,19-20).

163. *Op. cit.* 36; 37 (*op. cit.*, pp. 42,24-43,6). Theophanes was also concerned to present his views as consonant with those of Cantacouzenos; that is why he inserted into his letter some of the patristic passages cited in Cantacouzenos' letters; see POLEMIS, *Theophanes* (cf. *supra*, n. 108), p. 69.

164. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles* II,12 (Quod relationes dictae de Deo ad creaturas non sunt realiter in Deo / "Ότι αἱ εἰρημέναι περὶ Θεοῦ πρὸς τὰ κτίσματα ἀναφοραὶ οὐκ εἰσὶ πραγματικῶς ἐν τῷ Θεῷ), 2 (translation by J. RICKABY; cf. *supra*, n. 87):

1. Αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἀποτελέσματα οὐσαι τοιαῦται ἀναφοραὶ πραγματικῶς ἐν τῷ Θεῷ εἶναι οὐ δύνανται.

2. α' Ὡς μὲν γὰρ συμβεβηκότα ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι οὐ δύνανται, οὐδενὸς ὄντος ἐν αὐτῷ συμβεβηκότος, ὡς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ βιβλίῳ (I,23) δέδεικται. Ἄλλ' οὐδ' αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ

they [i.e., the relations between God and the creature] are not in Him and yet are predicated of Him, the only possible conclusion is that they are attributed to Him merely by our mode of thought (κατὰ τὸν τρόπον μόνον τῆς ἐπινοίας), inasmuch as other things are in relation with him.<sup>165</sup>

εἶναι δύναται. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ “πρὸς τί εἰσιν, ἅτινα κατὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτῶν πρὸς τί πως ἔχουσιν”, ὡς ὁ Φιλόσοφος ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις (ARISTOTLE, *Categorías* 7, 6a36-37) φησὶν, ἀνάγκη ἂν ᾖ αὐτὴν τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὅτι ποτ’ ἐστί, πρὸς ἕτερον λέγεσθαι. Ὁ δὲ “τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστί, πρὸς ἕτερον λέγεται” (*ibid.*), ἐκείνου κατὰ τινὰ τρόπον ἤρτηται, μήτ’ εἶναι μήτε νοεῖσθαι χωρὶς ἐκείνου δυνάμενον. Ἀνάγκη τοίνυν ἂν ᾖ τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐσίαν ἐξωτερικοῦ τινος ἐτέρου ἠρτηῆσθαι. Οὐκ ἄρα αἰ τοιαῦται ἀναφοραὶ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ εἰσιν ὡς τινὰ πράγματα.

3. β’ Ἐτι, δέδεικται ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ (I,28,8; I,42,6; I,62,5) ὅτι “πάντων ὄντων μέτρον ἐστίν” ὁ Θεός (cf. Sap. 11,20; cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I,3,5 arg. 2; 10,4 arg. 3; 13,5 arg. 3 (where this position is explicitly attributed to ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics* IX,1); PS.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITE, *De divinis nominibus* II,10, ed. SUCHLA (cf. *supra*, n. 11), pp. 134,15; 147,9; *Liber de causis* XV,135, ed. A. PATTIN, *Le Liber de causis. Edition établie à l’aide de 90 manuscrits avec introduction et notes*, Leiden 1966, p. 82,97-100; ex PROCLI *Institutio theologica* 92 and 117, ed. DODDS (cf. *supra*, n. 40), pp. 83; 102,28). Δρᾷ τοίνυν ὁ Θεός εἰς τὰ ἄλλα ὄντα ὡσπερ τὸ “ἐπιστητὸν” πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν “ἐπιστήμην” (cf. ARISTOTLE, *Categorías* 7, 6b33-35), ὅτι ταύτης μέτρον ἐστίν: ἐκ γάρ τοῦ τὸ πρᾶγμα “εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι” “ὁ λόγος” ἢ “ἡ δόξα” “ἀληθής ἐστίν ἢ ψευδής” κατὰ τὸν Φιλόσοφον ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις (ARISTOTLE, *Categorías* 5, 4a23-28; 4a34-b2; cf. *De interpretatione* 9, 19a33). Τὸ δὲ “ἐπιστητὸν”, εἰ καὶ ἀναφορικῶς λέγεται πρὸς τὴν “ἐπιστήμην” (ARISTOTLE, *Categorías* 7, 6b33-35; *Metaphysics* V,14,1, 1020b31), ἴσως ἢ σχέσις, ὡς πρᾶγμα, οὐκ ἐστίν ἐν τῷ ἐπιστητῷ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. Ὅθεν κατὰ τὸν Φιλόσοφον ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ τῶν Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά τὸ “ἐπιστητὸν” λέγεται ἀναφορικῶς οὐχ ὅτι τοῦτο πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέρεται, ἀλλ’ ὅτι “ἕτερον ἀναφέρεται πρὸς αὐτό” (ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics* V,14,8, 1021a29-30). Αἰ εἰρημέναι ἄρα ἀναφοραὶ πραγματικῶς ἐν τῷ Θεῷ οὐκ εἰσίν.

4. γ’ Ἐτι, αἰ εἰρημέναι ἀναφοραὶ λέγονται περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐ μόνον τῇ παραθέσει τῶν ἐνεργείων ὄντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν δυνάμει, ἐπειδὴ κἀκείνων εἰς τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τῇ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα παραθέσει καὶ “πρῶτον ὄν” (I,13-14; II,6) λέγεται καὶ “ἔσχατον ἀγαθόν” (I,41). Ἄλλὰ τοῦ ἐνεργεία ὄντος πρὸς τὸ δυνάμει μόνον ὄν οὐκ εἰσὶ σχέσεις πραγματικά: εἰ γὰρ μή, εἶπετο ἂν εἶναι ἀπείρους ἐνεργεία σχέσεις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, τῶν μειζόνων ἀριθμῶν τοῦ δύο ἀπείρων ὄντων δυνάμει, ὧν πάντων αὐτὸς πρότερος. Ὁ δὲ Θεός οὐχ ἐτέρως ἀναφέρεται πρὸς τὰ ἐνεργεία ὄντα ἢ πρὸς τὰ ἐν δυνάμει: ἐπεὶ οὐ μεταβάλλεται τῷ παράγειν τινὰ (I,13,24; 14,4). Οὐκ ἄρα πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἀναφέρεται ἀναφορᾷ πραγματικῶς ἐν αὐτῷ ὑφεστώσῃ.

5. δ’ Ἐτι, ὁ ἂν ἐκ νέου ἐπίη τινί, ἀνάγκη ἐκεῖνο μεταβάλλεσθαι ἢ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηχός. “Σχέσεις” δὲ “τινες” ἐκ νέου “λέγονται” “κατὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ”, ὡσπερ ὅτι “Κύριος” ἢ “διοικητής” ἐστὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, οὗ “νῦν ἤρξατο εἶναι” (AUGUSTINUS, *De Trinitate* V,16,17). Εἰ τοίνυν κατηγοροῦτο σχέσις τις πραγματικῶς ἐν τῷ Θεῷ ὑφεστώσα, εἶπετο ἂν τι ἐκ νέου τῷ Θεῷ ἐπιέναι, καὶ οὕτω μετεβάλλετο ἂν ἢ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηχός. Οὗ τὸ ἐναντίον δέδεικται ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ βιβλίῳ (*ibid.*) (Vat. gr. 610, ff. 105<sup>v</sup>-106<sup>v</sup>).

165. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles* II,13 (Quomodo praedictae relationes de Deo dicantur / “Ὅτι αἰ σχέσεις, αἷς ὁ Θεός πρὸς τινὰ πράγματα λέγεται, οὐκ εἰσὶ πράγματα ἐκτὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑφεστώσα (ἐν ἄλλοις ἢ ἐπιγραφῇ: Πῶς ἂν αἰ προειρημέναι ἀναφοραὶ περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ λέγοντο), 1; translation by J. RICKABY (cf. *supra*, n. 87): 1. Οὐ δύναται δὲ λέγεσθαι ὡς αἰ προειρημέναι ἀναφοραὶ ὑφεστήκασιν ἕξω ὡσπερ τινὰ πράγματα ἐκτὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ.

2. α’ Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ Θεός τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἀρχή (I,13-14; II,6) καὶ ἔσχατον ἀγαθόν (I,41), ἀνάγκη ἂν ᾖ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀναφορὰς ἐκείνας τὰς πράγματα οὔσας ἀναφορὰς πρὸς τὸν Θεόν

It should be added that, in this context, Theophanes<sup>166</sup> appeals to the subsequent passage from Maximus Confessor's *Disputatio cum Pyrrho*: "It is not possible to think and speak of 'relation' without things related".<sup>167</sup> He then poses this proposition as a premise in a syllogism that goes as follows: "But 'creating' is a relation. Without it, therefore, this relation cannot exist".<sup>168</sup> This passage, which, as far as I know, does not occur in Palamas' writings, is one of those beloved to John Cyparissiotis, an anti-Palamite author with clear Thomistic influence,<sup>169</sup> who draws from it the same conclusion.<sup>170</sup> Nicephoros Gregoras also appealed to it in the context of his anti-Palamite polemics.<sup>171</sup>

ἐτέρας εὐρεῖν· καὶ εἰ κάκεινα πάλιν πράγματα εἶεν, ἀνάγκη πάλιν τρίτας σχέσεις εὐρεῖν, καὶ οὕτως ἐπ' ἄπειρον. Οὐκ ἄρα αἱ σχέσεις, αἷς ὁ Θεὸς πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἀνάγεται πράγματα, εἰσι τινα πράγματα ἐκτὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑφ'εστῶτα.

3. β' Ἔτι, διπλοῦς ἐστὶ τρόπος, ὃν τι παρωνύμως κατηγορεῖται. Παρονομάζεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὄντος αὐτοῦ· ὡσπερ ἀπὸ τοῦ τόπου λέγεται τις "εἶναι που", καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ χρόνου "ποτέ". Ἐτερον δὲ τι παρονομάζεται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνόητος αὐτῶ· ὡσπερ ἀπὸ τῆς λευκότητος "λευκός". Ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς σχέσεως οὐδὲν εὐρίσκειται παρονομαζόμενον ὡσπερ ἐκτὸς ὑφ'εστῶσης, ἀλλ' ἐνούσης· οὐ γὰρ παρονομάζεται τις "πατήρ" εἰ μὴ ἀπὸ τῆς πατρότητος, ἧτις αὐτῶ ἐνεσθιν. Οὐκ ἄρα δυνατόν τὰς ἀναφοράς, αἷς ὁ Θεὸς πρὸς τὰ κτίσματα ἀναφέρεται, εἶναι τινα πράγματα ἐκτὸς αὐτοῦ. Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν δέδεικται (II,12) μὴ εἶναι ταύτας ἐν τούτῳ πραγματικῶς, καὶ πάλιν κατὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ λεγομένας (sic pro λέγονται; "dicuntur"), καταλείπεται ταύτας ἀπονέμεσθαι τούτῳ κατὰ τὸν τρόπον μόνον τῆς ἐπινοίας, καθὸ τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀναφέρονται. Ὁ γὰρ ἡμέτερος νοῦς τῶ νοεῖν ἕτερόν τι πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέρεσθαι, συννοεῖ καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἐκείνου πρὸς τοῦτο, εἰ καὶ ποτε κατὰ τὸ πρῶγμα οὐκ ἀναφέρεται.

4. Καὶ οὕτω φανερόν ὅτι κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον λέγονται περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ αἱ εἰρημίαι ἀναφοραὶ καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ κατηγορούμενα. Πάντα μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα, ὡσπερ ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ θέλησις, τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ δηλοῦσιν, αἱ δὲ εἰρημίαι ἀναφοραὶ οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μόνον τὸν τῆς ἐπινοίας τρόπον. "Ὁμοῦς οὐδ'" ὁ νοῦς ἐστὶ ψευδής· καθὸ γὰρ ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν θείων ἀποτελεσμάτων νοεῖ εἰς αὐτὸν ὀριζομένας τὸν Θεόν, ἀναφορικῶς τινα κατηγορεῖ τοῦ Θεοῦ· ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ "ἐπιστητὸν" νοοῦμεν καὶ σημαίνομεν, καθὸ ἡ "ἐπιστήμη" ἀναφέρεται εἰς αὐτό (cf. *supra*, n. 144) (*Vat. gr. 610*, ff. 106<sup>v</sup>-107<sup>v</sup>).

166. *Op. cit.* 36, ed. POLEMIS (cf. *supra*, n. 129), p. 36,4-5.

167. "Ὁὐ γὰρ δυνατόν τὴν σχέσιν ἄνευ σχετῶν νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν" (PG 91: 316D).

168. *Op. cit.* 36, ed. POLEMIS (cf. *supra*, n. 129), p. 36,5-7.

169. See J.A. DEMETRAKOPOULOS, "Georgios Gemistos-Plethon's Dependence on Thomas Aquinas' *Summa contra Gentiles* and *Summa Theologiae*", in: *Archiv für mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur* 12 (2006), pp. 276-341, esp. 287-293.

170. JOHN CYPARISSIOTES, *Κατὰ Νεῖλον Καβάσιλα* IV,4; 5; V,2; 5, ed. S.T. MARANGOUAKES, *Ἰωάννου τοῦ Κοπριαρισσίου Κατὰ Νεῖλον Καβάσιλα λόγοι πέντε ἀντιροητικοὶ νῦν τὸ πρῶτον ἐκδιδόμενοι*, Athens 1985, pp. 173,12-13; 184,11-13; 236,14; 252,12-13; *Τῶν θεολογικῶν ὁήσεων ἔκθεσις στοιχειώδης* III, 3; 4, ed. B.L. DENTAKES, *Ἰωάννου τοῦ Κοπριαρισσίου Τῶν θεολογικῶν ὁήσεων ἔκθεσις στοιχειώδης. Τὸ κείμενον νῦν τὸ πρῶτον ἐκδιδόμενον*, Athens 1982, pp. 115,11-12 and 117,4-6; 125,22-23.

171. NICEPHOROS GREGORAS, *Oratio dogmatica* I (= *Historia Romana* XXIII), 106: "Τὴν ἐνέργειαν ταύτην ἐν τοῖς συνθέτοις κτίσμασι χρῆ νοεῖν «κίνησιν οὐσαν ἐνεργουμένην», ὡς ὁ θεὸς ἐκ Δαμασκίου φησιν Ἰωάννης (JOHN OF DAMASCUS, *Expositio fidei* 59,13-14;

Theophanes' semi-Palamism becomes apparent also from his silence regarding the distinction between the various divine energies. As far as I was able to determine, Theophanes' only reference to the question on the unity or multiplicity of God's energy runs as follows:<sup>172</sup> "From the quality and the operation of these images [sc. of the creatures, which are images of their Creator] the diversity of the simple energy of God is faintly revealed". This is just a latent paraphrase of a passage from John of Damascus' *Expositio fidei*,<sup>173</sup> where emphasis is obviously laid upon the simplicity of the divine energy.<sup>174</sup>

That Theophanes should be included among the latent yet conscious (even though not as rigid as, e.g., Scholarios) Byzantine Thomists is that, just few lines earlier, he explicitly reproduces Thomas' *analogia entis*:

... Ὑμνεῖ τοῦτον ἡ θεολογία καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων τῶν ὄντων ὡς "ὄντα", ὑπερούσιον ὄντα, διὰ τὸ ἐμπερὲς ἀμωσγέπως καὶ ὅμοιον πρὸς αὐτὸν τῶν ὄντων· καὶ γὰρ καὶ "ἥλιος" καὶ "φῶς" καὶ "πῦρ" καὶ "πνεῦμα" καὶ "ὔδωρ" ὀνομάζεται καὶ ἕτερόν τι αὐτῶν, καὶ ἔστι μετρία καὶ τοῦθ' ὑπάνοιξις τῆς κατὰ τὴν θεολογίαν μνήσεώς τε καὶ γνώσεώς...<sup>175</sup>

ed. KOTTER (cf. *supra*, n. 16), p. 145) "Ἦτις καὶ σχέσις ἐστὶ συνθετικὴ τῶν ἄκρων καὶ «ἄνευ τῶν σχετῶν νοεῖσθαι» (MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *loc. cit.*) μὴ δυναμένη· ἄκρα δὲ φημι τὸ τε ἐνεργεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργούμενον"; ed. L. SCHOPEN, *Νικηφόρου τοῦ Γρηγοροῦ Ῥωμαϊκῆ ἱστορία. Corpus scriptorum historiae Byzantinae, Pars XIX,1: Nicephorus Gregoras, Vol. I, Bonn 1829, p. 339,10-15.*

172. THEOPHANES OF NICAIA, *Λόγος εἰς τὴν πανάχαρτον καὶ παναγίαν δέσποιναν ἡμῶν Θεοτόκον 2*, ed. M. JUGIE, *Theophanes Nicaenus. Sermo in sanctissimam Deiparam, ubi multa de mediatione ejus universalī necnon de ratione Incarnationis. Textus graecus cum interpretatione latina*, Rome 1936, p. 12,1-3: "Ἀπὸ τῆς ποιότητός τε καὶ ἐνεργείας τουτουῶν τῶν εἰκότων τὸ ποικίλον τῆς ἀπλῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐνεργείας ἀμυδρῶς πως ἀποκαλύπτεται...".

173. JOHN OF DAMASCUS, *Expositio fidei* 14,19-21, ed. KOTTER (cf. *supra*, n. 16), p. 42. Cf. *op. cit.* 10,12-16, ed. KOTTER, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

174. John's passage is one of those specifically cited and interpreted by JOHN CYPARISSIOTES (*Κατὰ τῶν τοῦ Παλαμικοῦ τόμον διαζοίσεων καὶ ἐνώσεων ἐν τῷ Θεῷ VI,6*, ed. LIAKOURAS (cf. *supra*, n. 29), pp. 358,6-359,5) (cf. *op. cit.* VIII,12; ed. LIAKOURAS, *op. cit.*, p. 416,15). Of course, it is also commented on by some Palamites; see, e.g., PHILOTHEOS KOKKINOS, *Against Gregoras VI*,1560-1570; ed. KAIMAKES (cf. *supra*, n. 13), pp. 215-216; still, it obviously admits more easily an anti-Palamite than a Palamite interpretation. Thus, if one would like to support Palamas' position on the distinction of the various energies of God, one would be expected to have recourse to other passages.

175. THEOPHANES OF NICAIA, *Λόγος εἰς τὴν πανάχαρτον καὶ παναγίαν δέσποιναν ἡμῶν Θεοτόκον 2*, ed. JUGIE (cf. *supra*, n. 172), pp. 10,14-11,3 ("Theology praises Him on the basis of the names of the beings as «being» (although He lies above being), because of his being somewhat like and similar with the beings; for instance, He is called «sun», «light», «fire», «wind», «water» et sim., and this, too, constitutes a sufficient way of being introduced to gain knowledge about God...").

Here Theophanes paraphrases Aquinas' *Summa contra Gentiles* I,29 (Περὶ τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁμοιότητος πρὸς τὰ κτίσματα), 2, which<sup>176</sup> is but the metaphysical background to Aquinas' doctrine of the 'divine names' implicitly adopted by John VI Cantacouzenos:

Τὰ γὰρ ἀποτελέσματα τὰ τῶν οἰκείων αἰτιῶν ἀποδέοντα οὐ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῖς οὔτε κατὰ τοῦνομα οὔτε κατὰ τὸν λόγον. Ὅμως ἀνάγκη ὁμοιότητα τινὰ εὐρίσκεισθαι ἐν αὐτοῖς· κατὰ τὴν φύσιν γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ ποιοῦντος, ἵνα τὸ ποιοῦν ὁμοιον ἑαυτῷ ποιῇ, ἐπειδὴ ἕκαστον, καθόσον ἐστίν, ἐνεργεῖα ποιεῖ. Ὅθεν τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος ἐν τῇ ἐξηρημένη αἰτίᾳ εὐρίσκειται μὲν ἀμηγέπη, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἕτερον τρόπον καὶ ἐτέραν αἰτίαν, ἥς τῷ λόγῳ ἡ αἰτία ὁμώνυμος λέγεται. Ὁ γὰρ ἥλιος ἐν τοῖς ὑποκάτω σώμασι τῷ δρᾶν αἰτιός ἐστι θερμῆς, καθό ἐστιν ἐνεργεῖα· ὅθεν ἀνάγκη τὴν γινομένην ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου θερμότητα ἔχειν τινὰ ὁμοιότητα πρὸς τὴν ἐνεργητικὴν δύναμιν τοῦ ἡλίου, δι' ἣς ἡ θερμὴ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκάτω τοῦτοις τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχει, ἥστινος τῷ λόγῳ 'θερμὸς' ὁ ἥλιος λέγεται, εἰ καὶ μὴ κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον. Καὶ οὕτως ὁ ἥλιος πᾶσιν ἐκείνοις ἀμηγέπη ὁμοιος λέγεται, οἷς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἀποτελέσματα ἐνίησι δραστηκῶς· οἷς πάλιν πᾶσιν ἀνόμοιός ἐστι, καθόσον τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποτελέσματα οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τὴν θερμὴν κέκτηνται, ὅς ἐν τῷ ἡλίῳ εὐρίσκειται. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ ὁ Θεὸς πάσας τελειότητας τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀπονέμει, καὶ διατοῦτο ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἅπαντα ἔχει, ὁμοῦ δὲ καὶ ἀνομοιότητα.

It is again the rare word "ἀμηγέπη" (recognisably modified by Theophanes to "ἀμωσγέπως"), by which (or by "ἀμηγέπη") Demetrios Cydones renders Aquinas' "aliquatenus" and "aliquialiter",<sup>177</sup> which betrays Theophanes. What shows that Theophanes treated Aquinas as an authority is that he discovered Aquinas' Ps.-Dionysian source,<sup>178</sup> where both the doctrine of the *analogia entis* (expressed in terms of cause and result) occurs and the simile of sun and heat is used, and he reproduced Aquinas' passage by enriching it with Ps.-Dionysian material, such as the remaining instances of divine names.

It seems, therefore, that Theophanes' Palamism is less Palamite even than the mitigated Palamism of John VI Cantacouzenos. As for the discrepancy between the views expressed by Theophanes in his

176. *Vat. gr.* 610, f. 36<sup>v</sup>.

177. For "aliquatenus" see, e.g., *Summa contra Gentiles* I, 31,2; 35,2; 49,3 (*Vat. gr.* 610, ff. 38<sup>v</sup>; 41<sup>v</sup>; 54<sup>r</sup>). For "aliquialiter" see, e.g., *Summa contra Gentiles* I, 28,3; 29,2; 31,2; 35,2; 43,8; 49,3; 54,9; 66,10; 67,1; 89,4; 89,9; 91,9 (*Vat. gr.* 610, ff. 35<sup>v</sup>; 36<sup>v</sup>; 38<sup>v</sup>; 41<sup>v</sup>; 48<sup>v</sup>; 54<sup>r</sup>; 58<sup>r</sup>; 68<sup>r</sup>; 68<sup>v</sup>; 88<sup>v</sup>; 88<sup>v</sup>; 91<sup>r</sup>).

178. PS.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITE, *De divinis nominibus* I,6; II,8, ed. SUCHLA (cf. *supra*, n. 11), pp. 118,11-119,9; 132,14-133,4.

two texts, I would be prepared to subscribe to the explanation<sup>179</sup> that writing a text in order to explain and defend an ecclesiastical doctrine officially sanctioned just a few years earlier did not allow for the expression of personal views. What Theophanes allowed himself to do in this context was only to insert into his writing some Thomistic phrases; and he postponed the full development of their meaning for a literary occasion presumably apt for such a purpose. That he saw his treatise on the *novitas mundi* as such an occasion is indicated by the fact that the development of his ideas on the problem of the distinction between God's essence and energies does not form an organic part of the treatise. The treatise, almost fifty pages long, contains nine arguments for the possibility or the necessity of the eternity of the world (five pages), 24 arguments against the eternity of the world (24 pages), and a refutation of the nine contrary arguments (nineteen pages). The issue of the distinction between God's essence and energies occurs in the *ad I<sup>um</sup>*, which, as a result, turned out to be no less than eleven pages long, namely, longer than the refutations of all the other arguments together (six pages). This suggests that Theophanes was eager to publish somewhere, even in this parenthetical and structurally unorthodox way, his own views on Palamas' doctrine of divine being; and these views were Thomistic in their core<sup>180</sup> as well as partially patristic and partially Thomistic in dress.<sup>181</sup>

#### 4.3. *Callistos Angelicoudes*: "Thomas sanus sane Palamita"

Few things are known about Callistos Angelicoudes, a minor theologian of the second half of the fourteenth century.<sup>182</sup> Angelicoudes

179. I.D. POLEMIS, *Theophanes* (cf. *supra*, n. 108), p. 70 (cf. *op. cit.*, p. 112 et al.).

180. This conclusion matches I.D. POLEMIS' finding (*Theophanes* [cf. *supra*, n. 108], pp. 87-109) that Theophanes' views of the nature of the Tabor light as well as his doctrine of the human knowledge of God owe a lot to Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*.

181. Whenever a full investigation into the Thomistic passages latently reproduced by Theophanes is carried out, it will also be necessary to see the way he combines them with his explicit as well as implicit references to some Greek patristic authorities, such as Maximus Confessor.

182. See ST. G. PAPADOPOULOS, *Καλλίστου Ἀγγελικοῦδῆ "Κατὰ Θεομᾶ Ἀζωνιάτου". Εἰσαγωγή, κείμενον, κριτικὸν ὑπόμνημα καὶ πίνακες*, Athens 1970, pp. 9-10; IDEM, *Ἑλληνικαὶ μεταφράσεις* (cf. *supra*, n. 140), pp. 156-172.

wrote some pro-hesychast treatises.<sup>183</sup> No contribution whatsoever to speculative theology is offered in them. Still, a defence of Palamism occurs in Angelicoudes' long polemical writing *Against the Latin Thomas Aquinas' Book Allegedly Written "Against the Hellenes"*.<sup>184</sup> The main point of Angelicoudes' critique of Aquinas is that this Latin theologian was too imbued with heathen philosophy. For this reason, according to Angelicoudes, in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, which was intended to be a Christian refutation of 'Hellenism', Aquinas made so many concessions to the opposing side that the entire work turned out to be a contradictory and thus pointless mixture of Christianity and pagan philosophy. Angelicoudes does not show even the least good will toward discerning any sort of consistency in what he regards as instances of blatant contradiction of this type; he polemically and naively depicts Thomas as a schizophrenic intellectual<sup>185</sup> by picking out this or that passage from the work attacked and presenting it as clashing with another. In so doing, Angelicoudes created a list of Thomistic passages he reproved and a list of those he approved.

Angelicoudes, being a professed pro-hesychast theologian, did not fail to focus on the issue of the distinction between God's 'essence' and 'energies'. He devoted to this topic a very long section (§§ 211-531; 491 sqq. refer to the question of the nature of the 'divine light'), entitled "On Divine Simplicity and on the Difference between

183. Ed. S. KOUTSAS, "Callistos Angelicoudès: *Quatre traités hésychastes inédits*. Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes", in: *Θεολογία* 67/1 (1996), pp. 114-156 and 318-360; 67/4 (1996), pp. 696-755; 68/1-2 (1997), pp. 212-247 and 536-581.

184. Ed. PAPADOPOULOS (cf. *supra*, n. 182).

185. Cf. G. PODSKALSKY, "Die Rezeption der thomistischen Theologie bei Gennadios II. Scholarios (ca. 1403-1472)", in: *Theologie und Philosophie* 49 (1974), pp. 305-322, esp. p. 322, n. 111. Angelicoudes may have been inspired by NEILOS CABASILAS' *Ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι Λατίνους, σὺλλογισμοῖς χρωμένους, ἀποδείξει τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐκπορευόμενον* III,2,13, ed. CANDAL (cf. *supra*, n. 70), p. 196,5-7. Neilos' ambivalent stand towards Aquinas is in keeping with Demetrios Cydones' information that Neilos shifted from a "passionate lover" of Aquinas to an enemy of his; DEMETRIOS CYDONES, *Apologia I*; ed. MERCATI (cf. *supra*, n. 21), p. 391,27-31. Angelicoudes, in his turn, probably inspired the doubts of the early Bessarion about the consistency of Thomas' *Summa contra Gentiles*, which doubts Andreas Chrysoberges undertook to dispel; see ANDREAS CHRYSOBERGES, *Ἀπολογία ἀποδεικτικὴ ἀπὸ τῶν συγγραμμάτων τοῦ μακαριωτάτου Θωμᾶ πρὸς τὸν πανιερώτατον μητροπολίτην Νικαίας κ̅Ϟ Βησσαρίωνα περὶ τῆς θείας οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας* (a.D. 1438), ed. E. CANDAL, "Andreae Rhodiensis, O.P., inedita ad Bessarionem epistula (De divina essentia et operatione)", in: *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 4 (1938), pp. 329-371, esp. 360,15-21; 362,3-14; 366,3-12.

Essence and Energy” (Περὶ θείας ἀπλότητος καὶ διαφορᾶς οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας).<sup>186</sup> Interestingly enough, there are many Thomistic passages whose content he fully and explicitly subscribes to<sup>187</sup>:

And then, coming back to his senses, he [i.e., Aquinas] says: “Our mind, according to diverse conceptions, invents diverse names, and assigns them to God. In so doing, since it does not assign them from the same point of view, these names are not synonymous, though they denote something absolutely one”. ...

Here it is; he confesses — even though involuntarily — the truth... He is right in saying that now [i.e., *in statu viae*] we cannot know the divine essence; for this reason, we do not apply to it a specific name or denote it by means of just one, but by means of many names, such as ‘powerful’, ‘wise’, ‘good’, and all those spoken of it. By confessing, therefore, that the essence is characterized by unity and that the names by means of which the essence is denoted are many, he obviously means that these names are something other than the essence. ...

“Our mind grasps each of the two, i.e., the divine potency and its act, by means of its diverse acts”. ...

“Although the names spoken of God do not signify the same thing, nevertheless they are not synonyms, because they do not signify the same ‘reason’”. If, therefore, “the names spoken of God” “signify” “the same thing” and yet “many and diverse ‘reasons’”, how can these things, admitting of different ‘reasons’, be taken as God’s simple essence? In fact, the divine essence does not admit of any ‘reason’ at all; on the contrary, it is the things spoken of God and considered as being in Him

186. Ed. PAPAPOPOULOS (cf. *supra*, n. 182), pp. 115,15-250,21.

187. CALLISTOS ANGELICOUCDES, *Κατὰ τοῦ “Καθ’ Ἑλλήνων” δῆθεν λεγομένου βιβλίου Θωμᾶ Λατίνου* 223; 343; 435; 515, ed. PAPAPOPOULOS (cf. *supra*, n. 182), pp. 119,20-23; 167,15-24; 204,18-19; 243,10-18: “Πάλιν ἑαυτοῦ γενόμενος (Thomas Aquinas) φησί: «Κατὰ διαφορᾶς νοήσεις ὁ νοῦς διάφορα εὕρισκει ὀνόματα, ἅτινα τῷ Θεῷ ἀποδίδωσι. Καὶ οὕτως, ἐπειδὴ οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἀποδίδωσι ταῦτα, συμβαίνει ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι πολυώ- νυμα, εἰ καὶ πρᾶγμα σημαίνει πάντη ἓν» (Summa contra Gentiles I,35,2; cf. *supra*, p. 296). ... Ἴδου καὶ ἄκων ὁμολογεῖ τὴν ἀλήθειαν... Ἄλθως λέγει ὅτι νῦν οὐ δυνάμεθα γινώσκειν τὴν θεϊαν οὐσίαν: διὰ τοῦτο ταύτη ἴδιον ὄνομα οὐ προσάπτωμεν οὐδὲ ἐνὶ μόνῳ ὀνόματι ταύτην ἐκφαίνομεν, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς, οἷον ‘δυνατήν’, ‘σοφὴν’, ‘ἀγαθὴν’ καὶ ὅσα περὶ αὐτὴν λέγεται. Ὁμολογῶν τοίνυν ὅτι ἡ οὐσία ἔχει τὸ ἐνιαῖον, ταῦτα δὲ εἰσι πολλά, ἐξ ὧν ἡ οὐσία δηλοῦται, φανερόν ὅτι ἕτερον ταῦτα θέλει εἶναι παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. ... «Ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς διαφορᾶς νοήσεσιν ἐκάτερον θεωρεῖ, τὴν θεϊαν δηλαδὴ δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐνεργεϊαν αὐτῆς» (II,10,1; cf. *supra*, n. 17). ... «Εἰ καὶ τὰ περὶ Θεοῦ λεγόμενα ὀνόματα τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνουσι πρᾶγμα, ὅμως οὐκ ἔστι πολυώνυμα, ἐπειδὴ οὐ σημαίνουσι τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον» (I,32,1). Εἰ τοίνυν «τὰ περὶ Θεοῦ λεγόμενα» «πρᾶγμα» μὲν «σημαίνουσιν» ἓν, «λόγους» δὲ πολλοὺς τε καὶ διαφέ- ροντας, πῶς θεία οὐσία ἔσται ἀπλῆ ταῦτα τὰ διάφορον λόγον ἐπιδεχόμενα; Ἡ θεία οὐσία οὐδαμῶς ἐπιδέχεται λόγον, τὰ δὲ περὶ Θεοῦ λεγόμενα καὶ ἐν τῷ Θεῷ θεωρούμενα, οἷον ἡ ‘δύναμις’, ἡ ‘σοφία’, ἡ ‘γνώσις’, ἡ ‘ἀγαθότης’, ἡ ‘πρόνοια’, τᾶλλ’ ὅσα περὶ Θεοῦ λέγονται, ἕκαστον ἴδιον ἔχει λόγον καὶ ὅπωςδῆποτε γνωστὸν ἔσται”.



(e.g., 'power', 'wisdom', 'knowledge', 'goodness', 'providence', etc.) that each have their proper 'reason' and are up to an extent knowable.

Angelicoudes, obsessed by a polemical spirit, fails to discern between the various degrees of *ἐπίνοια* and mistakes Aquinas' 'conceptual' attribution of relative predicates to God, whose ontological weight regards not God the Creator but only the created beings, for Basil of Caesarea's 'conceptual' distinction between the various objectively existing divine qualities.<sup>188</sup> And he does so despite being a professed Palamite, i.e., by overlooking (and, in this sense, compromising) Palamas' *distinctio realis*.

#### 4.4. *Manuel II Palaiologos: A Latent Moderate Thomistic Palamism*

A grand-son of John VI Cantacouzenos (cf. *supra*, pp. 292-305), Manuel II Palaiologos (1350-1425) was to be the last Byzantine emperor (1391-1425) with a remarkable skill at writing and some intellectual (theological and, in this context, some philosophical) erudition and capacities. As is to be expected, amongst Manuel's wide-ranging interests the *Filioque* occupied pride of place. In the context of his *ad hoc* discussion of this topic in his bulky yet well-organized by chapters *Writing on the Procession of the Holy Spirit* (*Σύγγραμμα περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος ἐκπορεύσεως*) (written, at least in part, in Paris between 1400 and 1402<sup>189</sup>), he discussed the nature of the distinction between God's essence and energy by explicitly attacking Barlaam and Gregory Acindynos (ch. 65)<sup>190</sup> and thus implicitly defending Gregory Palamas. True, this issue occupies a place in

188. See also *op. cit.* 435-436, ed. PAPADOPOULOS, *op. cit.*, p. 204, 19-32, which sounds like an exposition of the 'right' doctrine of the divine names both in Thomistic and Basilian terms (cf. BASIL OF CAESAREA'S *Adversus Eunomium* I,7,14-15; cf. *supra*, n. 5). As we have seen (cf. *supra*, pp. 271-272, n. 22), the probably tendentious yet accurate way Demetrios Cydones rendered some relevant passages from the *Summa contra Gentiles* implicitly pushed the Greek-speaking readers of Thomas' *chef-d'œuvre* to recall Basil's theological use of the Stoic *ἐπίνοια*.

189. See CH. J. DENDRINOS, *An Annotated Critical Edition (Editio Princeps) of Emperor Manuel II Palaeologus' Treatise "On the Procession of the Holy Spirit"* (unpublished Doct. Diss., University of London, Royal Holloway College), London 1996 (forthcoming in Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca), pp. xvii-xx, and his paper in this volume (pp. 397-422).

190. "Ἐκθεσις ὧν λέγουσιν οἱ τῆς Βαρλαάμ καὶ Ἀκινδύνου αἰρέσεως καὶ ἀνάμνησις σύντομος, ὡς ταῦτα ἐξελέγηγκται τοῖς προειρημένοις"; ed. DENDRINOS, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

Manuel's thought only to the extent that he deemed it to be connected with his primary concern, i.e., the refutation of the *Filioque*; still, he devoted one third of the work to the essence-energy question, namely, chapters 23-74<sup>191</sup> (which amounts to 52 chapters out of the total sum of 156). Besides, as the editor of his text remarks,<sup>192</sup> Manuel, in the concluding unionistic platform to his anonymous Latin interlocutor, did not fail to include the distinction between the nature and the natural properties of God.<sup>193</sup> Further, the Greek-Latin way he treated the issue is of special interest. Let us see in detail the most important of the relevant passages.<sup>194</sup>

Ch. 23: ... Τὴν μὲν γὰρ φύσιν ὁ Θεὸς ἄγνωστος ἡμῖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπρόσιτος καὶ ἀμέθεκτος, διὰ δὲ τὴν φυσικὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔξεστιν εἰπεῖν τοῦναντίον...<sup>195</sup>

Ch. 44: ... Οὐ ταῦτὸν ἁμαρτιῶν εἴσπραξις' καὶ ἰσχυρῶσις', οὐδὲ ὄργη τοῦ Θεοῦ' καὶ ἰσχυρῶσις' οὐκοῦν οὐδ' ὁ ἔλεος' τῆς δικαιοσύνης'. Εἰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀλλήλοις ταῦτόν, οὐδὲ τῆ φύσει ταῦτόν ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ταῖς ὑποστάσεσιν ἢ γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐκ ἀκριβῶς παντάπασιν ἦν ἓν τι καὶ ταῦτόν ἐαυτῆς, εἰ ἦν ταῦτόν ἀτεχνῶς τοῖς διαφέρουσι πως ἀλλήλων. Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ συμμείχθαι λέγει τις τῆ τοῦ Θεοῦ δικαιοσύνη τὸν ἔλεον καὶ τῷ ἔλεῳ τὴν κρίσιν καὶ μὴ εἶναι θατέρου χωρὶς, ἀλλ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ συμμείχθαι ταῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀεὶ συνεῖναι ἀλλήλοις<sup>196</sup> φάσκοντός ἐστι καὶ δηλοῦντος διαφορὰν ἐν αὐτοῖς οὖσαν, θεοπρεπῶς νοῦν ἔχουσι νοουμένην.

191. Ed. DENDRINOS, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-123.

192. DENDRINOS, p. xxxvii.

193. Ch. 156: "...αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην τὴν αὐτοῦ [sc. of God] ἀγαθότητα καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπλότητα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν φύσιν"; ed. DENDRINOS, p. 316,10-12.

194. Ed. DENDRINOS, pp. 37,9-10; 70,4-14; 76,9-21; 100,8-11; 109,13-111,7; 114,12-13.

195. Cf. *op. cit.* 73: "Ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἄρα οὐσία ἀμέθεκτος, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια μεθεκτὴ" (ed. DENDRINOS, p. 119,7); 24: "...καὶ ὅπως ἴσθας ἂν τις εἴποι προσηγορίας περὶ Θεοῦ, μόνη ἢ ἐνέργεια δέξαιτ' ἂν, ἡ φύσις δὲ μηδαμῶς" (ed. DENDRINOS, p. 43,12-13). Manuel's conclusion in this chapter (*op. cit.*, pp. 42,15-43,4), that whatever man is in principle able to know about God (in order to satisfy his innate and thus unquenched aspiration for that) is gained through knowledge of His creature and His acts on creature, is but a latent paraphrase of GREGORY NAZIANZEN's *Oratio XXVIII*, 13,23-34, also cited by JOHN VI CANTACOUZENOS (cf. *supra*, p. 295).

196. Cf. Ps. 100,1. See Ps.-JOHN CHRYSOSTOM, *In Psalmos 101-107*, ad 102,2: "Κιωνῶ τόνου τῷ ἐλέῳ τὴν ὄργην... ἀεὶ γὰρ ὡς φύσει ὦν ἀγαθὸς ἐλέους, τὴν σύζυγον ἔχων τῷ ἐλέῳ τούτῳ δικαιοσύνην..." (PG 55: 643-644). Cf. BASIL OF CAESAREA, *Asceticon magnum*, proem, 4; PG 31: 897C (probably taken from EUSEBIUS OF CAESAREA's *Commentaria in Psalmos* 35, PG 23: 320C-D). Cf. the theological elaboration of this idea by THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae* I,21 (specifically devoted to this couple of divine properties), Prol.: "...περὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ἐλεημοσύνης αὐτοῦ δεῖ πραγματεῦσασθαι"), a. 4 co.:

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἕτερον οὐσα ἢ ἐνέργεια δεδειγμένη παρὰ τὴν φύσιν τρόποις δὴ τισιν ἡμῖν οὐ πᾶν καταληπτοῖς, οἰκειότατον ἡμῶς καὶ γνησιώτατον καὶ παντελῶς ἀχώριστον αὐτῆς φαίνεται.

Ch. 50:... Σύνθετον ἐκεῖνοι (sc. the ancient pagans) βουλόμενοι δεῖξαι τὸ θεῖον, εἰ Τριάς τοῦτο γένοιτο, ἡγοῦντο σφίσις ἀρκεῖν ὁμοίως σύνθετον ἀποδειῖξαι, εἰ ἐνέργειαν ὅλως ἔχοι τῆς φύσεως διαφέρουσαν<sup>197</sup>. εἰκότως· εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦδε φαίνοιτο σύνθετος ὁ Θεός, πολλῶν γε μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ Τριάς εἶναι. ... Ἄλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲν τι πάσχει τὸ Θεῖον διὰ τὸ Τριάς εἶναι· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ διὰ τὸ τῆ ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργεῖα τὰ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐνεργεῖν· ἀπαθῆς γὰρ ἢ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἐκ τῆς φύσεως πρόοδος καὶ ἀδιάστατος καὶ ἀνεκφοίτητος καὶ ἀμέριστος.

Ch. 57: Μηδεῖς μοι τοῖνυν λεγέτω τοὺς θεολόγους ψιλοῖς ὀνόμασι χρῆσθαι περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας...

Ch. 65:... Ἔστι τοῖνυν ὃ βούλονται [the anti-Palamites] ἢ μὴδὲν διαφέρειν τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν ταύτης ἐνέργειαν κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον ἢ λόγον ἢ λογισμὸν ἢ δοῦλον εἶναι ταύτην καὶ κτίσμα, εἰ τῆς οὐσίας διαφέρει τὸ σύνολον. ...

Ch. 70: ... Οὐ γὰρ ὡς αὐτὸς ὑπολαμβάνεις ἐλέγετο ἄν, εἰ καὶ πολλαχῆ καὶ παρὰ πολλῶν τοῦτ' ἐλέγετο. Οὐ γὰρ ὡς “ἐν καὶ ἀδιάφορον”<sup>198</sup> τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν δηλοῦν, οὐδ' ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν ἐν πρώτῳ τῶν *Τοπικῶν* ταῦτα δὴ ταυτοσημαντα ἀλλήλοις “ὀνόματα” “λόπιον” καὶ “ἰμάτιον”,<sup>199,200</sup> ἢ ὡς ἄν εἴποι τις “ἄορ”, “ζίφος”, “φάσγανον”, “σπάθη” καὶ ἄλλα ἄττα τοιαῦτα,<sup>201</sup> οὐδ' ὡς οἱ θεοφάντορες ἄνδρες “οὐσίαν” τε καὶ

“Τὸ δ' ἔργον τῆς θείας δικαιοσύνης ἀεὶ τὸ τοῦ ἐλέους ἔργον προϋποτίθησι καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἴδρται” (*Vat. gr.* 609, f. 43<sup>v</sup>), which is close to Manuel's words.

197. P.S.-JUSTIN MARTYR, *Quaestiones Christianorum ad gentiles* III, 1, ed. J.C.T. OTTO, *Sancti Iustini philosophi et martyris opera quae feruntur omnia* (Corpus Apologetarum Christianorum saeculi secundii), tomus V, Jena 1881 (repr. Wiesbaden 1969), pp. 286; 288 (= juxta MOREL 177C-D; 178D-E). This passage is appealed to by Palamas in his *Πρὸς τὸν εὐλαβέστατον ἐν μοναχοῖς Διονύσιον* 2 (cf. *infra*, n. 203), which is one of the major sources (along with Joseph Calothetos and Thomas Aquinas) of ch. 70-71 of Manuel's writing. It is also quoted in the *Synodal Tome of 1351*, 22, PG 151: 734B = KARMIRE, *Tὰ δογματικά* (cf. *supra*, n. 54), p. 323.

198. JOSEPH CALOTHETOS, *Oration II* (*Κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν Ἀζινδόνων καὶ Βαυλαῶν τῶν κακοδόξων*), 5, ll. 97-98; 6, l. 113, ed. TSAMES (cf. *supra*, n. 50), p. 74; cf. *infra*, n. 212. Cf. GREGORY PALAMAS, e.g., *Διάλογος ὀρθοδόξων μετὰ Βαυλααμίτων* 16; 51, ed. MAN-TZARIDES (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 175,9.

199. ARISTOTLE, *Topics* I,7, 103a6-10; cf. 103a27; 149a4.

200. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I,13,4 co. (cf. *infra*, p. 336).

201. JOHN OF DAMASCUS, *Dialectica sive capita philosophica (recensio fusior)* 32,2-4 (= *recensio brevis* 17), ed. KOTTER (cf. *supra*, n. 10), p. 102. Of the numerous ancient and Byzantine passages containing this or similar lists of *πολῶνυμα*, Damascenus' is the closest one to Palaiologos' lines. Cf. GREGORY PALAMAS' *Against Gregoras*, I,10: “Ἄλλ' εἴποι ἄν ὁ Γρηγοροῦς ὅτι αὐτὸς τῆ προφορᾶ μόνη τῆς λέξεως διαφέρειν ἐπὶ Θεοῦ τὰ λεγόμενα φησι, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Ἀκινδύνης; ... ὡς «ἄορ», «σπάθη», «φάσγανον»· ἐν γὰρ πάντῃ τὸ ὑπὸ τούτων σημαίνονμεν καὶ τῆ προφορᾶ μόνη τῆς λέξεως διενήνοχεν ἀλλήλων”; ed. CHRESTOU

‘φύσιν’ και ‘μορφὴν’ ἐπὶ Θεοῦ λεγόμενα εἰς “ταῦτόν” ἤκειν λέγουσιν<sup>202</sup>. ἡ γὰρ ἄν και τὴν ἐνέργειαν οὗτοι προσέθηκαν και συνηριθμουν τοῖς εἰρημένοις, εἰ γε ὄνομα ψιλὸν ἐνόμιζον ταύτην εἶναι και ταῦτόν τοῖς διαφόροις ἐκείνοις ὀνόμασιν, ἅπερ ἐν σημαίνειν πεφύκασιν.<sup>203</sup>

Οὐ τοίνυν ὡς αὐτὸς ὑπολαμβάνεις ἐλέγετ’ ἄν, εἴπερ ἐλέγετο τὸ ‘ταῦτόν’, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὁ λόγος εὐθὺς δηλώσει. Δῆλον γὰρ ὡς διὰ τὴν ἄκραν ἔνωσιν τῆς ἐνεργείας πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν, ὡς “φυσικῆς και οὐσιώδους”<sup>204</sup> οὐσης αὐτῆς και τῷ καθηρμύσθαι, ὡς ἄν τις εἴποι, και συναίδια εἶναι πάντως ἄν ἐλέγετο τοῖς εἰποῦσιν: “ἓν” τι δὲ ταῦτα χρῆμα “παντάπασι” “ἀδιάφορον”<sup>205</sup> οὐδαμῶς ἄν ἐφαίνετο ταύτη. Τὸ γὰρ ‘οὐσίαν και ἐνέργειαν’ εἰπεῖν οὐ τὸ ‘ἀδιάφορον’ εἰπεῖν συγχωρεῖ, ἀλλὰ και εἰσάγει διαφορὰν και

(cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 262,18,26. Palamas, too, bases himself on John of Damascus; still, the Palamite passage cannot fully account for that of Manuel. However, Palamas might have inspired Palaiologos to write the lines under discussion.

202. JOHN OF DAMASCUS, *Institutio elementaris* 1, ll. 1-3, ed. KOTTER (cf. *supra*, n. 10), p. 20; *Dialectica* XXXI,23-28, ed. KOTTER, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

203. Cf. GREGORY PALAMAS, *Πρὸς τὸν εὐλαβέστατον ἐν μοναχοῖς Διονύσιον* 2: “...τὸ μὴδὲν διαφέρειν τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Ὅτι δὲ τοῦτο δόγματός ἐστιν ἐλληνικοῦ και ὁ ἐν μάρτυσι φιλόσοφος Ἰουστίνος ἐν τῷ Πρὸς Ἑλλήνας ἐξηνηγεμένῳ λόγῳ (revera Ps.-JUSTINI MARTYRIS *Quaestiones Christianorum ad gentiles*; cf. *supra*, n. 197) παρίστησιν ὅτι γε μὴν ὁ τοῦτο λέγων ἀναρεῖ τὸ εἶναι Θεόν, ἐκείνος τε ὁ σοφὸς μάρτυς ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ λόγῳ και οἱ ἄλλοι θεοφόροι πατέρες ἐν διαφόροις λόγοις ἀποδεικνύουσι. Τὸ γὰρ μηδαμῆ διαφέρειν πάντῃ τε και πάντως ἐν ἓστι και μονώτατον, ἐτέρου παντὸς παντάπασι ἀμοιρον. ... Ὡσπερ οὐδεὶς ποτε ἔφη τὸν Θεὸν οὐσίαν και φύσιν ἔχειν (ἀδιαφόρων γὰρ ὄντων τούτων ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ θατέρῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀρκούμεθα), τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδ’ ὁ Βαλαάμ και Ἀκίνδυνος και ὅσοι φρονοῦσι κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἀκολούθως ἄν φαῖεν οὐσίαν και ἐνέργειαν ἔχειν τὸν Θεόν, ὡς διακένου ψόφου παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὄντος τοῦ τῆς ἐνεργείας ὀνόματος και μὴδὲν παρ’ αὐτοῦ τῆ προσθήκη δεικνύτος. Ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἄν τις φαίη τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐσίαν ἔχειν και φύσιν ἢ τῆς οὐσίας εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἐπειδήπερ ἀλλήλων οὐδὲν διενηγόρασιν. Οὕτω τοίνυν οὐδὲ Βαλαάμ και Ἀκίνδυνος τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐσίαν και ἐνέργειαν ἔχειν ἐροῦσιν οὐδὲ τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐσίας τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι, ἐπεὶ μὴδ’ αὐτὰι κατ’ αὐτοὺς διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων”; ed. MAT-SOUKAS (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 480,4-26. The latter passage occurs almost verbatim in PALAMAS’ *Against Acindynos* I,6,14, edd. CONTOYIANNES-PHANOURGAKES (cf. *supra*, n. 24), pp. 49,12-50,7. Further, in I,6,15-16, a reference to Ps.-Justin’s passage alluded to by Manuel occurs, too (*op. cit.*, p. 51,3-26); and in the II,20,97-99 (edd. CONTOYIANNES-PHANOURGAKES, *op. cit.*, pp. 154,6-156,24) a long use of Ps.-Justin’s passage for the same purpose occurs. Still, in the *Πρὸς τὸν εὐλαβέστατον ἐν μοναχοῖς Διονύσιον*, the process of the argument is exactly the same as that in Manuel’s chapters. One would also guess that Manuel may have had in mind the passage from *Against Acindynos II*, because in this a link between the divine simplicity against the essence-energy multiplicity and the essence-persons multiplicity is made. A passing mention of this passage in *Against Acindynos IV*, 26,108 (edd. CONTOYIANNES-PHANOURGAKES, *op. cit.*, pp. 369,28-370,3) can be ignored in this context.

204. Cf. GREGORY PALAMAS, e.g., *Περὶ θείας και θεοποιοῦ μεθέξεως ἢ περὶ τῆς θείας και ἕπεροφνοῦς ἀπλότητος* 24, ed. MANTZARIDES (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 157,26; from Cyril of Alexandria (cf. *supra*, n. 122).

205. GREGORY PALAMAS, *op. cit.* 23, ed. MANTZARIDES, *op. cit.*, p. 157,11-13.

τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς φύσεως οὐ χωρίζει. Κἀν συνάξεως, κἀν συναρμόσεως, κἀν πᾶσαν λέξιν φιλόσοφον<sup>206</sup> συναγάγῃς, κἀν καινοτέρων ἄλλην ἐπινοήσεως ἐνώσεως μέθοδον, ἀπὸ τοῦ 'ταυτόν εἶναι' λέγειν 'οὐσίαν καὶ ἐνέργειαν' οὐκ ἔνεστιν, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐν κυρίως δοῦναι νοῆσαι. "Τὸ" γὰρ "ταυτόν" ταυτῶ ταυτόν" ἐστὶν καὶ τῶν πρὸς τι, καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε μὴ συνεπινοεῖσθαι τούτῳ καὶ ἕτερον ἢ καὶ πλείω,<sup>207</sup> πρὸς ἅπερ ἂν λέγοιτο.<sup>208</sup> Τὸ γε μὴν 'ἐν' οὐχ ὅπως ἐτέρῳ ἐστὶν ἐν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἑαυτῷ· ἦν γὰρ ἂν ταύτη γε τὸ ἐν καὶ οὐχ ἐν· καὶ τοῦτο πάντῃ ἀδύνατον. "Ὡστ' οὐδεὶς σοι λόγος εὐσχημῶν λείπεται ἢ τὸ 'ταυτόν' τῷ 'ἐν' ἴσον ἀκριβῶς εἶναι λέγοντι ἢ μὴ εἶναι διαφορὰν οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας.

Εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ καθαρώτερον περὶ τούτων διεξιέναι, τὸ 'ταυτόν' σχέσιν ἔχον ἐστὶ πρὸς ἕτερον, ὥσπερ εἰρηται, τὸ δὲ κυρίως ἐν ἄσχετον ὅλως καὶ οὐ πρὸς ἕτερόν πως ἔχον ἐστίν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐτέρῳ 'ἐν' δύναιται ἢ λέγεσθαι ἢ εἶναι (πρόθεν, ὅπερ οὐδ' αὐτῷ;), ὡς ἤδη φθάσαν ἀποδεδείκται.

206. See ARISTOTLE'S *Metaphysics* V,9,1-4 (1018b27-a19), used by Joseph Calothenos (cf. *infra*, p. 335, n. 212).

207. Cf. GREGORY PALAMAS, *Λόγος διασαφῶν ἐν ἐπιτόμῳ τῆν τοῦ Βασιλαῖμ καὶ Ἀκινδύνου δόξαν καὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ εὐσεβείας αὐτοῖς ἀντιλεγόντων* 14: "ὁ ἐνῶν δύο τινὰ ἐνοῖ τοῦλάριστον"; ed. PHANOURGAKES (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 99,1.

208. Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS' *Summa theologiae*, I,13,7 (Utrum nomina quae important relationem ad creaturas dicantur de Deo ex tempore) co.: "Εἰδέναι προσήκει ὅτι, ἐπεὶ δύο ἄκρα ζητεῖ πᾶσα ἀναφορά, τριχῶς ἂν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ εἶναι πρᾶγμα ἢ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἢ λόγῳ μόνῳ. Ποτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἑκατέρου μέρους ἡ ἀναφορά πρᾶγμα ἐστὶ λόγῳ μόνῳ, ὅταν δηλονότι μεταξὺ δύο τινῶν οὐ δύνηται εἶναι τάξις ἢ σχέσις εἰ μὴ κατὰ μόνην τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐπίνοιαν, ὡς ὅταν λέγωμεν: 'τὸ ταυτόν ταυτόν ἑαυτῷ'; καθὼ γὰρ ὁ λόγος ἐπινοεῖ τι δις τὸ αὐτό, ὑφίστησιν ἐκείνο ὡσπερ δύο, καὶ οὕτως ἐπινοεῖ ὁμοιότητα τινὰ ἢ σχέσιν αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτό (ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics* V,9,3, 1018a7-9). 'Ὁμοίως δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπὶ πασῶν τῶν ἀναφορῶν τῶν μεταξὺ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, ἃς ἀναπλάττει ὁ λόγος, καθόσον ἀναπλάττει τὸ μὴ ὄν ὡς ἄκρον τι. Τὸ αὐτὸ τέ ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ πασῶν τῶν ἀναφορῶν, αἵτινες ἔπονται τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ λόγου, ὡσπερ τὸ γένος, τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.

Τινὲς δὲ τῶν ἀναφορῶν πράγματά εἰσι τῇ φύσει καθ' ἑκάτερον τῶν ἄκρων· ὅτε δηλονότι μεταξὺ δύο ἄκρων ἐστὶ τις σχέσις κατὰ τι πραγματικῶς προσὸν ἑκατέρῳ· ὡς δῆλον ἐπὶ πασῶν τῶν ἀναφορῶν τῇ ποσότητι ἐπομένῳ, ὡσπερ τὸ 'μέγα' καὶ τὸ 'μικρόν', τὸ 'διπλάσιον' καὶ τὸ 'ἡμισυ' καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· τὸ δ' ὅμοιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀναφορῶν τῶν ἐπομένῳ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ πάθει, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς 'κινήσεως' καὶ τοῦ 'κίνητου', τοῦ 'πατρὸς' καὶ τοῦ 'υἱοῦ' καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων.

Ποτὲ δὲ ἡ ἀναφορά ἐν μὲν θατέρῳ τῶν ἄκρων πρᾶγμα ἐστὶ φύσει, ἐν δὲ τῷ λοιπῷ λόγῳ μόνον. Τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει, ὡσάντις ἂν δύο ἄκρα μὴ τῆς αὐτῆς τάξεως ὦσιν· ὡσπερ ἡ 'αἰσθησις' καὶ ἡ 'ἐπιστήμη' ἀνάγονται πρὸς τὸ 'αἰσθητὸν' καὶ 'ἐπιστητὸν', ἄτινα, καθόσον εἰσὶ πράγματά τινα ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ εἶναι ὑφιστάμενα, ἔξω τῆς τάξεως εἰσι τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν μὲν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἐστὶ πραγματικῶς ἡ ἀναφορά, καθ' ἣν τάττονται πρὸς τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ ἐπίστασθαι τὰ πράγματα, εἰ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα καθ' ἑαυτὰ θεορούμενα ἐκτὸς τῆς τοιαύτης εἰσι τάξεως· ὅθεν ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐστὶ τις ἀναφορά πραγματικῇ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἰσθησιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον μόνον, καθόσον δηλονότι ὁ νοῦς ἐπινοεῖ ταῦτα ἐντὸς τῶν ὄρων τῶν ἀναφορῶν τῆς 'αἰσθήσεως' καὶ τῆς 'ἐπιστήμης'. Ὅθεν φησὶν ὁ Φιλόσοφος ὅτι οὐ διὰ τὸ αὐτὰ πρὸς ἕτερα ἀναφέρεσθαι λέγονται ἀναφορικῶς, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἕτερα πρὸς αὐτὰ ἀναφέρονται, ὡς λέγεται ἐν τῷ ε' τῶν *Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*

Ch. 71: ...ἐν τῷ 'φύσιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν' ὀνομάζειν... 'Ο συμπλεκτικὸς ἐνταῦθα σύνδεσμος, ὁ 'καί', οὔτε ματαίως οὔτε περιέργως τέθειται δηλονότι,<sup>209</sup> ἀλλ' ὡς καὶ διάφορά πως ταῦτα δεικνύς καὶ ἀχώριστα.<sup>210</sup>

(ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics* IV,15,8, 1021a26-30). 'Ομοίως καὶ τὸ 'δεξιόν' οὐ λέγεται περὶ τοῦ κίονος, εἰ μὴ καθόσον ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ζῳῳ τὸ 'δεξιόν'. ἔθεν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναφορά οὐκ ἔστι πραγματικῶς ἐν τῷ κίονι, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ζῳῳ.

'Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ὁ Θεὸς ἐκτός ἐστιν ἕλης τῆς τάξεως τῶν κτισμάτων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα τάττονται πρὸς ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν, φανερόν ὅτι τὰ μὲν κτίσματα πραγματικῶς ἀναφέρονται πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ οὐδεμία ἐστὶ πραγματικὴ ἀναφορά [ex cod. διαφορὰ correxi] πρὸς τὰ κτίσματα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον μόνον, καθόσον τὰ κτίσματα πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀναφέρονται. Καὶ οὕτως οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνόματα ἀναφορὰν πρὸς τὰ κτίσματα δηλοῦντα κατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀπὸ χρόνου, οὐ διὰ τινος τοῦ Θεοῦ μεταβολῆν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τῆς κτίσεως μεταβολῆν ὥσπερ ὁ κίων γίνεται δεξιὸς οὐδεμιᾶς μεταβολῆς περὶ αὐτὸν γενομένης, ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλοντος τοῦ ζῳῳ" (*Vat. gr. 609*, f. 30<sup>r</sup>).

209. See p. 480,17-29 of Palamas' passage cited *supra* in n. 203.

210. "Ch. 23: As far as His nature is concerned, God is unknowable, inaccessible and imparticipable to us; but regarding His natural energy, we are entitled to say the opposite. ... Ch. 44: The 'punishment' and 'remission' of our sins are not the same; nor is the 'wrath' the same as the 'grace' of God, nor is 'mercy' identical to 'righteousness'. If then these are not identical to each other, neither are they identical to nature or to the hypostases. For, it follows that nature would not on the whole be precisely one and the same with itself, if it were simply identical to those which differ in a certain way from each other. Indeed, if one states that the mercy of God is mixed together with His righteousness, and His judgement with His mercy, and that the one does not exist without the other, by simply mentioning this very mixing and eternal union which exists between them he states and declares that there is a difference between them, perceived by reasonable men as befits God. Nevertheless, though it has been proven that the energy is different from the nature in certain ways which are not quite comprehensible to us, yet it appears that the energy is most akin to, naturally united with, and totally inseparable from nature. ... Ch. 50: Wishing to prove that if the Divinity became a Trinity, then It would be composite, they assumed that it would suffice to prove that similarly the Divinity is composite, if Its energy differs on the whole from Its nature; naturally. For, if on the basis of this argument God would appear to be composite, far more so on the grounds that He is a Trinity. ... But, in reality, the Divinity is not affected at all by being a Trinity, and therefore, neither is It affected because It operates whatever It directs towards us through Its own energy. For, the emanation of the energy from the nature is impassible, continuous, inseparable and indivisible. ... Ch. 57: Therefore, let no one tell me that the theologians use bare names when they refer to the 'energy'... Ch. 65: Now, what they think is either that the energy of the essence of God does not differ in any way, for any reason or consideration [*distinctio rationis*] whatsoever from the essence, or if it differs entirely from the essence [*distinctio realis*], that it is then a subservient and a created being. ... Ch. 70: For, even if this 'identical' were stated by many theologians in many of their writings, this would not have been stated as you yourself understand it, because this 'identical' does not indicate that the essence and energy is one and indistinguishable. Nor do these words [i.e., essence and energy] signify each other in the way that Aristotle states in his first book of the *Topics*, for example "cloak and mantle", or as one would say, "dagger, sword, blade, broad sword" and other similar ones, nor as the theologians state that 'essence', 'nature', and 'form' regarding God are 'identical'. For surely, if they had really

Manuel officially puts himself in the Palamite party by unambiguously declaring (ch. 23) that one must distinguish between the “nature” and the “natural energy” of God. He is really in keeping with Palamas and the patristic Palamists by arguing that, should this distinction be taken as a threat to divine simplicity, the doctrine of the *Deus trinus* should absurdly be taken as such, too. He is also in keeping with all the Palamites up to his time in implying that this distinction is not a radical one (“τὸ σύνολον”), but should rather be drawn “in some way” or “in some respect” or “conceptually” (“κατὰ τρόπον ἢ λόγον ἢ λογισμόν”; ch. 65).

Further, Manuel’s argument that multiplicity, both that springing from Trinity and that springing from the essence-energy distinction, is supposed to be deemed a cause of composition, not if clashing with absolute simplicity (conceived of as self-identity), but only if entailing

thought that this is a mere name and identical to those different names which they understood to signify one thing, they would have added also the ‘energy’, and would have counted it along with those aforementioned names. Therefore, if indeed the ‘identical’ had been mentioned by the theologians, it would not have been stated in the way you understand it, but as our argument will immediately show. Now, it is evident that those who mentioned these names would have stated them on the grounds of the total union of the energy with the essence (since energy is natural and essential to the essence), and, as one would say, on the basis of their union they are also coeternal. In this case, the energy and essence would not at all appear to be one thing entirely indistinguishable. For, in saying “essence and energy” it is not permissible to perceive them as indistinguishable, but on the contrary, this statement introduces a difference and does not separate energy from nature. Even if you gather together, or mix, or join, or collect every philosophical term or expression, or even if you invent a newer method of union by stating that the essence and energy are identical, it is impossible to be able to perceive the one precisely. For what is identical, is identical to that to which is identical, and it also belongs to the category of related things, and it is impossible not to perceive at the same time another thing, or even more than one, with reference to its subject. But surely the one not only is not one with reference to another thing, but not even with reference to itself. For, in this way there would be at the same time one and not one, which is absolutely impossible. Therefore, none of your arguments remains sound, since you state that either the ‘identical’ is absolutely equivalent to the ‘one’, or that there is no difference between essence and energy. If we must clarify this point in greater detail—the ‘identical’ exists in relation to another thing, as has already been stated, while properly speaking the ‘one’ is entirely unrelated and exists without any relation to another thing. For how is this possible when the ‘one can neither’ be referred or exist in relation to itself, as it has just been proven? Ch. 71: ...by the very fact that you state ‘nature *and* energy’... it is clear that the copulative conjunction ‘and’ which is used here was not placed without purpose or superfluously, but because it indicates that these are in a certain way different and at the same time inseparable” (translation by DENDRINOS, *An Annotated* [cf. *supra*, n. 189], slightly revised).

“passion” (ch. 50), is Palamite *tout-court* (see *supra*, p. 276). Furthermore, his argument that the notion of an absolutely simple, in the sense of self-identical and non-differentiated (“ταυτότον... ἐν τι παντά-  
 πασιν ἀδιάφορον”), being is by definition absurd looks like a logical transformation of a similar metaphysical argument produced by Theophanes of Nicaea (cf. Theophanes’ “πάντη ταύτων καὶ ἕν”; v. *supra*, p. 307).

That the Palamism of Manuel was conscious is shown by the fact that, when writing some of the chapters cited above, he had opened on his desk some writings of Palamas, whence he borrowed many things. Manuel’s appeal to (Ps.-)Justin’s defence of the distinction between essence and energy and his connection of this distinction with the possible threat to divine simplicity caused by the doctrine of the Holy Trinity is a reproduction of a similar appeal to (Ps.-)Justin by Palamas in his *Letter to Dionysius 2*. Furthermore, Manuel’s comment on the advisability of the conjunction ‘and’ in the phrase “essence and energy” derives from what Palamas had said in the sequence of his appeal to (Ps.-)Justin.

So far so good. Now if we try patiently to investigate further the sources of Manuel’s argument in ch. 44 and, especially, in ch. 70, we will realise that Manuel reproduced Joseph Calothetos’ argument for the reality as well as the incomprehensibility of the essence-energy distinction in God in combination with Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of the truth-value of the divine names as expounded in q. 13 (“Περὶ τῶν θείων ὀνομάτων”<sup>211</sup>), aa. 4 and 7 of Part I of the *Summa theologiae*. Let us try to reconstruct the process that took place in Manuel’s mind when writing the above passages.

Of the chapters of Manuel’s work that are devoted to the essence-energy question (ch. 61 to 72 in main), ch. 70 shows by its very title (“That if one were to say that nature and energy are identical, he would have shown that energy differs from nature, rather than if it were not stated at all; for the ‘identical’ is never stated with reference to a single thing, but with reference to a number of things which are associated”) that the author’s intention was to treat the problem in the light of the philosophical notions of ‘one’ and ‘identical’. To carry out his project, Manuel follows three steps, the first two forming the

211. *Vat. gr. 609*, f. 28<sup>v</sup>.



*pars destructiva* of his argument and the last one the *pars constructiva*: *i*) excluding the possibility that essence and energy are 'one' in the sense that they are synonyms; *ii*) excluding the possibility that essence and energy are 'one' in any of the remaining meanings of this term enumerated in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*; *iii*) positively and conclusively establishing that essence and energy, for all their being insolubly associated with each other, should be taken *e limine* as two things.

*Step 1.* Half of a century earlier, a task identical to Manuel's had been undertaken by Joseph Calothesos (cf. *supra*, p. 329, n. 198). Calothesos, in his effort to qualify the nature of the identity and the difference between God's essence and energy,<sup>212</sup> had latently yet fully

212. JOSEPH CALOTHETOS, *Oration II (Katà tōn autōn 'Aκινδόνου και Βασιλαῖου τῶν κακοδόξων)*, 5-6, ll. 97-126: "Ἄλλ' εἰπάτω... πῶς ταῦτό και ἐν και ἀδιάφορον; ... [Possibility 1 excluded:] «Τὰ μὲν ἐν ἐστὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν, τὰ δὲ κατ' εἶδος, τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένος, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν οἷον ὅσ' ἀριθμῶ, και εἶδει ἐν' ὅσα δ' εἶδει, οὐ πάντ' ἀριθμῶ, ἀλλὰ γένει πάντα ἐν, ὅσαπερ και εἶδει' ὅσα δὲ γένει, οὐ πάντ' εἶδει, ἀλλ' ἀναλογία ἐν» (ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics* V,6,20-21; 1016b31-35). Και αὐθις, «ταῦτὰ λέγεται, ὡν ἡ ἕλη μία ἢ εἶδει ἢ ἀριθμῶ, και ὡν ἡ οὐσία μία. Ὡστε φανερόν ἐστι ἡ ταυτοῦτης ἐνότης τίς ἐστὶν ἢ πλειόνων τοῦ εἶναι ἢ ὅταν χρῆται ὡς πλείοσιν' οἷον ὅταν λέγη αὐτὸ αὐτῶ ταυτόν' ὡς δυοὶ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῶ» (ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics* V,9,3; 1018a6-9). 'Ἄλλ' εἰπάτω ἐν ποίῳ μορίῳ τῶν τοιοῦτων τεχνολογημάτων ἐν και ταῦτό και ἀδιάφορον οὐσία και ἐνέργεια. Πότερον ἐν τοῖς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ; 'Ἄλλ' ἐν τῶ ἀριθμῶ λέγεται, «ὡν ἡ ἕλη μία»; τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ τῶ ἀριθμῶ ἐν τῶ εἶδει. 'Ἀλλὰ τῶ εἶδει ἐν; Και οὕτω διαπίπτει αὐτῶ ὁ λόγος' τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ τῶ εἶδει ἐν τῶ γένει. 'Ἀλλὰ τῶ γένει ἐν και ταῦτό; Και οὕτω δοκεῖ ἔξω πάσης ἡστυνοσούν ἀληθείας ἐρρίφθαι ὁ λόγος' τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ τῶ γένει ἐν τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ. [Possibility 2 excluded:] 'Ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ πολυώνυμα ἐν; Και οὕτως ἡμάρτηται αὐτῶ ὁ λόγος' ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἐν και ταῦτό τὸ ὑποκειμένον, τὰ δ' ὀνόματα ἐν μόνῃ τῇ προφορᾷ τὴν παραλλαγήν ἔχουσιν. [General conclusion:] «Ὡστε κατ' οὐδένα τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων ταῦτό και ἐν οὐσία και ἐνέργεια. Ἐκεῖνα μὲν <γὰρ> διαιροῦνται κατὰ γένος, κατ' εἶδος, κατ' ἀριθμὸν, ἐνοῦνται δ' αὖ τῶ εἶδει, τῶ γένει, τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ' ἡ δὲ θεία φύσις και ἐνέργεια θαυμασιῶς και ἀρρήτως και τὴν ἐνοῦσιν ἴσχει και τὴν διαίρεσιν διαιρεῖται γὰρ ἀδιαρέτως και ἐνοῦται διαιρετῶς' ὥστε παράδοξος ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις και ἡ ἐνωσις και ἡ διαίρεσις»; ed. TSAMES (cf. *supra*, n. 50), pp. 74-75. Calothesos was most probably inspired by GREGORY PALAMAS' latent paraphrase of ARISTOTLE'S *Metaphysics* V,6,20-21 in *Πρὸς Δανιὴλ Αἴγιον* 1-2: "Πᾶν τὸ ἐν πως ἀναγκαίως ἐστὶν ὡς οὐχ ἐν. Τὰ γὰρ ἐν τῶ γένει διάφορα τῶ εἶδει, και τὰ ἐν τῶ εἶδει διάφορα τῶ ἀριθμῶ' ἐστὶ δ' ἂ και τῶν ἐν τῶ ἀριθμῶ και αὐτῇ τῇ ὑποστάσει διάφορά ἐστὶ ταῖς φύσεσι' πολλὰ δὲ και τῶ ὑποκειμένον ὄντα ἐν οὐ διάφορα μόνον ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ και ἐναντία [e.g., some ἐτερόνυμα, such as ἀνάβασις and κατὰβασις when predicated of ὁδός]. Και οὐ λέγω ταῦτα νῦν ὡς οὕτως ἐχούσης τῆς ἐνεργείας πρὸς οὐσίαν ἡγνισοῦν..."; ed. MATSOUKAS (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 376,5-12. A similar list of various meanings of 'one' occurs in JOHN OF DAMASCUS' *Dialectica* XXXVIII,29-33, ed. KOTTER (cf. *supra*, n. 10), p. 105; and yet Palamas and Calothesos had recourse to Aristotle's writing itself. Let it be added that Aristotle's systematization of the various notions of 'one' was applied to the problem of the unity and distinction between God's essence and energy by Gregory Acindynos (GREGORY ACINDYNOS, *Ἐτερος ἀντιρρητικός κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν πονηροτάτων δογμάτων* 22-23; ed. J. NADAL CAÑELLAS [cf. *supra*, n. 31]; on Acindynos' use of Aristotle see a forthcoming article by

enumerated Aristotle's various sorts of 'being one' by tacitly yet verbatim citing two relevant passages from Book V of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.<sup>213</sup> Calothenos subsequently rejected — facing no real difficulties in doing so — the possibility of taking 'essence' and 'energy' as "synonyms" (πολυώνυμα),<sup>214</sup> which coincides with being "one in number".

In his first two steps, Manuel tacitly reproduces Calothenos' rejection of the possibility of taking 'essence' and 'energy' as 'one' in either of these two ways. Yet, Manuel reasonably reverses the order that these ways appear in Calothenos' text by putting the 'synonyms' case first, since this case, by standing for full identity, corresponds to the extreme anti-Palamite view ('essence' and 'energy' are just two linguistic sounds both standing for the same concept and thing<sup>215</sup>), whereas the remaining Aristotelian sorts of 'being one' stand for a partial 'oneness' conceived of in terms of partial identity (being the same in so far as belonging to the same species, to the same genus, etc.). Manuel also enriches Calothenos' argument with a direct reference to Aristotle's *Topics* and John of Damascus' *Institutio elementaris*, whence he borrows some examples of synonyms: "λώπιον καὶ ἰμάτιον" from Aristotle and "ἄορ", "ζίφος", "φάσγανον", "σπάθη" from John of Damascus.

Yet, this is not all. Manuel tacitly integrates into his chapter some Latin material, too. He takes refuge in Thomas Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*, I<sup>a</sup>, q. 13, a. 4 (cf. *supra*, p. 303, n. 103), where a treatment of the problem of the multiplicity of the divine names with the aid of these Aristotelian logical tools was available to Manuel. Aquinas

J. NADAL CAÑELLAS; my sincere thanks to Prof. Dr. J. Nadal Cañellas for allowing me access to his forthcoming edition of this Acindynian writing) and John Cyparissiotis, too (JOHN CYPARISSIOTES, *Katà τῶν τοῦ Παλαμικοῦ τόμου διαρρίσεων καὶ ἐνώσεων ἐν τῷ Θεῷ* VII, Proem; VIII,10, ed. LIAKOURAS [cf. *supra*, n. 31], pp. 360,14-16; 411,25-414,9).

213. On this finding see J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, *Νικολάου Καβάσιλα "Κατὰ Πρόδρομος". Πλατωνικός φιλοσκηπτισμός και ἀριστοτελικός ἀντισκηπτισμός στη βυζαντινή διανόηση τοῦ 14<sup>ου</sup> αἰῶνα* (with an English Summary: *Nicholas Cabasilas' "Contra Pyrrhonem". Introduction, Critical Edition, Modern Greek Translation, Philosophical Analysis, and Historical Context*, Athens 1999, pp. 265-266, n. 493 (where by accident I wrote "David Dishypatos" instead of Joseph Calothenos). This is not the only source of Calothenos' text that escaped the editor's attention.

214. JOSEPH CALOTHETOS, *op. cit.* 6, ll. 118-121, ed. TSAMES (cf. *supra*, n. 50), pp. 74-75.

215. Cf. Manuel's description of his opponents' view in ch. 47: "Ἐκεῖνοι ταῦτόν εἶναι νομίζουσι τῆ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐσίᾳ τὴν αὐτῆς ἐνέργειαν, μηδαμῆ μηδαμῶς οἰόμενοι διαφορὰν ἐν αὐταῖς ὑπάρχειν", ed. DENDRINOS, *An Annotated* (cf. *supra*, n. 189), p. 60,5-6.

argued against the synonymical approach to the various divine names. Manuel was so impressed by Thomas' argument that he allowed for a distinctive trace of Demetrios Cydones' translation of the Latin text to find a place in his own writing. The concluding words of the "Respondeo" of Aquinas' article, in Cydones' translation, read: "...τὰ ἀποδιδόμενα τῷ Θεῷ ὀνόματα, εἰ καὶ ἐν πρᾶγμα σημαίνει, διὰ μέντοι τὸ πολλοῖς καὶ διαφόροις λόγοις τοῦτο σημαίνειν οὐκ εἰσὶ ταυτοσήμαντα" (cf. *supra*, n. 103). Demetrios seems to have been seriously puzzled about how to render a Latin term, *synonyma*, which, although being Greek in origin, is not precisely equivalent to Aristotle's *συνώνυμα* but to what the logical handbooks and commentaries from Late Antiquity through the Byzantine times labelled *πολύωνυμα*. This is, at least, what one might suppose from the fact that the title of the *Summa contra Gentiles* I,35, "Quod plura nomina dicta de Deo non sunt synonyma", was alternatively rendered as "Ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ ὀνόματα τὰ περὶ Θεοῦ λεγόμενα οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνουσι πρᾶγμα" and "Ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ ὀνόματα τὰ περὶ Θεοῦ λεγόμενα οὐκ εἰσὶ πολυώνυμα" (cf. *supra*, p. 296). Demetrios, facing the same problem when translating the *Summa theologiae*, rendered the Latin *synonyma* by digging out of the mine of ancient Greek vocabulary the rare word "ταυτοσήμαντα"<sup>216</sup> — which is exactly the word used by Manuel in the same context. Given that, as far as I know, this word does not occur even once in any ancient or Byzantine philosophical or theological writing, Manuel's use of it can be explained only in terms of his having latent recourse in the above article of Aquinas' *Summa theologiae* in Demetrios Cydones' translation.<sup>217</sup>

216. He also uses the periphrasis "τὰ αὐτὸ σημαίνοντα" (cf. *supra*, p. 303, n. 103). Prochoros Cydones, in translating Aquinas' *De potentia*, seems to have preferred to render the Latin *synonyma* as *συνώνυμα* (see, e.g., the *ad hoc* text in q. 7, a. 6: "Πότερον ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα εἰσὶ συνώνυμα"; *Coisl. gr.* 96, ff. 187<sup>v</sup>-193<sup>r</sup>).

217. This is not the only time Palaiologos profited from Thomas Aquinas; he did so also in his *Διάλογος μετὰ τινος Πέρσον τὴν ἀξίαν Μοντεσίζη ἐν Ἀγκύρα τῆς Γαλατίας*; see J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, "Pope Benedict XVI's Use of the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos' *Dialogue with a Muslim Muterizes*: The Scholarly Background", in: *Archiv für mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur* 14 (2008), pp. 264-304, esp. 276-278. This was only natural, since "Manuel... was most probably taught by Demetrios Cydones, though it is not clear for how long and in what way the teaching was conducted. He was certainly inspired by Cydones and often acknowledged his debt to him"; DENDRINOS, *An Annotated* (cf. *supra*, n. 189), p. iii.

Further, Aquinas<sup>218</sup> also mentions the Aristotelian example of “λώπιον καὶ ἰμάτιον” (see *supra*, p. 329, n. 199) and Demetrios Cydones rendered it in a way that constitutes a self-same reproduction of Aristotle’s original words. This suggests that Manuel, for all his professional, scholarly reference to Aristotle’s *Topics*, picked up the example from Aquinas, merely making Aquinas’ implicit reference to Aristotle’s text explicit.<sup>219</sup>

*Step 2.* Manuel then comes to the various meanings of ‘one’ expounded by Aristotle and applied by Calothesos to the essence-energy problem. Given Manuel’s dependence on Calothesos’ passage, Manuel’s indeterminate way of referring to the various meanings of ‘one’ (“...πᾶσαν λέξιιν φιλόσοφον...”), contrary to what one might think at first glance, does not actually lack precision; for Manuel alludes to a list of meanings of ‘one’ elaborated by the philosopher *par excellence*, i.e., Aristotle, as well as to a recent and rather well-known theological application of this list to the issue in question.<sup>220</sup>

*Step 3.* Still, once more, Manuel profited from an oblique yet serious glance at Aquinas. This time, his additional source was one of the subsequent articles of the *Summa theologiae*, i.e., I<sup>a</sup>, q. 13, a. 7 (“Utrum nomina quae important relationem ad creaturas dicantur de Deo ex tempore”). There, Aquinas, explicitly referring, *inter alia*, to one of the two passages from Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* (1018a6-9) cited by Calothesos (cf. *supra*, p. 335, n. 212), argues for construing the *ad extra* ‘relative’ divine names as bearing some ontological import by definition, in contrast to the purely mental or self-referential distinctions and relations, which are in fact pseudo-relations. Both Aquinas and Manuel classify the notion of ταὐτό/idem as πρὸς τι / *relativum*, which is not found explicitly in the underlying Aristotelian text (Aquinas: “...ἀναφορὰ... σχέσις... ‘τὸ ταὐτὸν ταὐτὸν ἕαυτῷ’”; Manuel: “‘Τὸ’ γὰρ ‘ταὐτὸν’ ταὐτῷ ταὐτόν’ ἐστὶν καὶ τῶν πρὸς τι”; “τὸ

218. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I,13,4 s.c. (cf. *supra*, p. 303, n. 103).

219. This Aristotelian example (see also *Sophistical Refutations* 6, 168a30-31; *Physics* I,2 and III,3 185b19-20 and 2020b13) occurs in Aquinas’ *De potentia* (7,6), too; still, Prochoros Cydones rendered it as “ἰμάτιον καὶ ἐσθής” (*Coisl. gr.* 96, f. 188<sup>r</sup>).

220. Let it be noted that Calothesos, although he cited Aristotle’s list in full, did not examine the last meaning of ‘one’, i.e., being one by way of “analogy”. Likewise, Palaiologos implicitly dismissed this way, too, by rejecting all the Aristotelian meanings of ‘one’ *en bloc*.

‘ταυτόν’ σχέσιν ἔχον ἐστὶ πρὸς ἕτερον”). They exclude this sort of relation (described by Aristotle as “just taking a thing as if being two”) from theological language and resort to what they understand as real relations. Aquinas qualifies that these relations are real only as regards one of their terms, i.e., creature, which means that they denote something real not in *Deus creator* but in the *creatura*. Manuel says the same thing by stressing that the energies of God do not produce anything in Him but only in the realm of the created world.

Let us note the technical detail that, once more, Demetrios Cydones rendered explicit the Aristotelian passage that was tacitly included in Thomas’ text; so, it made it easy for Manuel both to notice the provenance of the passage and to recall Calothetos’ citation of it and its application to the essence-energy problem.

Still, Manuel, for all this, did not answer the question on the nature of the relation of this energy with the being it emanates from. Whereas Aquinas said explicitly that what is called God’s ‘act’ is an one-way relation of creature to God, Manuel just says that the way God’s nature and energy differ from each other is rather incomprehensible (“τρόποις δὴ τισιν ἡμῖν οὐ πάνυ καταληπτοῖς”), which is just the conclusion of Calothetos’ treatment of the issue.<sup>221</sup>

Manuel feels that he fully satisfies his Palamism by concluding that no sort of unity allows for taking ‘one’ as an absolutely undifferentiated, uncompromisingly simple being, and stops here.

Is this exposition and defence of Palamism Palamite in tenor? To judge from both the content and the sources of Manuel’s doctrine, it is so only to a limited extent. It should not escape our attention that Manuel, despite his professed attack on the first two anti-Palamites, Barlaam the Calabrian and Gregory Acindynos, and despite his

221. JOSEPH CALOTHETOS, *op. cit.* 6, ll. 123-126: “Ἡ δὲ θεία φύσις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια θαυμασίως καὶ ἀρρήτως καὶ τὴν ἔνωσιν ἴσχει καὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν· διαιρεῖται γὰρ ἀδιαίρετως καὶ ἐνοῦται διαιρετῶς. Ὡστε παράδοξος ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ ἡ ἔνωσις καὶ ἡ διαίρεσις”, ed. TSAMES (cf. *supra*, n. 50), p. 75; “The divine nature and the divine energy are both united and divided miraculously and ineffably; for they are divided indivisibly and united divisionally. Thus, in these things, both unity and division exceed humans’ thoughts”. One might wonder if Calothetos, by embarking upon a refutation of the anti-Palamite identification of the divine essence with the divine energy on philosophical grounds, does not refute himself, too, inasmuch as he explicitly proves equally unable to formulate a logically consistent theory of non-identity between the divine essence and the divine energy and implicitly shows himself to be proud of that.

explicit defence of the official Palamite doctrine of the Tabor light, never mentions Palamas<sup>222</sup> or Palamas' writings. Further, later on, in his *De ordine in Sancta Trinitate* (probably written in 1423<sup>223</sup>), Manuel seems to repudiate implicitly Palamas' fundamental doctrine of the infinite distance between God's essence and energies by stating: "...the divine being and its properties stand infinitely infinite times above our being and properties" (τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου "ἀπειράκις ἀπείρωις" ὑπερκεῖσθαι τῶν ἡμετέρων<sup>224</sup>). Contrary to Palamas' (mis) interpretation of Maximus Confessor's famous phrase "ἀπειράκις ἀπείρωις" (v. *supra*, pp. 279-280), which had been assigned special value early on by having been included in the Ἀγιορειτικὸς τόμος<sup>225</sup>, Manuel used the phrase to describe not the gap between God's nature and His properties but the gap between God's nature and His properties on the one hand and the created world on the other. This was the way several anti-Palamites construed this well-known Maximian passage repeatedly in their writings against this or that work of Palamas or of this or that officially Palamite author.<sup>226</sup> Palaiologos

222. See DENDRINOS, *An Annotated* (cf. *supra*, n. 189), p. xxix.

223. See DENDRINOS, *op. cit.*, p. 7 of the Introduction to the edition of the text.

224. MANUEL II PALAIOLOGOS, Ὅτι ὑπὲρ τάξιν ἢ Τριὰς καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἀσχημάτιστον καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἢ ἐν αὐτῇ τάξιν δεικνύται πραγμάτων τε καὶ παραδειγμάτων, ed. DENDRINOS, *op. cit.*, p. 318,15.

225. 5, ed. PSEUTONGAS in: CHRESTOU (ausp.), *op. cit.*, Vol. II (cf. *supra*, n. 11), p. 574,20-21.

226. See, e.g., GREGORY ACINDYNOS' *Refutatio magna operis Gregorii Palamae cui titulus "Dialogus inter Orthodoxum et Barlaamitam"* II,44,3-4, ed. J. NADAL CAÑELLAS, *Gregorii Acindyni opera. Refutationes duae operis Gregorii Palamae cui titulus "Dialogus inter Orthodoxum et Barlaamitam"* (CCSG, 31), Turnhout 1995, pp. 144-145; Ἐπιστολὴ τοῦ Παλαμῆ ἀνεσκενασμένη, ἣν ἀπὸ Θεσσαλονίκης τῷ μακαρίτῃ ἀπέστειλεν Ἀκινδύνῳ, 2, ll. 32-33; 47-49; 60-64; 80; 82; 90-91; 108-109; 135; 139-140; 146; 149-150; 226-227; 5, ll. 45-46; 48-49; 54-55; 83-84; 112-113; 223-224; 242; 249-250; 258-259; 6, ll. 25-26; 89-90; 94-96; 7, ll. 11-16; 190-193; 8, ll. 97-98; 12, ll. 15-17; 13, ll. 45; 63; 79-81; 14, ll. 65-68; 84-85; Ὁμολογία τοῦ μακαρίτου Ἀκινδύνου, ll. 106-107; 122-125; Ἡ τοῦ Παλαμῆ "Ὁμολογία" ἀνεσκενασμένη, 18, ll. 38-39; 22, ll. 50-51; Ὁμολογία Γρηγορίου ἱερομονάχου τοῦ Ἀκινδύνου πρὸς τὴν δέσποιναν, 9, ll. 1-2; 6-7; 10, ll. 1-2; Πνευματικὴ διαθήκη 3, ll. 27; 54-55; 89; 6, ll. 44-45; 9, ll. 54-55; 10, ll. 18; 17, l. 12; cf. NADAL CAÑELLAS, *La résistance* (cf. *supra*, n. 2), p. 159. In some of these passages, Acindynos uses Maximus' phrase in order to denote the infinite gap between the God uncreated and the world created (edd. NADAL CAÑELLAS - BENETOS; cf. *supra*, n. 35). See also THEODOROS DEXIOS' *Appellatio adversus Johannem Cantacuzenum* 64,48-104, 65,79-87, 67,2-7, 69,20-24 and 69,92-103; ed. I.D. POLEMIS, *Theodori Dexii opera omnia* (Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca, vol. 55), Turnhout-Leuven 2003, pp. 162-164, 167, 173, 179 and 182; for more occurrences see *op. cit.*, Index locorum laudatorum, p. 369; NICEPHOROS GREGORAS' *Historia Byzantina XXXV (= Oratio dogmatica VI)*, 16, ed. BEK-

consistently used this phrase to express the same idea in some of his other writings, too.<sup>227</sup>

Still, what Manuel apparently found in Aquinas to be redolent of Palamism is the latter's emphasis on the difference between the various divine perfections (due to the limits of the human intellect) and on the partial *fundamentum in re* of all these perfections.<sup>228</sup>

KER, Vol. III (cf. *supra*, n. 36), pp. 482,15-483,11; *Antirrhetica priora* 3,4-14, ed. H.-V. BEYER, *Nikephoros Gregoras. Antirrhetica I. Einleitung, Textausgabe, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen* (Wiener Byzantinistische Studien, vol. XII), Vienna 1976, pp. 393-405. Cf. MANUEL CALECAS, *Περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας* (PG 154: 301B). See also PROCHOROS CYDONES' *Περὶ καταφατικῶν καὶ ἀποφατικῶν τρόπων ἐπὶ τῆς θεολογίας καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ ὄρει τοῦ Κορίου θεοφανείας* (*Vat. gr.* 678, ff. 34<sup>v</sup>; 33<sup>v</sup>-34<sup>r</sup>; 36<sup>v</sup>). Cf. also JOHN CYPARISSIOTES, *Τῶν θεολογικῶν ῥήσεων ἐξθεσις στοιχειώδης* VIII,4, ed. DENTAKES (cf. *supra*, n. 170), p. 429,8-9; IDEM, *Κατὰ τῶν τοῦ Παλαμικοῦ τόμου διακρισεων καὶ ἐνώσεων ἐν τῷ Θεῷ* VI,6; VIII,8, ed. LIAKOURAS (cf. *supra*, n. 31), pp. 348,5-23; 380,10-381,14; 407,16-28; IDEM, *Κατὰ Νείλον Καβάσιλα* IV,5; V,12, ed. MARANGOUDAKES (cf. *supra*, n. 170), pp. 180,18-19; 288,3-4.

227. See DENDRINOS, *An Annotated* (cf. *supra*, n. 189), app. font., *ad loc.* See also MANUEL II PALAIOLOGOS' *De processione Spiritus Sancti* 68, ed. DENDRINOS, *op. cit.*, p. 106,7-9.

228. Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I,13, 3 (cf. *supra*, pp. 297-298); 4 Resp. (cf. *supra*, p. 303, n. 103) and ad 2; 12 (cf. *supra*, pp. 298-299); *De potentia*, 7,6 co.; ad 1; ad 4 (*Coisl. gr.* 96, ff. 188<sup>v</sup>-189<sup>r</sup>). Further investigation should be carried out to detect the probable dependence of Manuel on Aquinas' *De potentia*. Cf., e.g., Manuel's question in ch. 53: "Πότερον ἔστιν ἀληθῶς ἐνέργεια Θεοῦ ἢ μάτην θρυλεῖται, προσηγορία ψυχῆς τις οὐσα καὶ ἀμοιροῦσα τοῦ εἶναι χρῆμα; Καὶ ἄκτιστός ἐστιν αὕτη, εἴ γε ἀληθῶς ἔστιν, ἢ κτιστή;" (ed. DENDRINOS, *op. cit.*, p. 80,1-3; cf. ch. 72: "[according to a Latin error]... τὴν θεῖαν ταύτης ἐνέργειαν μηδὲν τι χρῆμα εἶναι..."; ed. DENDRINOS, *op. cit.*, p. 116,10) with the very title of the *De potentia*, 3,3: "Πότερον ἢ κτίσις ἐστὶ τι χρῆμα ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν ἢ οὐ καί, εἴ ἐστι, τί ἐστι" (*Coisl. gr.* 96, f. 33<sup>v</sup>). Let us recall that this is a Thomistic article that had attracted Theophanes of Nicaea's interest (cf. *supra*, pp. 314-315). Let it be added that Manuel, in ch. 68 of his *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit*, does not fail to reproduce Aquinas' and Palamas' argument for taking God's creative activity as a real entity: "We must examine also this, namely that if something that is created does not receive its existence through uncreated energy, then the need for these energies would be infinite, for each energy would always be created from another energy, and thus we would never cease to postulate, until we perceive something that creates without ever being created. However, if a created being came into existence not at all through uncreated energy, then neither would it have existed through a created energy. But this is impossible, for something which exists in time does not come into existence by its own power, for how can it possibly come into existence by that power which had never existed? ... Therefore, even if one conceded to this impious and godless doctrine stated in the past by the heretics and refuted by the saints, namely that the Son is energy of the Father and that this energy [i.e. Son] is created, since it is not proper *not* to be uncreated energy within God, through which the beings were created, or at least the first among those created beings — whatever you wish to call it —, even if this first being had been created before everything else and no doubt would surpass all others in terms of time and space, to the

#### 4.5. *Marcos Eugenicos: A Crypto-Thomist Professed Anti-Latin*

Marcos Eugenicos (ca. 1392-1445) is mostly known as a figure emblematic for his uncompromised anti-Latin ecclesiastical energy and decisiveness, especially because of his stance in the Council of Ferrara-Florence (1438-39).<sup>229</sup> Still, as we will see, this image of Eugenicos has more to do with the predominance of Byzantine historiography in Byzantine intellectual history than with Eugenicos' thought itself.

In a list of Latin errors he elaborated in a text dating from 1440/42,<sup>230</sup> Marcos includes the doctrine of the identity between essence and will in God, which he explicitly ascribes to Thomas Aquinas, and the doctrine of the createdness of the divine energy and grace:<sup>231</sup>

For our part, we declare, in accordance with the Fathers, that the will and the energy of the uncreated and divine nature are uncreated, too, whereas they, for their part, declare, in accordance with the Latins and

extent that one would want its creator to be, undoubtedly it must have its own creator, and this creator must be eternal and standing outside all creation, so that the created beings might not be produced infinitely. Such an argument is quite clearly absurd, for infinity belongs to God alone"; ed. DENDRINOS, *op. cit.*, pp. 104,11-105,1; 105,8-106,1. Unfortunately, a close examination of the wording of the original text does not seem to reveal any special dependence either on Palamas or on Aquinas (or on Theophanes of Nicaea, who had given the same argument; cf. *supra*, p. 312).

229. On Marcos Eugenicos see the relevant chapter by N. CONSTAS in: CONTICELLO-CONTICELLO (eds.), *La théologie byzantine* (cf. *supra*, n. 34), pp. 411-475.

230. PILAVAKIS, *Markos Eugenikos' "First"* (cf. *supra*, n. 138), p. 111; CONSTAS, "Mark Eugenikos" (cf. preceding note), pp. 421; 427.

231. MARCOS EUGENICOS, *Epistola encyclica contra Graeco-Latinos ac decretum Synodi Florentinae* 6, ed. L. PETIT, *Documents relatifs au concile de Florence. II. Oeuvres anticonciliaires de Marc d'Éphèse. Documents VII-XXIV. Textes édités et traduits* (Patrologia Orientalis, vol. XVII,1, N° 83), Paris 1924, p. 457,12-21: "Καὶ ἡμεῖς (sc. the genuine Greek Orthodox) μὲν τῆς ἀκτίστου καὶ θείας φύσεως ἀκτιστον καὶ τὴν θέλησιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι φαμεν κατὰ τοὺς Πατέρας, οὗτοι (sc. the Γραικολατῖνοι) δὲ μετὰ τῶν Λατίνων καὶ τοῦ Θωμᾶ τὴν μὲν θέλησιν ταυτὸν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, τὴν δὲ θεῖαν ἐνέργειαν κτιστὴν εἶναι λέγουσι, καὶ τε θεότης ὀνομάζοιτο καὶ τε θεῖον καὶ ἄυλον φῶς καὶ τε Πνεῦμα ἅγιον καὶ τέ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον, καὶ οὕτω κτιστὴν θεότητα καὶ κτιστὸν φῶς καὶ κτιστὸν Πνεῦμα ἅγιον τὰ πονηρὰ πρεσβεύουσι κτίσματα". Marcos refers to Thomas Aquinas' *Summa contra Gentiles* I,73 ("Ὅτι ἡ θέλησις τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ"; *Vat. gr.* 610, f. 77v) and *Summa theologiae*, I,19,1 co. ("Καὶ ὡσπερ τὸ νοεῖν αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῦ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι αὐτοῦ"; *Vat. gr.* 609, f. 38v). See, however, Thomas' qualifications in I,19,2 ad 1: "...Εἰ καὶ τὸ θεῖον βούλεσθαι ὡς πρᾶγμα τὸ θεῖον εἶναι ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅμως διαφέρουσι λόγῳ, διαφόρως καὶ σημαίνόμενα καὶ νοούμενα... Ὅταν γὰρ λέγω τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι, οὐ σημαίνεται τις πρὸς ἕτερόν τι σχέσις, ὡσπερ ὅταν λέγω τὸν Θεὸν θέλουν..." (*Vat. gr.* 609, f. 40r).



Thomas, that God's will is the same thing as His essence as well as that the divine energy is created, for all its being called 'divinity' and 'divine and immaterial light' and 'Holy Spirit' and so on; thus, in so speaking, they, the malicious creatures, believe in a created divinity, created light and created Spirit.

Fortunately, we can say much more about Eugenicos' view of the divine energies and their being both united to and distinct from the divine essence, for he devoted to this issue much more than the passing (and, at least in part, understandable in terms of the anti-Latin character of the text) negative reference to Aquinas just cited. Earlier on, he had set out to combat the anti-Palamite polemics of Manuel Calecas (ca. 1350?-1410), a convert to Catholicism who had joined the Dominican Order. To do so, he wrote two pieces against Calecas. Further, Marcos produced a set of *Syllogistic Chapters against the Heresy of the Acindynists on the Essence and Energy*.<sup>232</sup>

Let us look closely at these texts. Eugenicos, in his *Πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν εἰρημένων Μανουήλ τῷ Καλέκα κατὰ τοῦ "Συνοδικοῦ τόμου" ἀντιρρητικὸς πρῶτος, ἢ περὶ διακρίσεως θείας οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας* (*First Refutation of the First of Manuel Calecas' Pieces against the Synodal Tome, or on the Distinction between the Divine Essence and Energy*), comments upon Basil of Caesarea's *Adversus Eunomium* I,8,22-34<sup>233</sup> as follows:<sup>234</sup>

Do you understand that "the divine names", "when applied to the essence", neither have "the same meaning", "as is the case with the polynoms", nor are "devoid of reality" and "meaningless", but each of them corresponds to a specific meaning? And, if each of them corre-

232. I say "earlier on", because it is not so reasonable to date these writings to the last three or four years of Eugenicos' life. PILAVAKIS (*Mark Eugenikos* [cf. *supra*, n. 138], pp. 90; 149), the editor of the two *Antirrhetics against Manuel Calecas*, places them, along with the *Chapters*, in the 1430s. True, this is just a guess, but a plausible one.

233. EDD. SESBOÛÉ et al. (cf. *supra*, n. 5), p. 194.

234. ED. PILAVAKIS (cf. *supra*, n. 138), p. 179,17-22: "Ἀκούεις ὡς οὐτ' «ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας τίθενται» «τὰ ὀνόματα» «ταὐτὸ πάντα δυνάμενα», «καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πολυωνύμων» (passage cited also by GREGORY PALAMAS; see, e.g., *Against Acindynos* II,19,92; edd. CONTOYIANNES-PHANOURGAKES [cf. *supra*, n. 25], p. 150,11-12; *Against Gregoras* II,9; ed. CHRESTOU [cf. *supra*, n. 13], p. 271,5-7), οὕτε μὴν «ἀνύπαρκτα καὶ ἀσήμαντά» ἐστίν, ἐκάστῳ δὲ αὐτῶν ἴδιον ὑποβέβληται σημαίνόμενον νόημα; Εἰ δὲ νόημα, δῆλον ἔστι καὶ πρᾶγμα· νόημα γὰρ ἄνευ πράγματος ὑποθέσθαι τῶν ἀμηχάνων, ὡσπεροῦν οὐδὲ λόγον ἄνευ νοήματος". Several of Marcos' passages cited here are met here and there in BULOVIĆ, *Tò μυστήριον* (cf. *supra*, n. 2).

sponds to a specific meaning, it obviously corresponds to a specific reality; for it is impossible to accept that there is a meaning without an underlying reality, just as it is impossible to accept that there is a word without a meaning.

This is blatantly naïve epistemological realism.

Later on in the same text, Marcos qualifies that the difference between God's essence and energies as well as between the various energies themselves is conceptual:<sup>235</sup>

'Being realities' and 'really differing from each other' ... is not the same. We, in accordance with the Doctors, declare and believe the former, by stating that they are naturally and substantially and uncreatedly inherent to the essence of God; yet we forbid to speak of 'really differing from each other', because this has to do with things that exist per se [i.e., the primary substances], not with things distinguished only conceptually.

This is the way Eugenikos formulated and defended Palamism in his *Πρὸς τὰ δεύτερα τῶν εἰρημμένων Μανουήλ τῷ Καλέκα κατὰ τοῦ "Συνοδικοῦ τόμου" λόγος ἀντιρρητικὸς δεύτερος, ἢ περὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν διάκρισιν ἀσυνθέτου τῆς θείας οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας* (*Second Refutation of the Second of Manuel Calecas' Pieces Against the Synodal Tome, or on the Non-Compositional Character of the Distinction between the Divine Essence and Energy*),<sup>236</sup> too:<sup>237</sup>

[Ἡ δὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐκκλησία...], δύνανται ἐνεργητικὴν καὶ θελητικὴν, εἴτουν κίνησιν δραστηκὴν αὐτῷ [sc. God] προσεῖναι κηρύττουσα, διακρίνει ταύτην εὐσεβῶς τῆς οὐσίας, ἐπινοία μόνη κατὰ τοὺς θεολόγους, ὡς τὸ προσόν τοῦ ὧ πρόσεστι. ...

235. Ed. PILAVAKIS (cf. *supra*, n. 138), p. 228,19-27: "Ὁὐ ταύτων ἐστὶ... τὸ 'πράγματα εἶναι' καὶ 'πραγματικῶς διαφέρειν'. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς (sc. the Palamites) λέγομεν καὶ κατὰ τοὺς διδασκάλους φρονοῦμεν..., φυσικῶς καὶ οὐσιωδῶς καὶ ἀκτίστως ἐνυπάρχειν αὐτὰ τῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐσίᾳ τιθέμενοι (ex ed. τιθέμενα correxi), τὸ δὲ πραγματικῶς διαφέρειν ἀπαγορεύομεν, ἅτε τοῖς καθ' αὐτὰ ὑφ' ἐστῶσι προσήκον καὶ οὐ τοῖς ἐπινοία μόνον... διακρινομένοις. Οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ σύνθεσις ἐκ τούτων ἔσται τῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐσίᾳ".

236. A critical edition of this writing is being prepared by Dr. M. PILAVAKIS as a Doct. Diss. started at Durham University and transferred to the Theological Faculty of the University of Athens (*Markos Eugenikos' "Second Antirrhetic against Manuel Calecas about the Essence and Energy". Editio Princeps*). I am grateful to Dr. Marios Pilavakis (Athens) for kindly providing me with a copy of his edition and allowing me to cite some passages from it.

237. Ed. PILAVAKIS (cf. *supra*, n. 236), pp. 5,3-6; 18,10-11; 37,17-38,1; 38,11-13; 50,14-51,2.

... Ἡ διάκρισις ἐπινοία μόνη κατὰ τοὺς θεολόγους, οὐ πράγματι...

Καὶ ὁ μέγας Βασίλειος “ἐπὶ τῆς ἀπλῆς καὶ ἀσωμάτου φύσεως τὸν αὐτὸν τῆ οὐσίᾳ λόγον ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὴν ἐνέργειαν”<sup>238</sup> εἶπεν, ὡς οὐ δυναμένων ἀλλήλων διορισθῆναι πραγματικῶς· ἐπινοία γὰρ διακρίνονται μόνη.

...

Διακρίνεται μέντοι καὶ οὕτω τῆ ἐπινοία, ὡς μὴ ταυτὸν εἶναι καθάπαξ ἐνέργειάν τε καὶ οὐσίαν φάναι, καθάπερ “οὐσίαν” τυχὸν “καὶ φύσιν”.<sup>239</sup>...

“Οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ σύνθεσιν ταῦτα (sc. His attributes) ὁ Θεός, ἀλλὰ ‘κατὰ διαφόρους ἐπινοίας’<sup>240</sup> ταῦτα λέγεται”.<sup>241</sup>

... Καὶ τὸ τοῦ “σίτου” παράδειγμα<sup>242</sup> δεχόμεθα μάλα ἀσμένως, εἴπερ δηλαδὴ ‘πρᾶγμα’ νοοῖτο τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ ὑφ’ ἑστώως. Οὕτω γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἶεν τὰ ἐπὶ Θεοῦ λεγόμενα διάφορα πρᾶγματα, δηλαδὴ καθ’ αὐτὰ ὑφ’ ἑστώως, ἢ ὅπως ποιοῦντα σύνθεσιν. ‘Πράγματα’ δὲ αὔθις αὐτὰ λέγοντες καὶ διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων ὁμολογοῦντες “οὐ συνδιασχίζομεν τῆ ἐπινοία τὸ ὑποκείμενον” οὐδ’ ἐπισωρεύομεν αὐτῷ ταῦτα καὶ σύνθετον ἐξ αὐτῶν ποιοῦμεν, “ἀλλ’ ἐν εἶναι” φρονοῦντες, “ὅ,τι ποτέ ἔστι”<sup>243</sup> τὸ ἀκατανόητον ἐκείνο καὶ μόνον ὄντως ἀπλοῦν “ἐν ἀκινήτῳ ταυτότητι ὑπερδρυμένον”,<sup>244</sup> “οἰκειῶς ἔχειν” ὅμως “πρὸς ἅπαντα ταῦτα”<sup>245</sup> κατὰ τοὺς διδασκάλους φασμέν.<sup>246</sup>

238. Cf. *supra*, n. 77. Cf. GREGORY PALAMAS, *Against Acindynos* III,11,32-12,38, edd. CONTOYIANNES-PHANOURGAKES (cf. *supra*, n. 24), pp. 188,6-192,23.

239. From JOHN OF DAMASCUS’ *Dialectica* (cf. *supra*, p. 330, n. 202).

240. GREGORY OF NYSSA, *Contra Eunomium* I,584; II,300, ed. JAEGER (cf. *supra*, n. 10), pp. 195,4; 314,25.

241. PS.-ATHANASIOS OF ALEXANDRIA, *De sancta Trinitate dialogi* I (PG 28: 1144D) (cf. *supra*, n. 9).

242. BASIL OF CAESAREA, *Adversus Eunomium* I,6,44-54, edd. SESBOÜÉ et al. (cf. *supra*, n. 5), p. 186. Cf. GREGORY PALAMAS, *Διάλογος ὀρθοδόξων μετὰ Βαρλααμίτων* 39, ed. MANTZARIDES (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 201,28-30.

243. GREGORY OF NYSSA, *Contra Eunomium* II,477, ed. JAEGER (cf. *supra*, n. 10), p. 365,20-21.

244. PS.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITE, *Epistle IX*, 3, edd. HEIL-RITTER (cf. *supra*, n. 37), p. 203,3-4. Cf. IDEM, *De coelesti hierarchia* I,3; XII,3, edd. HEIL-RITTER, *op. cit.*, pp. 8,8; 43,14-16; *De divinis nominibus* I,6; IX,9, ed. SUCHLA (cf. *supra*, n. 11), pp. 118,8-9; 212,17-18.

245. GREGORY OF NYSSA, *Contra Eunomium* II,477 (cf. *supra*, n. 243).

246. “[The Church of God...], when declaring that a power full of act and will or an effective movement is adjacent to God, distinguishes it from the essence of God in a pious manner, i.e., only conceptually, just as the adjacent property differs from the being it is attached to. ... According to the theologians, the distinction is only conceptual, not real... As for Basil the Great’s dictum that «in the case of the simple and incorporeal nature, energy admits of the same ‘reason’ with essence», what he meant is that these things cannot be really separated from each other; for they are distinguished only conceptually. ... «God is not what is predicated of Him in a composite way, but He is said to be so and so ‘according to diverse concepts’». Still, [essence and energy] are distinguished conceptually, so that we do not say that the terms ‘essence’ and ‘energy’ are totally identical, as,

The way Marcos states here that essence and energy as well as the energies themselves are distinguished from each other fully accords with the Palamite line followed by his contemporary Joseph Bryennios (cf. *supra*, pp. 287-291). In addition, by qualifying that the divine unity is “real” (“πραγματική”), whereas the distinction between the various divine “realities” (“πράγματα”) is drawn “ἐπινοία μόνη”, and that “πραγματικῶς διαφέρειν” has no place in God, he reproduces the relevant wording of Theophanes of Nicaea (cf. *supra*, pp. 305-310).

To qualify the concept of “ἐπίνοια”, Marcos<sup>247</sup> invokes also the example of a ladder, which, while being called ‘ascent’ and ‘descent’, which are two clearly different things, is still one. ‘Ladder’ is produced as an example of ‘heteronyms’ along with ‘grain’ in Ammonius’ *In Porphyrii “Isagogen”*, where<sup>248</sup> even the same distinctive wording occurs (e.g., calling ascent and descent “things”/“πράγματα”; using for ascent and descent not only “ἀνάβασις” and “κατάβασις”, which is the most usual way in the relevant ancient and Byzantine expositions of heteronyms<sup>249</sup> [as well as better Greek], but also “ἄνοδος” and “κάθοδος”<sup>250</sup>).

e.g., ‘essence’ and ‘nature’. ... Further, we willingly accept the example of grain, if by ‘thing’ the *subjectum* or the being existing per se is meant. For, in this sense, the divine predicates are not diverse things, namely, beings existing per se, or realities entailing composition. On the other hand, when calling these predicates ‘things’ and confessing that they differ from each other, we do not fragment their *subjectum* by means of the concept we form about it nor do we heap them up on Him so as to render Him composite; on the contrary, while believing that, whatever this incomprehensible and indeed uniquely simple being, which abides above all in a state of an immutable self-identity, is, we also say, in accordance with the Fathers, that it is akin to all these things”.

247. MARCOS EUGENICOS, *Second Antirrhetics*, ed. PILAVAKIS (cf. *supra*, n. 236), p. 51,19-24.

248. AMMONIUS, *In Porphyrii “Isagogen sive Quinque Voces”*, ed. A. BUSSE, *Ammonius in Porphyrii Isagogen sive quinque voces* (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, vol. IV,3), Berlin 1891, pp. 70,24-71,3.

249. I have in mind a full list of these expositions I elaborated for my forthcoming monograph *Εὐνόμιος* (cf. *supra*, n. 8).

250. This wording occurs also in EUSTRATIUS OF NICAEA’S *In Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea I Commentaria*, ed. G. HEYLBUT, *Eustratii et Michaelis et anonyma in Ethica Nicomachea commentaria* (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, vol. 20), Berlin 1892, p. 31,17-19. In addition, “ἄνοδος” and “κάθοδος” stand for “ascensus” and “descensus”, taken as an instance of things opposite “ratione terminorum”, in Prochoros Cydones’ translation of THOMAS AQUINAS’ *De potentia* (10,2, arg. 2; *Coisl. gr.* 96, f. 248<sup>r</sup>); yet these brief, passing occurrences cannot be the sources for Eugenicos’ wording.

Still, Marcos was alarmed by Ammonius' proper description of the distinction between 'ascent' and 'descent' as "different from each other only conceptually and in virtue of their relation [with something else]" (τῷ λόγῳ μόνῳ καὶ τῇ σχέσει διάφορα). Thus he goes on to say in typically Palamite language that, in the peculiar case of God, the conceptually distinguished "things" are "naturally and *ab aeterno* inherent in Him" and then go down to us. In so doing, he falls back on his naïve realism (cf. *supra*, p. 344).

In a similar way, Marcos, in his succinct *Κεφάλαια συλλογιστικά κατὰ τῆς αἰρέσεως τῶν Ἀκινδυνιστῶν περὶ διακρίσεως οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας - περὶ τοῦ θείου φωτός - περὶ τῶν πνευματικῶν χαρισμάτων* (*Syllogistic Chapters against the Heresy of the Acindynists on the Distinction between Essence and Energy — On the Divine Light — On the Spiritual Gifts*),<sup>251</sup> reproduces several traditional arguments from the Palamite arsenal; e.g., distinguishing between essence and energy in God does not imply separating Him into two parts or elements, just as the human soul, for all its various and clearly distinct faculties and activities, is deemed composite by no one.<sup>252</sup> As far as the nature of the distinction between God's essence and energy is concerned, he explicitly refers<sup>253</sup> to Basil of Caesarea's relevant doctrine as well as to his famous example of "grain" and describes the distinction as being "κατ' ἐπίνοιαν διάφορα". Still, he does so in order to declare that both this distinction and the entity called 'energy' correspond to something real in God, which stands between God's essence and created beings.<sup>254</sup>

251. Ed. W. GASS, *Die Mystik des Nicolaus Cabasilas "Vom Leben in Christo"*, Greifswald 1849 (repr. Leipzig 1899), pp. 217-232. This text has not been critically edited as yet; on its manuscript tradition see PILAVAKIS (cf. *supra*, n. 138), pp. 89-90. As far as its title is concerned, I think that one should either include the three "περὶ..." in it or exclude them all. GASS used *Vindob. theol. gr. 171*, ff. 1<sup>v</sup>-11<sup>v</sup>. The passages cited here have been checked against this manuscript and several mistakes by Gass were tacitly corrected. This holds for the chapter numbers; whereas in the manuscript 68 chapters are neatly marked, Gass numbered 64. I follow the division as it stands in the manuscript, which, after all, is more consistent than that by Gass.

252. MARCOS EUGENICOS, *Κεφάλαια συλλογιστικά κατὰ τῆς αἰρέσεως τῶν Ἀκινδυνιστῶν* 17, ed. GASS (cf. *supra*, n. 251), pp. 222,22-223,2; see also p. 173,25-28.

253. *Op. cit.* 20; 13; 18; 22, ed. GASS (cf. *supra*, n. 251), pp. 223,18-27; 220,14-17; 223,3-7; 223,32-224,3.

254. *Op. cit.* 16: "Μήποτε οὖν ἔστι τι μεταξὺ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τῶν ὄντων, καθ' ὃ ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ὡς αἰτίος ὀνομάζεται καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτήν; Τοῦτο δὲ τί ποτ' ἂν ἄλλο εἴη πλὴν ἢ ἐνέργεια..."; ed. GASS (cf. *supra*, n. 251), p. 222,11-14. This statement seems to be directed against the following passage from JOHN CYPARISSIOTES' (ca. 1310?-

In addition, Marcos reproduces Joseph Calothetos' usage of Aristotle's classification of the various meanings of 'being one' and draws the same conclusion in the same spirit of appealing to patristic authorities as the highest criterion for what is theologically true or false:<sup>255</sup>

Τὸ 'αὐτὸν' ἢ γένοι ἢ εἶδει ἢ ἀριθμῶ. Ἄλλὰ γένοι μὲν ἢ εἶδει οὐκ ἂν φαῖεν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς οὐσίας. Λείπεται οὖν ἀριθμῶ αὐτὸν εἶναι, "καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πολυωνύμων",<sup>256</sup> ὡς ὅταν 'οὐσίαν' ἐπὶ Θεοῦ καὶ 'μορφῆν' καὶ 'φύσιν' τὸ αὐτὸ λέγωμεν.<sup>257</sup> Ἄλλὰ τὸ μὲν εἴρηται, τὸ δὲ σεσιώπηται, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ῥητῶς ἀπηγόρευται: "φύσις" γὰρ "καὶ ἐνέργεια" κατὰ τὸν θεῖον Κύριλλον<sup>258</sup> "οὐ αὐτὸν".<sup>259</sup>

Thus far, Marcos exhibits complete loyalty to official Byzantine Palamism, accompanied by a rather avowed anti-Thomist stand. Still, this is not all he had to say. His *Πρὸς τὰ δευτέρα τῶν εἰρημένων Μανουὴλ τῷ Καλέκκα κατὰ τοῦ "Συνοδικοῦ τόμου"* is redolent of crypto-Thomism. There, Marcos tries to interpret a much-vexed passage from the pseudo-Basilian *Adversus Eunomium* V (cf. *supra*, n. 238) in a way compatible with Palamism. After affirming once more that the distinction in question is 'conceptual', he cites a passage from Ps.-Dionysius Areopagite's *De divinis nominibus* this way:<sup>260</sup>

post 1377) *Τῶν θεολογικῶν ῥήσεων ἔκθεσις στοιχειώδης* VIII,10: "Πάντα δὲ μετὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ θεῖαν φύσιν κτιστά, ἐπεὶ καὶ μετὰ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν κτισμάτων οὔτε τι ἔστιν οὔτε τι ἐπινοεῖται ὡς ὑπαρξίς τις..." (cf. THOMAS AQUINAS' *Summa contra Gentiles* II,13,1, *supra*, n. 19; cf. also BASIL OF CAESAREA'S *Adversus Eunomium* II,31,22: "Δύο γὰρ ὄντων πραγμάτων, κτίσεώς τε καὶ θεότητος..."; edd. SESBOÜÉ et al. [cf. *supra*, n. 33], p. 128); ed. DENTAKES (cf. *supra*, n. 170), p. 477,31-33.

255. MARCOS EUGENICOS, *Κεφάλαια συλλογιστικά κατὰ τῆς αἰρέσεως τῶν Ἀκινδυνιστῶν* 4 (not 3, as is Gass' edition), ed. GASS (cf. *supra*, n. 251), p. 218,1-8.

256. BASIL OF CAESAREA, *Adversus Eunomium* I,8,27-28, edd. SESBOÜÉ et al. (cf. *supra*, n. 5), p. 194.

257. From JOHN OF DAMASCUS' *Dialectica* (see *supra*, p. 330, n. 202). Cf. GREGORY PALAMAS' *Against Gregoras* I,43: "Οὐσία" γὰρ καὶ 'φύσις' ἐν καὶ ἀδιάφορον ἐπὶ Θεοῦ, μόνῃ τῇ προφορᾷ τῆς λέξεως διαφέροντα", ed. CHRESTOU, Vol. IV (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 264,1-2.

258. CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA, *Thesaurus* XVIII (PG 75: 312C).

259. "Same" is conceived of in respect to genus or to species or to number. But they [sc. the anti-Palamites] would not say that energy is the same as essence with respect to genus or to species. It remains, therefore, that it is the same with respect to number, «as is the case with synonyms», as, for example, when saying that in God 'essence', 'form', and 'nature' are the same. Still, the latter one has been stated [by the Fathers], whereas the former has not – nay, it has been forbidden to be stated; for «nature and energy», according to Cyril, «are not the same». Cyril's passage had been repeatedly cited by Gregory Palamas.

260. Ed. PILAVAKIS (cf. *supra*, n. 236), p. 54,2-6: "The sun sheds its light along with its heat by means of the same ray, because it «in advance possesses in itself» «the shining»

...Ὁ ἥλιος [1]... φωτίζει {2} τε ὁμοῦ καὶ θερμαίνει διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀκτίνος [3], ὅτι περ ἐπινοία διακρινομένας “ἐν ἑαυτῷ προέχει” [4a/b] “τὴν φωτιστικὴν” [5] τε καὶ θερμαντικὴν “δύναμιν” [6]...

Ps.-Dionysius Areopagite's *De divinis nominibus* IV,6 reads:<sup>261</sup>

‘Φῶς’ οὖν ‘νοητὸν’ λέγεται τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν φῶς ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἀκτὶς [3] πηγαία καὶ ὑπερβλύζουσα φωτοχυσία, πάντα τὸν ὑπερκόσμιον καὶ περικόσμιον καὶ ἐγκόσμιον νοῦν ἐκ τοῦ πληρώματος αὐτῆς καταλάμπουσα καὶ τὰς νοεράς αὐτῶν ἄλλας ἀνανεάζουσα δυνάμεις καὶ πάντας περιέχουσα τῷ ὑπερτετάσθαι καὶ πάντων ὑπερέχουσα τῷ ὑπερκεῖσθαι καὶ ἀπλῶς πᾶσαν τῆς φωτιστικῆς [5] δυνάμεως [6] τὴν κυρεῖαν ὡς ἀρχίφωτος καὶ ὑπέρφωτος ἐν ἑαυτῇ [4a] συλλαβοῦσα καὶ ὑπερέχουσα καὶ προέχουσα [4b]...

At first sight, this seems to be the passage that Eugenicos reproduced, since he no doubt knew, as did all fourteenth and fifteenth-century theologians, the *corpus Dionysiacum*.<sup>262</sup> Still, things are more complicated. This Ps.-Dionysian passage is cited in Thomas Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*, I<sup>a</sup>, q. 13, a. 2 co., rendered into Greek by Demetrios Cydones<sup>263</sup> more than half a century before Eugenicos and, finally, reproduced by Eugenicos *via* Cydones' translation:

...Οὕτω γὰρ σημαίνει τὰ ὀνόματα τὸν Θεόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς τοῦτον γινώσκει. Ὁ δὲ ἡμέτερος νοῦς, τὸν Θεὸν γινώσκων, ἐκ τῶν κτισμάτων οὕτως αὐτὸν γινώσκει, ὥσπερ αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ κτίσματα {2} παριστᾷ. Προαποδεδεικται δὲ (I,4,2) τὸν Θεὸν “ἐν ἑαυτῷ προέχειν” [4a/b] πάσας τῶν κτισμάτων τὰς τελειότητας... Τῶν κτισμάτων ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον αὐτὸν παριστᾷ... καθόσον ἔχει τινὰ τελειότητα... ὡς ὑπερκειμένην ἀρχήν, ἧς τοῦ εἶδους ἀποδέουσι τὰ ἀποτελέσματα, ἔχοντα μέντοι τινὰ ὁμοιότητα ὥσπερ τὰ εἶδη τῶν ὑποκάτω σωμάτων παραδεικνύουσι τὴν δύναμιν [6] τοῦ ἡλίου [1].

The Ps.-Dionysian passage cannot fully account on its own either for the wording or for the content of Eugenicos' passage. In regard to the form, [1] occurs only in Marcos' and Aquinas' passages, and the same holds for [4a/b]. In regard to the content, Ps.-Dionysius'

and «heating power»...”. Cf. MARCOS EUGENICOS, *Κεφάλαια συλλογιστικὰ κατὰ τῆς αἰρέσεως τῶν Ἀζωνδυστῶν* 15, ed. GASS (cf. *supra*, n. 251), p. 221,28-29.

261. Ed. SUCHLA (cf. *supra*, n. 11), p. 150,1-7.

262. Cf. GREGORY PALAMAS, *Against Acindynos* I,7,24, edd. CONTOYIANNES-PHANOURGAKES (cf. *supra*, n. 24), p. 56,13-16.

263. *Vat. gr.* 609, f. 29<sup>r</sup>.

task is to illuminate the sense of the application of the word 'light' to God, whereas Eugenicos' as well as Thomas Aquinas' intention is to illustrate by means of the simile of the sun the simplicity of God against the multiplicity introduced by His various 'names'. In sum, in Aquinas and Eugenicos the same position is stated, expressed with the same terms and presented by the same simile. The latter's dependence on the former is, therefore, obvious.

This literary fact suggests that Marcos Eugenicos was positively attracted by the same Thomistic question (q. 13: "Περὶ τῶν θείων ὀνομάτων") as was Manuel II Palaiologos (cf. *supra*, pp. 334; 336-339) and that, by integrating Thomas' paraphrase of Ps.-Dionysius' passage from the *De divinis nominibus* cited above, he extracted, along with the simile of the sun, Thomas' idea that the various 'perfections' detected in the world pre-exist in God as a real unity divided into many things "ἐπινοία" and he implicitly subscribed to Thomas' *analogia entis* as far as theological epistemology is concerned. In so doing, Eugenicos in fact proves to be an adherent to John VI Cantacouzenos' 'Thomistic Palamism' (cf. *supra*, pp. 304-305), according to which the absolutely simple divine perfection is grasped as multiple because of the incapacity of the human mind.

Even more interesting is a philosophical defence of Palamism in Eugenicos' *Chapters*. One of his arguments for distinguishing between essence, power, and energy runs as follows:

Εἰ καὶ παράδοξον τὸ λεγόμενον εἶναι δόξει,<sup>264</sup> καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς αἰρετικίζουσιν Ἀκινδυνισταῖς, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐστὶν ἀληθέστατον, ὅτι περὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐγγυτέρω Θεοῦ φύσεων, νοερῶν τε καὶ λογικῶν, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐνέργεια διακρίνεται τῆς οὐσίας ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπωτέρω καὶ τῶν πάντη ξένων καὶ ἀλλοτριῶν.

Τρισὶ γὰρ τούτοις ὀρισμένων "ἀπάντων τῶν ὄντων", ὡς οἱ θεολόγοι διδάσκουσιν, "οὐσία, δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ"<sup>265</sup> ("τὸ γὰρ μηδεμίαν", φασί,

264. DIETRICH OF FREIBERG, *De cognitione entium separatorum et maxime animarum separatorum*, Prol., 4: "Fortassis autem aliqua, quae hic tractantur, videbuntur alicui absurda"; ed. H. STEFFAN, in: *Dietrich von Freiberg. Opera omnia. II: Schriften zur Metaphysik und Theologie. Mit einer Einleitung von K. FLASCH. Herausgegeben von R. IMBACH, M.R. PAGNONI-STURLESE, H. STEFFAN, L. STURLESE*, Hamburg 1979, p. 167,26.

265. THOMAS AQUINAS, *De potentia* 7,1, arg. 7: "Ἐν ὁπωσὺν χρήματι ἔστιν οὐσία, δύναμις καὶ ἐνέργεια, ὡς φησὶν ὁ Διονύσιος" (*Coisl. gr.* 96, f. 174<sup>r</sup>). Cf. PS.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITE, *De coelesti hierarchia* XI,2: "...εἰς τρία διήρηται τῶ κατ' αὐτοὺς ὑπερκοσμίῳ λόγῳ πάντες οἱ θεῖοι νόες, εἰς οὐσίαν καὶ δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν..."; edd. HEIL-RITTER (cf. *supra*, n. 37), pp. 41,22-42,2. Cf. PROCLUS' *Institutio theologica* 169: "Πᾶς νοῦς ἐν



“δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν ἔχον οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε τί ἐστι”<sup>266</sup>), (1) “τοῖς” μὲν “ἀψύχοις” καὶ ἀναισθητοῖς οἷον συνέπνυκται πρὸς τὴν φύσιν “ἡ ἐνεργητικὴ” “δύναμις”, συντηρητικὴ τις αὐτῶν οὐσα καὶ τοῦ εἶναι μόνον ὑπὲρ εἶσι καὶ διαμένειν παρεκτικὴ καὶ εἰ ἐπὶ τινων δὲ διακρίνοιτο, “ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς” ἡ θερμαντικὴ,<sup>267</sup> “μονομερής” ἐστὶν αὕτη καὶ ἄλογος καὶ βουλή-σεως ἔρημος.<sup>268</sup>

αἰῶνι τὴν τε οὐσίαν ἔχει καὶ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν”, ed. DODDS (cf. *supra*, n. 40), p. 146; In *Platonis “Timaeum” commentaria* II: “...τὸ νοητὸν διήρηται τριχῆ, τῆ τε οὐσίᾳ καὶ τῆ δυνάμει καὶ τῆ ἐνεργείᾳ...”, ed. E. DIEHL, *Procli Diadochi In Platonis Timaeum commentaria*, Vol. I, Leipzig 1903, p. 371,21-22; cf. the *app. font.* in the HEIL-RITTER edition. See also THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I,75 pr.: “...κατὰ τὸν Διονύσιον ἐν τῷ α΄ κεφαλαίῳ τῆς Ἀγγελικῆς ἱεραρχίας, τρία ἐν ταῖς ἀσωμάτοις οὐσίαις εὐρίσκονται, τὸ εἶναι, δηλονότι, ἡ δύναμις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια” (Vat. gr. 609, f. 95<sup>v</sup>); *De spiritualibus creaturis* 11, s.c. 1: “...τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Διονυσίου λεγόμενον ἐν τῷ εἰκοστῷ [sic] κεφαλαίῳ τῆς Ἀγγελικῆς ἱεραρχίας, ὅτι αἱ ὑπερκειμεναὶ οὐσίαι διαιροῦνται εἰς οὐσίαν καὶ δύναμιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν». Πολλῶ ἄρα μᾶλλον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἕτερον ἐστὶν ἡ αὐτῶν οὐσία καὶ ἕτερον ἡ αὐτῶν δύναμις, ἢ τε ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡ ποιητικὴ” (Coisl. gr. 96, f. 312<sup>v</sup>).

266. PS.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITE, *De divinis nominibus* VIII,5, ed. SUCHLA (cf. *supra*, n. 11), p. 203,2-4, latently but verbatim cited by GREGORY PALAMAS several times, e.g., in his *Epistle to Dionysius* 2, ed. MATSOUKAS (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 480,15-17, as well as in the *Synodal Tome of 1351*, 19; PG 151: 732D = KARMIREΣ, *Τὰ δογματικά* (cf. *supra*, n. 54), p. 322. Cf. JOHN OF DAMASCUS, *Expositio fidei* 37,12-13, ed. KOTTER (cf. *supra*, n. 16), p. 93. On this idea in Palamas cf. J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, *Ἀὐγουστῖνος* (cf. *supra*, n. 28), pp. 55-56.

267. Cf. STEPHANUS, *In Aristotelis librum “De Interpretatione” commentarium*: “Τὸ ‘δυνατὸν’ τοῖνον... λέγεται... ἡ ὅταν ὑπάρχη καὶ ἔξιν μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια... Καὶ εἰ μὲν γενητοῖς καὶ φθαρτοῖς ὑπάρχει, χωρισθείσης πάντως φθεῖρεται ἐκεῖνο ὃ ὑπάρχει. Οἷον τότε τὸ πῦρ γενητὸν μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ φθαρτὸν καὶ ἡνίκα ὑπάρχει, ἀνάγκη τὴν θερμότητα ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἡνίκα δ’ φθαρῆ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἦρσεν ἡ θερμότης, πάντως συμφθεῖρεται τῇ θερμότητι”; ed. M. HAYDUCK, *Stephani in librum Aristotelis De interpretatione commentarium* (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, vol. 18/3), Berlin 1885, p. 61,9-19.

268. Cf. AMMONIUS, *In Aristotelis librum “De Interpretatione” commentarium*: “...ἐνδείξασθαι ἡμῖν βουλόμενος [Aristotle] ὅτι ἐπὶ τινῶν ‘δυνατῶν’ εἶναι λεγομένων μονοειδῆς ἐστὶν ἡ δύναμις καὶ οὐκ ἐπαμφοτερίζουσα... Καὶ ποῖα ἐστὶ τὰ οὕτως ἔχοντα προστίθησιν, ὅτι τινὰ τῶν μὴ ἐχόντων λογικῆν οὐσίαν, οἷον τὰ ἄψυχα κατὰ τὰς ποιητικὰς ἐκτετῶν ἐνεργούντων δυνάμεις: «τὸ» γοῦν «πῦρ» θερμαῖνον «οὐ δύναται καὶ μὴ θερμαίνειν» (ARISTOTLE, *De interpretatione* 13, 23a2-3)... “Ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ἄμοιρα λογικῆς δυνάμειος ἐκτείνεσθαι βούλεται τὸ λεγόμενον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ἐφαρμόζειν, δηλοῦ ἐφεξῆς ἐπιφέρων: «ἐνία μέντοι δύναται καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀλόγους δυνάμεις ἅμα τὰ ἀντικείμενα δέξασθαι» (op. cit. 13, 23a3-4): τῶν τε γὰρ ἀψύχων αἱ παθητικαὶ δυνάμεις ἐναργῶς ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν... καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων αἱ ποιητικαὶ οὐκ εἰσὶ μονήρεις καὶ κατηνεγκασμένα, ὥστε ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς...: βαδίσαι γάρ, φέρε εἰπεῖν, δυνάμενος ὁ ὕλων δύναται καὶ μὴ βαδίσαι...”; ed. A. BUSSE, *Ammonius in Aristotelis De interpretatione commentarius* (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, vol. IV,5), Berlin 1897, pp. 241,20-242,2. A large part of Marcos’ wording occurs also in MICHAEL PSELLOS’ *Paraphrasis of Aristotle’s “De interpretatione”* (ed. A. MANUTIUS, *Ammonii Hermeciae commentaria in librum “Peri Hermeneias”*. *Magentini metropolitae Mytelinensis in eundem enarratio. Michaelis Pselli Paraphrasis in librum “Peri Hermeneias”*. *Ammonius Hermeciae in “Decem categoriis”*, Venice 1503, f. Oiii, rr, ll. 12-15 = p. 35), which is heavily indebted to Ammonius’ *Commentary*. Of

(2) “Ἐπι” δὲ “τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων”<sup>269</sup> καὶ ἔτι γε μᾶλλον τῶν λογικῶν “δραστηριώτερον” ἤδη “καὶ ἐκφανὲς μᾶλλον” τὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ἔργον<sup>270</sup> ἐστίν. “Ἄ γε οὐ πρὸς ἑαυτὰ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἕξω, καὶ οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ μόνον ἀλλὰ “καὶ τάναντία”, καὶ “πολλά” τε ὁμοῦ καὶ μεγάλα δύνανται τε καὶ ἐνεργοῦσι,<sup>271</sup> χρώμενα μὲν τοῖς οἰκείους σώμασιν ὡς ὄργανοις, πολλὰ δὲ ἕτερα δι’ αὐτῶν ὄργανα τῶν οἰκείων ἐνεργειῶν ποιούμενα.”<sup>272</sup>

(3) Καὶ ἐφεξῆς ἀνιοῦσιν αἱ νοεραὶ φύσεις καὶ νῶ μόνω ληπτὰ πολυδυναμώτεροι<sup>273</sup> πολλῶ τῶ μέσῳ τῶν μετ’ αὐτάς εὐρεθῆσονται· καὶ ὅσῳ ἐγγύς εἰσι τοῦ Θεοῦ τῇ ἀπλότῳ τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσίας, τοσοῦτον καὶ τῶ παντοδαπῶ καὶ ποικίλῳ τῆς ἐνεργείας. “Ἄς γε οἱ χαριέστεροι τῶν Λατινικῶν διδασκάλων φασι καὶ ἐκ πάσης ὕλης τε καὶ ιδέας περιπλάττειν ἑαυτοῖς σώματα κατὰ τὸ βουλητὸν αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἀναλόγους ἐμφανείας τοῖς θεωμένοις.”<sup>274</sup>

course, it is quite possible that Eugenicos had access to Psellos’ *Commentary*, too, just like GREGORY ACINDYNOS (*Refutatio magna* IV,20,111-120; ed. J. NADAL CAÑELLAS [cf. *supra*, n. 226], p. 348), who cited a passage from the concluding paragraph of the section where Psellos paraphrases Aristotle’s treatment of predicating ‘possible’ of ‘necessary’, whence Marcos borrowed his wording.

269. Cf. preceding note.

270. DIETRICH OF FREIBERG, *De cognitione entium separatorum*, 2: “...animae humanae... In quibus *efficacius et manifestius* differunt substantia, virtus et operatio”; ed. STEFFAN (cf. *supra*, n. 264), p. 169,69-74.

271. ARISTOTLE, *De Interpretatione* 13, 22b36-23a6: “Φανερόν δὲ ὅτι οὐ πᾶν τὸ δυνατόν ἢ εἶναι ἢ βαδίζειν καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα δύναται, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἐφ’ ὧν οὐκ ἀληθές· πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ κατὰ λόγον δυνατῶν, οἷον τὸ πῦρ θερμοτικὸν καὶ ἔχει δύναμιν ἄλογον. Αἱ μὲν οὖν μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις αἱ αὐταὶ πλειόνων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, αἱ δ’ ἄλογοι οὐ πᾶσαι, ἀλλὰ... τὸ πῦρ οὐ δυνατόν θερμαίνειν καὶ μὴ... εἶνα μέντοι δύναται καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀλόγους δυνάμεις ἕκαστα τὰ ἀντικείμενα... Οὐ πᾶσα δύναμις τῶν ἀντικειμένων...”. This is the passage commented on in the passages by Ammonius and Stephanus cited in nn. 267 and 268. As is obvious, Marcos borrows various words, phrases, and terms from both Aristotle and these commentators. Aristotle treats the notion of potency *in extenso* in *Metaphysics* IX,5 (1047b31-1048a24; cf. ARISTOTLE, *Categories* 10, 13a17-19: “...ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ὑπάρχοντος τοῦ δεκτικοῦ δυνατόν εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ τιμὴ φύσει τὸ ἐν ὑπάρχει, οἷον τῶ πυρὶ τὸ θερμῶ εἶναι...”). Still, Eugenicos used here only *De interpretatione*.

272. See GREGORY PALAMAS, *Διάλογος ὀρθοδόξου μετὰ Βαλααμίτου* 53: “Καὶ πάντα γε μὴν τὰ νοερὰ πλειόνων εὐμοιρεῖ δυνάμειον καὶ μειζόνων ἢ τὰ σώματα, τῶ τε πεφυκέναι καὶ διὰ σωμάτων ἐνεργεῖν διπλασίους ἑαυτῶν ποιεῖται τὰς δυνάμεις”; ed. MANTZARIDES (cf. *supra*, n. 13), p. 215,4-7.

273. One should not definitely exclude Gass’ reading “πολὺ δυναμώτεροι”, although this comparative form is almost non-existent and would sound more like a rendering of the Latin ‘multo potentiores’ (from some Latin text other than Dietrich’s). Still, the fact that Marcos also had in mind Palamas, who uses the term “πολυδυναμώτερος” (cf. *infra*, p. 355), makes, at least provisionally, this scenario unnecessary.

274. Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I,51,2 (“Utrum angeli assumant corpora”) co.: “Ἀπολογουμένοις ῥητέον ἂν εἴη ὅτι τινὲς ἔφασαν τοὺς ἀγγέλους μηδέποτε σώματα ἀναλαμβάνειν, πάντα δὲ τὰ ἐν τῇ θεῖᾳ Γραφῇ περὶ τῆς ἐμφανείας ἀγγέλων λεγόμενα ἐν ταῖς θεωρίαις συμβαίνειν τῶν προφητῶν, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ κατὰ φαντασίαν. Τοῦτο δὲ μάχεται τῶ

(4) “Ο” δὲ “τῶν ὄλων”<sup>275</sup> Θεός”,<sup>276</sup> “ἡ μακαρία φύσις”,<sup>277</sup> ὅσω τούτων ἀπάντων ἐξήρηται”,<sup>278</sup> τοσοῦτόν ἐστιν ἀπλοῦς τε ἅμα καὶ ὑπερούσιος,<sup>279</sup> καὶ οὐ πολυδύναμος ἢ μεγαλοδύναμος μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ “παντοδύναμος”,<sup>280</sup> ὡς “πᾶσαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ δύναμιν προέχων καὶ ὑπερέχων”,<sup>281</sup> Διονύσιος φησὶν ὁ κλεινός, καὶ ὡς “ἐπὶ πάντα τῆς αὐτοῦ δυνάμεως” καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας

σκοπῶ τῆς Γραφῆς. Πᾶν γὰρ τι φανταστῆ θεωρεῖα ὁρώμενον ἐν μόνῃ τῇ τοῦ ὁρῶντος ἐστὶ φαντασίη· ὅθεν καὶ οὐκ ἀδιαφόρως ὑπὸ πάντων ὁρᾶται· ἡ δὲ θεία Γραφή οὕτω πολλαῖς τοῖς ἀγγέλους φαινομένους εἰσάγει, ὥστε κοινῶς ὑπὸ πάντων ὁρᾶσθαι· ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν Ἀβραάμ φανέντες ἄγγελοι ὤφθησαν καὶ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ πάσης τῆς οἰκίας αὐτοῦ (Gen. 18,1-15)· καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Λὼτ (Gen. 19,1-3) καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τῶν Σοδόμων (Gen. 19,5)· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ τῶν Τωβίτα φανείς ἄγγελος (Tob. 5,4-12,22) ὑπὸ πάντων ἐωρᾶτο. “Ὅθεν δῆλον κατὰ σωματικὴν ὄρασιν τοῦτο συμβῆναι, δι’ ἧς τὸ ἐξω τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν κείμενον ὁρᾶται· ὅθεν καὶ ὑπὸ πάντων ὁρᾶσθαι δύναται. Τοιαύτη δὲ ὁράσει τὸ σῶμα μόνον ὁρᾶται. Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν οἱ ἄγγελοι οὔτε σώματά εἰσιν οὔτε σώματα ἔχουσι φύσει αὐτοῖς, ὡς εἴρηται (q. 50, a. 1; q. 51, a. 1), ἡνωμένα, λείπεται σώματα λαμβάνειν ἐνίοτε”; ad 3: “Εἰ καὶ ὁ ἀήρ ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ ἀραιότητι μένων οὔτε σχῆμα οὔτε χρῶμα κατέχει, ὅμως πυκνούμενος καὶ σχηματίζεται καὶ χρωματίζεται δύναται· ὡς δῆλον ἐπὶ τῶν νεφῶν. Οὔτω τοίνυν οἱ ἄγγελοι λαμβάνουσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἀέρος σώματα πυκνοῦντες αὐτὸν τῇ θείᾳ δυνάμει, ὅσον ἀνάγκη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ληφθέντος σώματος μόρφωσιν” (Vat. gr. 609, f. 74<sup>v</sup>). Περὶπλάττειν means, *inter alia*, “creating something tangible by condensing its staff”; see, e.g., THEOPHRASTUS’ *De igne*, fr. 43,6, ed. V. COUTANT, *Theophrastus. De igne*, Assen 1971, p. 29; this process corresponds exactly to what Aquinas describes here. Cf. also THOMAS AQUINAS, *De potentia* 6,7: “Πότερον οἱ ἄγγελοι ἢ καὶ οἱ δαίμονες δύνανται σῶμα προσλαμβάνειν ἢ οὐ” (translated by Prochoros Cydones; *Coisl. gr.* 96, ff. 161<sup>v</sup>-164<sup>v</sup>, esp. f. 163<sup>v</sup>): “Ὅθεν ἀπλῶς συγχωρητέον ἐστὶ τοὺς ἀγγέλους ποτὲ μὲν σώματα ἀναιρεῖσθαι μορφοῦντας σώματα αἰσθητά, τῇ ἐξωτερικῇ καὶ αἰσθητῇ ὁράσει ὑποκείμενα...”; IDEM, *De spiritualibus creaturis* 5, arg. 5 (translation by PROCHOROS CYDONES): “Οἱ ἄγγελοι ἀναιροῦνται τινα σώματα” (*Coisl. gr.* 96, f. 285<sup>v</sup>). Cf. DIETRICH OF FREIBERG, *De cognitione entium separatorum* 66,19-20; 70,103-104; 85,79; ed. STEFFAN (cf. *supra*, n. 264), pp. 231; 233; 246.

275. II Macc. 14,35; III Macc. 2,3; 6,9.

276. “Ο τῶν ὄλων Θεός” occurs some one hundred times in the Greek Patristic literature up to John of Damascus.

277. BASIL OF CAESAREA, *In Hexaemeron* 1,2; edd. DE MENDIETA-RUDBERG (cf. *supra*, n. 83), p. 5,15; *De fide* (PG 31: 469A); GREGORY OF NYSSA, *Contra Eunomium* III,6,40, ed. JAEGER (cf. *supra*, n. 63), p. 200,13-14; *Refutatio Confessionis Eunomii* 96, ed. JAEGER, *op. cit.*, p. 352,8; *De officio hominis* 22 (PG 44: 205A).

278. PS.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITE, *De divinis nominibus* V,10, ed. SUCHLA (cf. *supra*, n. 11), p. 189,15-16; MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *Quaestiones et dubia* 173, ed. J.H. DECLERCK, *Maximi Confessoris Quaestiones et dubia* (Corpus Christianorum. Series Graeca, vol. 10), Turnhout 1982, p. 120,3-4.

279. Cf. PS.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITE, *De divinis nominibus* VII,4, ed. SUCHLA (cf. *supra*, n. 11), p. 199,2-3; *op. cit.* II,4, ed. SUCHLA, p. 126,14; cf. 128,3.

280. PS.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITE, *De divinis nominibus* VIII,6, ed. SUCHLA (cf. *supra*, n. 11), pp. 203,23-204,2.

281. PS.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITE, *De divinis nominibus* VIII,2, ed. SUCHLA (cf. *supra*, n. 11), p. 201,1-2. Cf. GREGORY PALAMAS, *Against Acindynos* III, 22,103; VI, 17,65; edd. CONTOYIANNES-PHANOURGAKES (cf. *supra*, n. 24), pp. 235,17-19; 435,31-436,1.

“δικινομένης”<sup>282</sup>. “έπομένην” γάρ “αὐτὴν” ἀεὶ “τῆ βουλήσει καὶ σύνδρομον ἔχει”,<sup>283</sup> καὶ ἀμφοτέρα δήπουθεν “ἐπιθεωρούμενα τῆ οὐσίας”.<sup>284</sup>

Οὕτως οὐδὲν ἢ τῆς ἐνεργείας διάκρισις τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ἀπλότητα παραβλάπτει.<sup>285</sup>

282. PS.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITE, *De divinis nominibus* VII,4; VIII,2, ed. SUCHLA (cf. *supra*, n. 11), pp. 198,23-24; 201,17-18 (cf. Sap. 7,24).

283. GREGORY OF NYSSA, *Contra Eunomium* I,396; II,227, ed. JAEGER (cf. *supra*, n. 10), pp. 142,16-17; 292,5-6; III,7,22, ed. JAEGER, *Gregorii Nysseni opera. II* (cf. *supra*, n. 63), p. 223,1; *Refutatio Confessionis Eunomii* 47, ed. JAEGER, *op. cit.*, p. 331,14; *Oratio Catechetica*, ed. E. MÜHLENBERG, *Gregorii Nysseni opera*, Vol. III,4, Leiden-New York-Cologne 1996, pp. 13,11-12; 35,13-14; *Apologia in Hexaemeron* (PG 44: 69A); BASIL OF CAESAREA, *Adversus eos qui per calumniam dicunt dici a nobis tres Deos* (PG 31: 1496C). Cf. PS.-CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA, *De sancta Trinitate* 6 (ex GREGORII NYSSENI *Oratio Catechetica* 2 verbatim) (PG 77: 1129C); JOHN OF DAMASCUS, *Expositio fidei* 7,25 (ex GREGORII NYSSENI *Oratio Catechetica* 2 verbatim), ed. KOTTER (cf. *supra*, n. 16), p. 27; 100,121-122, ed. KOTTER, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

284. BASIL OF CAESAREA, *Adversus Eunomium* II,28,27-28; edd. SESBOÛÉ et al. (cf. *supra*, n. 31), p. 118. Cf. GREGORY OF NYSSA, *Contra Eunomium* I,655; II,100; II,479; ed. JAEGER (cf. *supra*, n. 10), pp. 214,23-24; 256,6-7; 366,7-8; *De officio hominis* 16 (PG 44: 184D).

285. MARCOS EUGENICOS, *Κεφάλαια συλλογιστικά κατὰ τῆς αἰρέσεως τῶν Ἀκινδυνιστῶν* 18, ed. GASS (cf. *supra*, n. 251), pp. 220,28-222,2 (“Although what I intend to say will seem strange, especially to the heretic Acindynists, it is nevertheless absolutely true, that is, as far as the natures that stand closer to God, namely the intelligible and rational ones, but also God himself, are concerned, energy is discerned from essence more than in the case of the beings that stand away from Him and differ radically from Him. In fact, as theologians teach, «all beings» are determined in regard to the following three things, namely, «essence, power, and energy»; for, as they say, «whatever has no power or, otherwise, energy neither exists nor is something concrete». Now (1) in the case of «the inanimate» and insensible beings «the energetic» «power» is enveloped, so to speak, in their nature, just keeping them in existence and providing them with the being that makes them what they are. And if in some cases energy is distinguishable from essence, «as in the case of fire» the power to heat, energy is one-dimensional, irrational, and deprived of will. (2) In the case of «the irrational animals» and, to a higher degree, in the case of rational ones, the result of the power is «more effective and more manifest» than in the previous one. Beings of this sort have the power to operate, and do operate, not only in regard to themselves but also *ad extra*, not only the same results but even the contrary ones, and «numerous» as well as great things, using first their bodies as instruments and further making many other objects instruments by means of their bodies. (3) Proceeding higher, the intelligible natures, which can be grasped only by means of the mind, will be found much more powerful than these lying behind them; indeed, to the extent they are close to God in virtue of the simplicity of their essence, they are also close to Him in virtue of the multifariousness and the diversity of their energy. These natures, as the sophisticated Latin doctors say, concoct out of any sort of matter and shape bodies for themselves *ad libitum*, in order to present themselves to the persons they intend to in the proper appearance. Finally, «the God of all», «the blessed nature», to the extent He «lies above all», is also simple as well as super-essential, and not only much powerful or greatly powerful but also «omnipotent», since «He has from eternity in Himself and in the full sense of the term all power», as the glorious Dionysius says, and since «His power» and energy «goes through all beings; for He always has it accompanying and serving His

The main point of this argument occurs in equal length in Gregory Palamas:<sup>286</sup>

...Τοσοῦτον ἀπέχει τοῦ εἶναι σύνθετον διὰ τὰς ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμεις καὶ τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον, ὥστε καὶ πῶς τῶν σωμάτων πλείους ἔχει δυνάμεις (2) τῶν μᾶλλον συνθέτων (1) τὰ ἀπλούστερα. Τῶν γὰρ τεσσάρων στοιχείων ἐν σώμασιν ἀπλούστερον οὐδέν· τίς οὖν καλεῖται “παμμήτωρ”; Οὐχ ἡ “γῆ”,<sup>287</sup> χωρὶς τῶν ὁμοστοίχων τᾶλλα μικροῦ πάντα παρ’ ἑαυτῆς προάγειν κατὰ “τὸ θεῖον” δυναμένη “πρόσταγμα”,<sup>288</sup> Πῶς οὖν ἡ πλείους ἔχουσα δυνάμεις ἀπλουστέρα, εἴ γε ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἔπεται ἡ σύνθεσις; ... Πολυδυναμώτερα τὰ ἀπλούστερα...

Τοῦτο δ’ ἂν ἴδοις καὶ πῶς (3) τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἐξετάζων. Καὶ πάντα γε μὴν τὰ νοερά πλείωνων εὐμοιρεῖ δυνάμεων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ τὰ σώματα, τῷ τε πεφυκέναι καὶ διὰ σωμάτων ἐνεργεῖν διπλασίους ἑαυτῶν ποιεῖται τὰς δυνάμεις. Ἄλλα τοσοῦτον ἐστὶν ἀπλᾶ μᾶλλον τῶν σωμάτων, ὡς μηδὲ σύγκρισιν ἐπιδέχσθαι κατὰ τοῦτο πρὸς αὐτά.

Εἰ τοίνυν τὰ πολυδυναμώτερα καὶ ἀπλούστερα, (4) τὸ παντοδύναμον καὶ ἀπλούστατον· καὶ τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴη τὸ κυρίως ἀπλοῦν καὶ πάσης συνθέσεως ἀπηλλαγμένον. Ἡ γὰρ σύνθεσις ἐξ ἀδυναμίας, ὡς εἶπεῖν, ἔστιν· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι καθ’ ἑαυτοῦ τῶν γενητῶν μονοειδῶς καὶ ἀμιγῶς παντάπασιν εἶναι τε καὶ ὑφεστάναι, τῆς πρὸς ἕτερον ἐξ ἀνάγκης δεῖται συμπλοκῆς, διὸ καὶ τῇ γενέσει σύνθετον εὐθὺς ἀπετελέσθη.

will», and both are definitely seen «to be adjacent to His essence». Thus, the fact that His energy is distinct [from His essence] does not harm the simplicity of the essence at all”). An identical *scala naturarum* is offered in MARCOS EUGENICOS’ *De hominis imbecillitate* (Λύσις ἀπορίας πρὸς τὸν βασιλεῖα ἀπορήσαντα, τί δήποτε νωθρὸν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁ Θεὸς ἐργασάμενος καὶ εἰς τὰ κακὰ προπετῆ, εἶτα κολάζει ἁμαρτάνοντα), ed. A. JAHN, “Marcus Eugenicos Ueber die moralische Schwäche des Menschen. Aus der Münchner Handschrift 495 zum ersten Male und mit Anmerkungen herausgegeben”, *Zeitschrift für die historische Theologie* 15 (1845), pp. 42-73, esp. 50,7-16.

286. GREGORY PALAMAS, *Διάλογος ὀρθοδόξου μετὰ Βαυλααμίτου* 52-53; ed. MANTZARIDES (cf. *supra*, n. 13), pp. 214,15-215,16.

287. Palamas draws on PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA’s *De officio mundi* 133: “Μήτηρ δ’ ὡς ἔοικε καὶ ἡ γῆ... ἦν ἐτύμως τὸ ποιητικὸν γένος «παμμήτορα» καὶ «καρποφόρον» καὶ «πανδώραν» εἶωθεν ὀνομάζειν, ἐπειδὴ πάντων αἰτία γενέσεως καὶ διαμονῆς ζῶων ἡμοῦ καὶ φυτῶν ἐστιν”; ed. L. COHN, *Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt*, tomus I, Berlin 1896 (repr. 1962), p. 36,3-8; Philo probably refers to AESCHYLUS’ *Prometheus vinctus* 90. Besides, EUSEBIUS OF CAESAREA included in his *Praeparatio Evangelica* (III,9,2) a passage from PORPHYRY’S *De agalmatibus*, where some verses of an Orphic hymn were cited, where the rare phrase “γαῖα παμμήτειρα” occurs; fr. 354F36 in: A. SMITH, *Porphyrii philosophi fragmenta*, Stuttgart-Leipzig 1993, p. 413. Cf. *Orphei hymni* X,1 (“Ω Φύσι, παμμήτειρα θεά...”) and 40,1 (“Δηώ, παμμήτειρα θεά...”); ed. G. QUANDT, *Orphei hymni*, Dublin-Zürich 1973 (1941), pp. 10; 31.

288. PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA, *De officio mundi* 168; ed. COHN (cf. *supra*, n. 287), p. 59,2; BASIL OF CAESAREA, *In Hexaemeron* IV,4; VIII,7, edd. DE MENDIETA-RUDBERG (cf. *supra*, n. 83), pp. 61,24; 141,21-142,1; GREGORY OF NYSSA, *Apologia in Hexaemeron* (PG 44: 65C); JOHN OF DAMASCUS, *Expositio fidei* 24,20, ed. KOTTER (cf. *supra*, n. 16), p. 68. Philo and the above-mentioned Christian Fathers refer to Gen. 1,11-12, commented on by Philo in the passage used by Palamas in par. 52 (cf. *supra*, n. 286).

Palamas reproduces a rather common Neoplatonic doctrine.<sup>289</sup> As his wording betrays, his argument is an explication of the subsequent passages from Syrianus' *Commentary on Aristotle's "Metaphysics"*:<sup>290</sup>

...Ἐν τοῖς ἀύλοις εἶδουσιν ἀεὶ τὰ πολυδυναμώτερα καὶ ὀλικώτερα προηγεῖται τῶν μερικωτέρων καὶ ὑφειμένων...  
...Πᾶν ἄνυλον εἶδος καὶ θεῖον ἐν ἀπληθύντῳ καὶ μονοσιδεῖ καὶ ἀπλουσ-  
τάτῃ οὐσία πολυδυναμωτάτον<sup>291</sup> ἐστὶ καὶ μετέχεται οὐ κατὰ πάσας ἐαυ-  
τοῦ δυνάμεις ὑπὸ τῶν τῆδε.<sup>292</sup>

Palamas also consciously combined Syrianus' passages with Proclus' *Institutio theologica*, ch. 127 ("Πᾶν τὸ θεῖον ἀπλοῦν πρῶτως ἐστὶ καὶ μάλιστα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐταρκέστατον"):<sup>293</sup>

"Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἀπλοῦν, ἐκ τῆς ἐνώσεως φανερόν· ἐνικώτατον γὰρ ἐστὶ πᾶν, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον διαφερόντως ἀπλοῦν. Ὅτι δὲ αὐταρκέστατον, μάθοι τις ἂν ἐννοήσας ὅτι τὸ μὲν σύνθετον ἐνδεές ἐστίν, εἰ καὶ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων, ὧν ἐστὶν ἕξω, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων γε, ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη.

This argument also occurs in Aquinas' *Summa contra Gentiles* II,14 in combination with his doctrine of the conceptual character of the relative names of *Deus creator*:<sup>294</sup>

289. See e.g., SIMPLICIUS, *Commentarius in Epicteti "Enchiridion"* I,5,52-57: "Καὶ γὰρ Θεὸς μὲν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ πάντων αἴτιον. Ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἀπλούστατον εἶναι... Ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ δύναμις ἔχειν τὴν ἀκροτάτην καὶ πᾶσαν"; ed. I. HADOT, *Simplicius. Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète. Introduction et édition critique du texte grec* (Philosophia antiqua, vol. 66), Leiden-New York-Cologne 1996, p. 200.

290. Ed. W. KROLL, *Syriani in Metaphysica commentaria* (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, vol. VI,1), Berlin 1902, pp. 29,4-5; 114,20-22.

291. As far as I was able to see, the comparative and superlative forms of πολυδύναμος occur only in Syrianus' *Commentary*.

292. Cf. PS.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITE, *De divinis nominibus* XI,2: "...τὴν ἀπλουστάτην αὐτῆς καὶ ἀμιγῆ τῆς ἐνοποιουῦ δυνάμεως παρουσίαν..."; ed. SUCHLA (cf. *supra*, n. 11), p. 219,15.

293. Ed. DODDS (cf. *supra*, n. 40), p. 112. Let it be noted that this chapter is not among those used by Ps.-Dionysius Areopagite; see the *Indices locorum* in: HEIL-RITTER (cf. *supra*, n. 37), p. 254. This means that Palamas was aware that he drew upon a heathen text. Let me repeat here the hypothesis that Palamas, just like Barlaam the Calabrian and many other Late Byzantine thinkers, allowed themselves to draw freely upon Proclus because they believed him to be a semi-Christian or sympathetic to Christianity, inasmuch as he had heavily drawn on what they thought was the literary production of Paul's disciple, Dionysius the Areopagite; on Palamas' Neoplatonic liberties see J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, review of D.N. MOSCHOS' published Doct. Diss.: *Πλατωνισμός ἢ χριστιανισμός; Οἱ φιλοσοφικὲς προϋποθέσεις τοῦ ἀντι-ἡσυχασμοῦ τοῦ Νιζηφόρου Γρηγοῦ (1293-1361)*, Athens 1998, in: *Βυζαντιακά* 19 (1999), pp. 403-418, esp. p. 417, note 41; IDEM, *The Christian Platonism of Barlaam the Calabrian. In Search of the Theological and Philosophical Background to His Greek Epistles*, forthcoming.

294. *Vat. gr.* 610, f. 107<sup>r</sup>.

...Τῆς θεΐα ἀπλότητι οὐκ ἐνίσταται, εἰ πλείους σχέσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγοται, εἰ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ οὐ σημαίνουσιν· ἐπειδὴ τῷ τῆς ἐπινοίας ἔπονται τρόπῳ. Οὐδὲν γὰρ καλύει τὸν ἡμέτερον νοῦν πολλὰ πολλαχῶς νοεῖν ἀναφερόμενα εἰς τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀπλοῦν ὃν καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἀπλοῦν ἐκεῖνο ἐν πολλαπλῇ σχέσει θεωρεῖν. "Ὅσο γὰρ τι μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἀπλοῦν, τοσοῦτο μείζωνος ἐστὶ δυνάμεως καὶ πλειόνων ἀρχῆς,<sup>295</sup> καὶ τούτου μᾶλλον πολλαχῶς νοεῖται ἀναφερόμενον· ὥσπερ τὸ σημεῖον πλειόνων ἐστὶν ἀρχῆς,<sup>296</sup> καὶ ἡ γραμμὴ ἢ ἡ ἐπιφάνεια. Τὸ τοίνυν πολλὰ ἀναφορικῶς περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ λέγεσθαι τῆς ἐσχάτης τούτου ἀπλότητι μαρτυρεῖ.<sup>297</sup>

Likewise, a partial description of the *scala naturarum* in the context of ascribing diverse grades of energy to each sort of being was available to Eugenicos in Prochoros Cydones' translation of Aquinas' *De spiritalibus creaturis*, a. 2 co.:

...“Ὅσο τι εἶδος ἐστὶ τελειότερον, τοσοῦτον ὑπερβάλλει τὴν σωματικὴν ὕλην· ὃ φαίνεται ἐπάγουσιν ἐν διαφοροῖς τάξεσιν εἰδῶν.

§(1) Τὸ γὰρ τοῦ στοιχείου εἶδος οὐκ ἔχει τινὰ ἐνέργειαν εἰ μὴ τὴν διὰ τῶν ποιητικῶν καὶ παθητικῶν ποιότητων· αἱ τυγχάνουσιν οὐσαὶ διαθέσεις τῆς σωματικῆς ὕλης. ...

Ἵπὲρ ταῦτα δὲ (2a) ἡ φυτικὴ ψυχὴ τὴν ἐνέργειαν κέκτηται, ἣ δὴ δουλεύουσιν ὀργανικῶς αἱ ποιητικαὶ καὶ παθητικαὶ ποιότητες· ἀλλ' ὅμως ὑπὲρ τὴν δυνάμιν τῶν τοιούτων ποιότητων αὐτῇ τὰς ἰδίας ἐνεργείας εἰληγεν, ἐν τῷ τρέφειν καὶ αὔξειν μέχρις ὀρισμένου πέρατος καὶ τῷ ἄλλ' ἄττα τοιάδε διεξεργάζεσθαι.

(2b) Ἡ δὲ αἰσθητικὴ ψυχὴ περαιτέρω ἔχει τὴν ἐνέργειαν, πρὸς ἣν οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ ἐκτείνονται αἱ ποιητικαὶ καὶ παθητικαὶ ποιότητες...

(2c) Τελεώτατον δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν, ἦγουν ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ, ἥτις ἐστὶ πέρας πάντων τῶν φυσικῶν εἰδῶν, ἔχει τὴν ἐνέργειαν ὑπερεκπίπτουσαν τοῖς ὅλοις τὴν σωματικὴν ὕλην..., ἀλλὰ νοῦ.

295. Ps.-ARISTOTELES, *Liber de causis* XVI,138, ed. PATTIN, *Le Liber de causis* (cf. *supra*, n. 164), p. 83,15-16; from PROCLUS' *Institutio theologica* 95,1-2, ed. DODDS (cf. *supra*, n. 40), p. 84. Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I<sup>a</sup> II<sup>ae</sup>, 45,3 ad 1; *De potentia* 5,10 arg. 6; 6,3 arg. 10; 7,8 co.

296. Cf. Ps.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITE, *De divinis nominibus* V,6, ed. SUCHLA (cf. *supra*, n. 11), p. 185,5-6.

297. At practically the same time as Eugenicos' composition of the *Κεφάλαια*, the Dominican archbishop of Rhodes, Andreas Chrysoberges (ob. 1451), defended (in early 1438) Thomas Aquinas' view of the essence-energy issue on the basis of the same axiom that Eugenicos used by explicitly and repeatedly ascribing it to Thomas Aquinas: "...Ἡ δὴ δυνάμις, ὅσον ἐστὶν ἀπλουστέρα καὶ ὑψηλοτέρα, τοσοῦτον ἔχει πρὸς πλείω. ... Ἐξεστὶ τὸς οὕτως ἀνιόντας ἐφικνεῖσθαι εἰς μίαν ἐνάδα... ἀπλουστέτην... μὴδὲν μηδαμῶς πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποτελεσμα μετουσίᾳ τινὸς ἐτέρου ἐρχομένην... Προϋπεθέμεθα γὰρ καὶ διὰ πλειόνων ἐπιχειρημάτων οὕτως ἔχειν ἐδείξαμεν τὴν δυνάμιν, ὅσον εἶναι ὑψηλοτέραν καὶ ἀπλουστέραν, τοσοῦτω κρείττονι τρόπῳ ποιεῖν καὶ ὀλιγώτερα δέεσθαι ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ τοῦ Διονυσίου λέγοντος οὕτως...” etc.; 9; 12; 18; ed. E. CANDAL, “Andreae Rhodiensis” (cf. *supra*, n. 185), pp. 356,24-25; 358,28-32; 364,30-33.

Καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἶναι οὐτινοσοῦν ἀναλογεῖ τῆ ἀυτοῦ ἐνεργεία..., ἕκαστον ἐνεργεῖ ἧ δὴ ἐστὶν ὅν...<sup>298</sup>

Most probably, Eugenicos knew of all these works. And yet, these works do not suffice to account for the content and the wording of ch. 15 of his *Syllogistic Chapters against the Acindynists*; as his unfamiliar Greek wording shows, Eugenicos probably paraphrased the Prologue and ch. 1-2 of the Dominican Dietrich of Freiberg's (1240-1320) *De cognitione entium separatorum et maxime animarum separatorum*:<sup>299</sup>

Fortassis autem aliqua, quae hic tractantur, videbuntur alicui absurda. ... Praemittenda est distinctio rerum spiritualium, ut uniuscujusque earum consideretur proprius modus sive secundum substantiam suam sive secundum suam propriam operationem.

(1) In summo igitur rerum cardine secundum infinitum excessum locatur prima causa, quae Deus est. Et ipse est intellectus per essentiam secundum rationem principii omnium non solum intellectualium et spiritualium, sed etiam corporalium, quae omnia primordialiter ex nihilo produxit creando.

(2) Secundo gradu et limite secundum ordinem naturae, si admittatur positio philosophorum eo, quod Scriptura sancta de eis non loquitur, sunt quaedam intellectuales substantiae, quas 'intelligentias' vocant, quae id, quod sunt, sunt intellectus per essentiam, in quorum quolibet resplendet tota universitas rerum essentialiter, id est per suam ipsarum intelligentiarum essentiam, per modum primi et immediati et nobilissimi effectus primae causae per actum creationis, qua actione propria primae causae supposita secundum philosophos una dictarum substantiarum intellectualium procedit ex alia non per modum creationis, quo universitas entium procedit a Deo, sed quodam inferiore modo causandi, quem indidit eis Deus virtute omnipotentiae suae ad eandem omnipotentiae suae virtutem declarandam.

(3) Ex his tertio loco secundum philosophos procedunt quaedam substantiae intellectuales, quas 'animas caelorum' dicunt, inferioris gradus et dignitatis quam praedictae; nihilominus tamen sunt intellectuales per essentiam suam. Sed in hoc deficiunt a nobilitate praedictarum, quia intantum inclinantur ad naturam corporalem, quod sunt actus et formae corporum, scilicet caelestium, unde et 'animae caelorum' dicuntur, quarum prima causa est Deus per modum creationis. Sed secundo loco modo quodam inferiore procedunt huiusmodi ab

298. *Coisl. gr.* 96, ff. 271<sup>v</sup>-272<sup>r</sup>.

299. DIETRICH OF FREIBERG, *De cognitione entium separatorum*, Prol. 4; c. 1; c. 2; ed. STEFFAN (cf. *supra*, n. 264), pp. 167,26; 168,2-169,80.



intelligentiis supposita in eis actione, quae est propria primae causae, quae est creatio secundum philosophos, et habetur ex *Libro de causis*, ubi dicitur quod "Deus creaverit animam mediante intelligentia",<sup>300</sup> id est coagente intelligentia, non per modum creationis, sed alio inferiore modo sibi proprio, sicut etiam dictum est supra de processu intelligentiarum in esse.

(4) Quartum genus rerum spiritualium sunt substantiae angelicae... In quibus jam differt substantia, virtus et operatio, et secundum hoc propria earum operatio, quae est intelligere et velle, differt a substantia earum.

(5) Quintum genus entium spiritualium sunt animae humanae separatae a corporibus sive in corporibus existentes. ... In quibus efficacius et manifestius differunt substantia, virtus et operatio.

Et est hic advertenda quaedam notabilis similitudo secundum proportionem quandam hinc inde; sicut enim dictum est supra quantum ad eas substantias, quae sunt primae in ordine entium creatorum et sunt intellectus per essentiam, videlicet quod sunt in duplici differentia.

Let us reconstruct the way Eugenicos wrote his ch. 18 by means of the sources I have already indicated in the relevant footnotes. Eugenicos begins with a strange warning — a warning against the strangeness of the argument he is going to put forward. What follows does not bear any real mark of strangeness — except for the Latin smell of some of his terms and his syntax or the philosophical character of the argument. In fact, his warning is but a latent reproduction of Dietrich's introductory warning.

Now what Eugenicos wants to show in his effort to defend Palamism is that, the closer to God a being is, the more the energy it possesses is. Eugenicos starts from a metaphysical axiom: all beings possess substance, potency (or power), and energy (or operation). He ascribes this axiom to the authority of "the theologians". His immediate citation from Ps.-Dionysius hints whom we should believe he had in mind. Still, if one looks for an explicit Ps.-Dionysian statement on the beings as bearers of substance, power, and energy, one can think of *De caelesti hierarchia* XI,2, where this threefold distinction is applied not to beings in general but to spiritual beings.<sup>301</sup> One would

300. PS.-ARISTOTLE, *Liber de causis* III,32, ed. PATTIN, *Le Liber de causis* (cf. *supra*, n. 164), p. 52,13-14; from PROCLUS' *Institutio theologica* 182, ed. DODDS (cf. *supra*, n. 40), p. 160,8-10.

301. In the *De divinis nominibus* IV,23, this distinction is again applied to some spiritual beings, the evil ones (ed. SUCHLA (cf. *supra*, n. 11), p. 170,16). This distinction

also think of Maximus' *Capita theologica et oeconomica* I,3-4, where such a distinction is implied in general terms; yet, no reference to (Ps.-)Dionysius occurs there.<sup>302</sup> Fortunately, a Latin source contains all we search for; Thomas Aquinas' *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 1, arg. 7 reads: "Ἐν ὁπωσοῦν χρήματι ἔστιν οὐσία, δύναμις καὶ ἐνέργεια, ὡς φησιν ὁ Διονύσιος". In all probability, this Latin passage lies behind that of Eugenicos, who presumably kept the Greek ones in the back of his mind just as an implicit or concomitant justification of its truth.

Then, Eugenicos describes the *scala naturarum* in terms of the subsequent steps: (1) inanimate and insensitive beings; (2) living beings, both irrational and rational; (3) (created) spiritual beings (i.e., the angels); and (4) God. Let us compare both the content and the structure of this set of steps with the sets contained in the authors cited.

In Palamas, the steps are: (1) composite bodies; (2) simple natural elements; (3) incorporeal substances; (4) God. The steps of Aquinas' partial *scala* run as follows: (1) simple natural elements; (2a) nutritive or vegetative soul; (2c) sensitive soul; (2d) the human soul. Finally, Dietrich's steps are as follows: (1/5) first cause or God; (2/4) intelligences; (3/3) souls of the heavenly bodies; (4/2) angelic substances; and (5/1) human souls. As regards the steps themselves that Marcos decided to include, it is obvious that none of these sets suffices to account on its own for Marcos' set. Indeed, in Palamas, irrational animate beings are absent; Aquinas, while including them, does not include angels and God; finally, in Dietrich, corporeal beings, both inanimate and animate, are absent, since they lie beyond the scope denoted by the very title of the work.

is applied to all "minds" in Ps.-MAXIMUS' *Commentarium in "De coelesti hierarchia"*, ad X,3 (PG 4: 92B) (cited by Marcos himself in his *Second Antirrhetics* and extended by him to God; ed. PILAVAKIS (cf. *supra*, n. 236), pp. 30,17-31,1). Cf. Ps.-DIONYSIUS' *De divinis nominibus* IV,10, ed. SUCHLA, *op. cit.*, p. 154,18-19, where this triplex occurs, but without any explanation. Of course, one might conclude from this passage that this triplex applies to all beings, or, at least, the created ones.

302. PG 90: 1084C-D. One can add an unidentified passage from (Ps.-)Maximus Confessor cited by GREGORY ACINDYNOS, *Refutatio magna* IV,19,106-110, ed. NADAL CAÑELLAS (cf. *supra*, n. 226), p. 348; cf. NADAL CAÑELLAS, *La résistance* (cf. *supra*, n. 2), p. 383. Yet even there, the distinction is applied especially to God. Finally, one can think of DAMASCIUS' *Commentary on "Parmenides"*, ed. C.E. RUELLE, *Damascii successoris Dubitationes et solutiones*, tome II, Paris 1899 (repr. Brussels 1964), p. 101,11-28. Still, it would be absurd to think that Eugenicos would call Damascius a "(Christian) theologian".

Still, these writings, with the exception of Thomas' *De spiritualibus creaturis*, should all be taken as having each made its own contribution to Eugenicos' lines. Indeed, Palamas' passage has probably led Eugenicos to produce a bottom-up description of the *scala naturarum* rather than a top-down one, as Dietrich did. Furthermore, it was definitely the Palamite passage that led Eugenicos to include the natural elements in his *scala*, for Palamas' argument from natural elements for the proportional relation between simplicity and efficacy is a decisive one. Further, nobody can fail to see that Eugenicos' statement that the souls of living beings multiply their efficacy by means of putting bodies at their service is obviously Palamite in origin. Let it be noted that Eugenicos, for all the obvious origins of this argument, did not quote from Palamas' *Dialogue of an Orthodox with a Barlaamite* verbatim.

What about Dietrich? His contribution has to do with Eugenicos' lines on angels; indeed, angels are contained in none of the other passages. Eugenicos' inclusion of them makes the set of his steps full, i.e., a *scala naturarum* proper (from simple natural elements up to God). Of course, Eugenicos omitted the threefold distinction of the intellectual substances (grades 2, 3, and 4 in Dietrich), which he mingled into one category, i.e., that of angels.

But why should one take refuge in Dietrich's text in particular to account for this inclusion by Marcos? First, Eugenicos' own reference to "the sophisticated Latin doctors" in the running course of his exposition of the high rank of the energy of angelic natures should in principle make us almost certain about the Latin provenance of this exposition. As for the content of Marcos' lines, the doctrine that the angels assume aerial bodies when appearing to humans occurs in many scholastic theologians, including Thomas Aquinas and Dietrich of Freiberg. Further, as one would expect, the awkward comparative type *μᾶλλον ἐκφανές* (instead of the grammatically more natural, monolectic type *ἐκφανέστερον*) in Marcos' grade (2) is almost non-existent in Greek literature.<sup>303</sup> Yet, it occurs verbatim in a parataxis with

303. It occurs only twice: HIPPOCRATES, apud GALENUS' *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* VI,8,65, ed. P. DE LACY, *Galen. On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* (Corpus medicorum Graecorum, vol. V,4,2), Berlin 1978, p. 420; DAMASCIUS, *Commentarius in Platonis Parmenidem*, ed. RUELLE (cf. *supra*, n. 302), p. 174,1. This is not the only strange Greek word or expression in Eugenicos' text. One should add, for instance, "ἐφεξῆς ἀνιοῦ-

δραστηριώτερον (“δραστηριώτερον ἤδη καὶ ἐκφανές μᾶλλον”) in Dietrich’s text (“efficacius et manifestius”) and in the same context, i.e., in Dietrich’s description of the difference between essence, power, and energy (cf. Marcos: “τὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ἔργον”) with regard to human souls (grade 5/1), i.e., with regard to the grade of beings Marcos was also referring to.<sup>304</sup> That the selfsame quotation from Dietrich is no longer than three successive words should not surprise us, for, as noted above (pp. 355; 360), Marcos seems to avoid long implicit quotations, even when reproducing Palamas, whose theology he intended to defend in the work in question.

Presumably, Eugenicos allowed himself to argue for the distinction between God’s energy and essence on the basis of the connection between simplicity and efficacy as stated in some Latin texts, because he saw that this argument had been brought forward by Palamas, too, whose pagan philosophical source (i.e., Proclus) he was also able to detect. In the last resort, Palamas himself had asserted the energetic aspect of God’s being along with the distinctiveness of this aspect from God’s essence by taking recourse to another non-Greek source,

σιν”, a dative clause without impersonal verb, which looks like a Greek rendering of a Latin ablative absolute.

304. This is the first time that some evidence for a (partial or full?) Byzantine rendering of one of Dietrich’s writings is brought to light. In the current state of research into the Byzantine translations of Latin works (cf. J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, “Greek Translations of Latin Philosophical Texts”, in: R. PASNAU [ed.], *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge 2009, pp. 822-825), and granted that there is no evidence that Eugenicos mastered Latin, I would only guess that he may have had access to Dietrich’s writing due to his close relationship with Scholarios, who began mastering Latin and translating scholastic works into Greek early in his life; see M.-H. BLANCHET, *Georges-Gennadios Scholarios (vers 1400 - vers 1472): un intellectuel orthodoxe face à la disparition de l’empire byzantine* (Archives de l’Orient chrétien, vol. 20), Paris 2008, pp. 298; 317-318. Scholarios had some taste for some Westerners’ angelology. For instance, a published *frustulum* (“Περὶ τῆς ἐωθινῆς καὶ ἑσπερινῆς ἐν ἀγγέλοις λεγομένης γνώσεως”; edd. L. PETIT, X.A. SIDÉRIDÈS, M. JUGIE, *Γενναδίου τοῦ Σχολαρίου ἅπαντα τὰ εὑρισκόμενα. Œuvres complètes de Gennade Scholarios*, tome III, Paris 1930, pp. 406,19-407,4) as well as *frust.* 1 (“Ὅτι ἡ τῶν ἀγγέλων γνῶσις τριπλῆ”) of an unpublished florilegium of his (“Γεωργίου τοῦ Σχολαρίου τεμάχια”; *Mon. gr.* 490, ff. 126<sup>v</sup>-127<sup>v</sup>; see I. HARDT, *Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum Bibliothecae regiae Bavaricae. Edidit IO. CHR. L. BARO DE ARETIN... Voluminis primi, codices Graecos ab I. HARDT recensitos complexi tomus V*, Monachii 1812, p. 91) exhibit some relevance with the scholastic reception of Augustine’s doctrine of the angels’ “cognitio matutina” and “cognitio vespertina”; cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I,58, 6 and 7; 62,9; DIETRICH OF FREIBERG, *De cognitione entium separatorum* 46-56; 62,21-22; 66,57-90; 88,49-59; ed. STEFFAN (cf. *supra*, n. 264), pp. 211-219; 224; 228-229; 249). I hope to edit Scholarios’ florilegium elsewhere.

i.e., Augustine's *De Trinitate*:<sup>305</sup> “Τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἐπὶ μόνου τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀληθέστατα ἂν λέγοιτο. Μόνος γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς ποιεῖ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐ γίνεται οὐδὲ πάσχει, ὅσον εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ οὐσίαν ἀνήκει.”<sup>306</sup> Still, neither Palamas nor Eugenicos would disguise himself as to the heated air of Augustine's passage, which is clearly Neoplatonic.<sup>307</sup>

In the *Syllogistic Chapters against the Acindynists*, Eugenicos did not fail to make use of one more Latin theologian, Thomas Aquinas. In ch. 17, an argument for Palamism is produced<sup>308</sup> overtly from a trivial sentence of Thomas Aquinas:

If every “potency is spoken of in regard to” something else (for it is attributed “to the potential”) — and this is what Thomas, the doctor of the Latins, explicitly declares —, then the essence of God is one thing, His potency another, if one is not prepared to include essence in the relatives.

As far as the argument itself is concerned, it seems to be inspired by Aquinas' argument against taking God's *ad extra* relations as realities

305. See J.A. DEMETRAPOULOS, *Αὐγουστίνος* (cf. *supra*, n. 28, p. 274).

306. AUGUSTINE, *De Trinitate* V,8,9,28-31: “Quod autem ad ‘*faciendum*’ attinet, fortassis de solo Deo verissime dicatur; solus enim Deus facit et ipse non fit, neque patitur quantum ad eius essentiam pertinet, qua Deus est” (edd. W.J. MOUNTAIN / F. GLORIE, *Sancti Aurelii Augustini De Trinitate libri XV* (CCSL 50), Turnholti 1968, p. 216). Palamas had used Maximos Planoudes' translation of Augustine's writing (edd. PAPHOMOPOULOS et al. [cf. *supra*, n. 34], p. 363,30-33).

307. As I have suggested elsewhere (J.A. DEMETRAPOULOS, *Aristotle's Categories and the “Nomina Divina” according to Anselm of Canterbury* [Ph.D. thesis; in Modern Greek], Athens 2001, pp. 32-33), Augustine's passage looks like a direct echo of PORPHYRY'S *Commentary on “Parmenides”*, fr. 12, ll. 23-27: “..τὸ ἐν τὸ ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ὄντος ὃν μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ οὐσία οὐδὲ ἐνέργεια, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν καθαρόν...”; ed. P. HADOT, *Porphyre et Victorinus. II: Textes*, Paris 1968, p. 104. Given that Porphyry was one of the major sources of Augustine's Neoplatonism, this similarity might be taken as corroborating the attribution of this *Commentary* to Porphyry.

308. Ed. GASS (cf. *supra*, n. 251), p. 220,23-27: “Εἰ πάντα «δύναμις πρὸς» ἕτερον «λέγεται» («πρὸς» γὰρ «τὸ δυνατὸν» ἀποδίδεται) — καὶ τοῦτο Θωμᾶς ὁ τῶν Λατίνων διδάσκαλος ῥητῶς ἀποφάνεται —, ἕτερον ἄρα οὐσία Θεοῦ καὶ ἕτερον δύναμις, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τι<> εἶναι φαίη τῶν πρὸς τι”. Eugenicos refers to Aquinas' description of the pair ‘potentia-possible’ as a pair of ‘relatives’ in some places in the *Summa theologiae*; see, e.g.: *Summa theologiae*, I,41,4, arg. 2 (*Vat. gr.* 609, f. 64<sup>r</sup>): “...Ἡ ‘δύναμις’ πρὸς τὸ ‘δυνατὸν’ λέγεται” (cf. ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics* V,12,5, 1019a32-34; IX,5,2, 1047b-35-36); I,82,3 co. (f. 107<sup>r</sup>): “...Ὁ ἴδιος τῆς ‘δυνάμεως’ λόγος κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἐστὶ τάξις...”. Cf. I<sup>a</sup> II<sup>ae</sup>, 56,6 co. The two Thomistic passages referred to by GASS, *Die Mystik* (cf. *supra*, n. 251), p. 220, n. 14, as the sources of Marcos' remark are misleading. S.G. PAPADOPOULOS, *Ἑλληνικαὶ μεταφράσεις* (cf. *supra*, n. 140), pp. 148-149, erroneously takes Marcos' passage to be anti-Thomistic.

in God in the *Summa contra Gentiles* II,12,2 (cf. *supra*, pp. 319-320, n. 164) — with the remarkable difference, however, that Aquinas stresses the unity of God's essence and energy so as to show them to be identical. Indeed, Marcos overlooks Aquinas' qualification in his reply to arg. 3 of I<sup>a</sup>, q. 41, a. 4 that “ἡ δύναμις ἀρχὴν σημαίνει, ἡ δ' ἀρχὴ σημαίνει διάκρισιν πρὸς τὸ οὐ ἔστιν ἀρχή. Διχῶς δὲ ἡ διάκρισις θεωρεῖται ἐν τοῖς ἐπὶ Θεοῦ λεγομένοις, μία μὲν πράγματι, ἄλλη δὲ λόγῳ μόνῳ. Τῷ μὲν οὖν πράγματι διακρίνεται ὁ Θεὸς κατ' οὐσίαν τῶν πραγμάτων, ὧν ἔστιν ἀρχὴ δημιουργικῶς... Ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἐνεργουῦντος οὐ διακρίνεται ἐπὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ παρὰ λόγῳ μόνῳ...”<sup>309</sup> In other words, Eugenicos managed to show that some sort of distinction between God's essence and power should be in order and that this distinction should be seen as compatible with God's simplicity (cf. the last sentence of ch. 19 of his *Chapters* cited above); still, he rather failed to qualify the mode of this distinction, whose character is, for all his intentions, confusedly Thomistic and unclearly Palamite.

Implicitly taking the energies of God as corresponding to the eternal reasons of beings, Eugenicos defends once more God's simplicity conceived of as the topos of these reasons by latently yet directly drawing on Thomas Aquinas. Ch. 24 reads:

Εἰ οἱ λόγοι τῶν ὄντων [1] ἐν τῷ Θεῷ [2] προαιωνίως ὄντες [3] οὐ μορφοῦσι {4} τὸν θεῖον νοῦν [5] οὐδὲ συντιθέασιν {6 e contrario}, οὐδ' αἰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἄρα προϋῶσαι ἐνέργειαι σύνθετον {6 e contrario} τοῦτον ἀποφανοῦσιν {7}.<sup>310</sup>

The premiss of this argument is exactly what Aquinas argues in the relevant article of the *Summa theologiae* (I<sup>a</sup>, q. 15, a. 2 co.):

Οὕτω τοίνυν ἀνάγκη ἐν τῷ θεῷ νῶ [2/5] τοὺς ἰδίους πάντων τῶν ὄντων λόγους [1] ὑπάρχειν [3]. “Ὅθεν Ἀύγουστίνος φησιν ἐν τῷ πγ' τῶν Ζητημάτων<sup>311</sup> ὅτι “ἰδίους λόγοις ἕκαστα δεδημιούργηται ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ”.

309. *Vat. gr. 609*, f. 64<sup>r</sup>: “Power signifies a principle. But a principle implies a distinction from that which it is a principle of. Now there are two kinds of distinction among those things that are predicated of God, viz., (a) a distinction in reality and (b) a merely conceptual distinction. By a distinction in reality, God is distinct in His essence from those things whose principle He is through a notional act. However, within God an action is not distinct from its agent except by a merely conceptual distinction...” (translation by FREDDOSO; cf. *supra*, n. 89).

310. Ed. GASS, *Die Mystik* (cf. *supra*, n. 251), p. 223,28-31 (“Since the reasons of beings, for all their being from eternity preexistent in God, do not constitute a Form for Him [taken as matter], neither would the energies that proceed from Him prove Him composite”).

311. Sic pro ‘ἐν τοῖς IIγ' ζητήμασι’.

“Ὅθεν ἔπεται ἐν τῷ θείῳ νῶ [2/5] πλείους εἶναι [3] ιδέας {1}. Τοῦτο δ’ ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐναντιοῦται τῇ θεΐᾳ ἀπλότῃτι {6 e contrario}, ῥᾶδιον κατιδεῖν {7}, εἴ τις θεωροίη τὴν τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος ιδέαν {1} ἐν τῇ τοῦ ποιούντος εἶναι διανοίᾳ, ὥσπερ τὸ νοούμενον, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς εἶδος {4}, ᾧ νοεῖται τὸ νοούμενον, ἔπερ ἐστὶν εἶδος {4} τὸν νοῦν [5] ἐνεργείᾳ ποιοῦν {4}. Τὸ γὰρ τῆς οἰκίας εἶδος {4} ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ τοῦ οἰκοδόμου νοούμενόν τί ἐστὶν ὑπ’ ἐκείνου, οὐ καθ’ ὁμοιότητα τὴν ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ οἰκίαν εἰδοποιεῖ {4}. Οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ ἐναντίον τῇ ἀπλότῃτι {6 e contrario} τοῦ θείου νοῦ [2/5] τὸ πλείω νοεῖν· ἐναντίον δ’ ἂν ᾗν τῇ τούτου ἀπλότῃτι {6 e contrario}, εἰ πλείοσιν εἶδεσιν {4} εἰδοποιεῖτο {4} ὁ θεῖος νοῦς [5].<sup>312</sup>

The similarity is clear. Let it only be added that Eugenicos’ *Chapters against the Heresy of Acindynisits* are full of terms obviously redolent of the Christian Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas. For example, even if in the above passage Eugenicos replaces *εἰδοποιεῖν* with *μορφοῦν*, in ch. 19 he says about the divine energy: “ἦν [sc. ἐνεργειαν] εἰ καὶ ‘λόγον’ ἢ ‘εἶδος τῶν ὄντων’ ἐθέλοι τις λέγειν, οὐ διοισόμεθα”.<sup>313</sup> What is more, in the same chapter,<sup>314</sup> he refers to the apophatic and cataphatic way of doing theology: “Ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀποφάσεων οἱ θεολόγοι φασὶν ὡς «ὑπὲρ πάντα τὰ ὄντα»<sup>315</sup> ὁ «μηδὲν ὦν τῶν ὄντων»<sup>316</sup> κατ’ οὐσίαν Θεός· ἐκ δὲ τῶν καταφάσεων ὡς αἴτιος πάντων ὁ πάντα ὦν κατὰ τὴν αἰτίαν θεολογεῖται”.<sup>317</sup> The topic is utterly Ps.-Dionysian;<sup>318</sup>

312. *Vat. gr. 609*, f. 36<sup>r</sup> (“It must be the case that in God’s mind there are proper conceptions of all things. Accordingly, in 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “Each thing is created by God through its own proper conception”. Hence, it follows that there are many ideas in God’s mind. Moreover, it is easy to see that this does not conflict with God’s simplicity, as long as one keeps in mind that the idea of a thing that is to be effected exists in the agent’s mind as that which is understood – and not as species by which something is understood, i.e., as a form that makes the mind to be in act. For the form of a house in the builder’s mind is something that is understood by him and in whose likeness he forms the house in the relevant matter. But it is not contrary to God’s simplicity that He should understand many things; rather, what would be contrary to His simplicity is that His mind should be formed by many species. Hence, the many ideas exist in God’s mind as ideas that are understood by Him”; translation by A.J. FREDDOSO; cf. *supra*, n. 89). Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I,15,1 co.

313. Ed. GASS (cf. *supra*, n. 251), p. 222,14-15.

314. *Op. cit.*, p. 222,3-14.

315. PS.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITE, *De divinis nominibus* IV,3; 9; V,1; XII,4, ed. SUCHLA (cf. *supra*, n. 11), pp. 146,6; 146,10; 153,15; 181,6; 225,19.

316. PS.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITE, *De divinis nominibus* I, 1; 5; 6; XI,6, ed. SUCHLA (cf. *supra*, n. 11), pp. 109,15; 117,3; 119,9; 221,20-222,2.

317. “From the point of view of the apophatic sentences, theologians say that God, «who is none of the beings», «lies above all beings», whereas from the point of view of the cataphatic sentences, He is described as the cause of all beings and, to this extent, as being all beings”.

318. See especially PS.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITE, *De divinis nominibus* I, 5; 6; VII,3, ed. SUCHLA (cf. *supra*, n. 11), pp. 117,3-4; 119,9; 198,7-9; *De coelesti hierarchia* II,2, ed.

still, when Marcos tries to reconcile these apparently contradictory ways, what he produces can be properly described as Thomistic Palamism: “Ζητητέον οὖν πῶς τοῦτο λέγεται. Καὶ γὰρ ὁ παρ’ ἡμῶν οἰκοδόμος, αἴτιος ὢν οἰκίας, οὐκ ἂν ‘οἰκία’ ποτὲ κληθεῖη· καὶ ὁ ἰατρός, αἴτιος ὢν ὑγείας, οὐκ ἂν ‘ὑγεία’ κληθεῖη. Πῶς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ συνδραμεῖται τό τε «μηδὲν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων» καὶ αὖθις τὸ «πάντα εἶναι».”<sup>319</sup> ‘Doctor’ and ‘builder’ are two of the most common examples in Aristotle’s exposition of how analogy lies midway between univocation and equivocation and stands for a peculiar form of unity between different beings.<sup>320</sup> It is exactly this Aristotelian concept which Aquinas used (along with some Aristotelian examples) in *Summa theologiae*, I<sup>a</sup>, q. 13, a. 5.<sup>321</sup>

And yet, Marcos, based on Aquinas’ doctrine of the analogy between cause and effect, could not believe that God can be the cause of the world without posing an intermediary being on His part: “So, we should hold that there is something lying between the essence of God and beings, according to which — but not according to His essence — He is called “the cause of beings” — shouldn’t we? And

HEIL-RITTER (cf. *supra*, n. 37), pp. 12,4-13,3; *De mystica theologia* 2, edd. HEIL-RITTER, *op. cit.*, p. 143,3.

319. “Let us investigate the manner that this is said. In our world, the builder, although being the cause of building, would never be called ‘a building’; likewise, the doctor, although being the cause of health, would never be called ‘health’. How then can both «being none of the beings» and, quite the opposite, «being all beings» coexist in the same subject?”

320. ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics* XII,4,4-8 (1070b10-35).

321. “Δεῖ ἄρα λέγειν ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνόματα κατ’ ἀναλογίαν (ARISTOTLE, *Metaphysics* IV,2,1-2, 1003a34-b3; V,2,3, 1013a35-b3) ἐπὶ τε τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τῆς κτίσεως λέγονται. Ὁ δὲ διχῶς ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων συμβαίνει· ἢ ὅτι πολλὰ πρὸς ἓν τι τάξιν ἔχει, ὡσπερ τὸ ‘ὑγιές’ λέγεται καὶ κατὰ τοῦ οὐρου καὶ τοῦ φαρμάκου, καθόσον ἐκάτερον λόγον ἔχει καὶ τάξιν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῷ ζῳῷ ὑγείαν, ἢς τοῦτο μὲν ἐστι σημεῖον, ἐκεῖνο δὲ αἴτιον, ἢ ὅτι τὸ ἕτερον λόγον πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον ἔχει, ὡσπερ τὸ ‘ὑγιές’ λέγεται καὶ κατὰ τοῦ φαρμάκου καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ζῳου, καθόσον τὸ φάρμακον αἰτίον ἐστι τῆς ἐν τῷ ζῳῷ ὑγείας (*ibid.*). Καὶ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος <communitalis> μέσος ἐστὶ τῶν τε καθαρῶς ὁμωνύμων καὶ τῶν συνωνύμων ἀπλῶς. Οὔτε γὰρ εἷς ἐστὶ λόγος ἐν τοῖς ἀναλογικῶς λεγομένοις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς συνωνύμοις (ARISTOTLE, *Categories* 1, 1a6-7), οὔτε παντελῶς διάφορος, ὡς ἐν τοῖς ὁμωνύμοις (ARISTOTLE, *Categories* 1, 1a1-2), ἀλλὰ τὸ ὄνομα, ὑπερ ἐνταῦθα (Cydones forsitan “hic” pro “sic” legit.) πολλαχῶς λέγεται, σημαίνει διαφόρους λόγους πρὸς ἓν <aliquid>· ὡσπερ τὸ ‘ὑγιές’ κατὰ μὲν τοῦ οὐρου λεγόμενον τεκμήριον ὑγείας σημαίνει, κατὰ δὲ τοῦ φαρμάκου αἴτιον τῆς αὐτῆς ὑγείας” (*Var. gr.* 609, f. 29<sup>v</sup>). Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I,13,6 co.; 10 co.; 16 co.; 16,6 co.; 7 co.; *Summa contra Gentiles* I,34,1.



what else might this be than His energy?" (Μήποτε οὖν ἔστι τι μεταξὺ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τῶν ὄντων, καθ' ὃ ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ὡς αἴτιος ὀνομάζεται καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτήν; Τοῦτο δὲ τί ποτ' ἂν ἄλλο εἶη πλὴν ἢ ἐνέργεια;).<sup>322</sup>

Of course, in drawing this conclusion, Eugenicos went further (or, better, in a direction different) than Aquinas would have been prepared to go; in fact, as we have seen on the occasion of the latent anti-Palamism of Theophanes of Nicaea (cf. *supra*, pp. 311-312; 316; 318; 321-324), Aquinas posited the creative energy of God on the part of the creature as a concomitant property of it. Still, the basis of Marcos' argument was drawn from Aquinas.

Further, Eugenicos uses the term ἴδιος λόγος,<sup>323</sup> which, though Aristotelian in origin,<sup>324</sup> is very common in Aquinas (*propria ratio*). Examples can be multiplied.

The conclusion that Eugenicos held a moderate and modified crypto-Thomism (which, in fact, having just been discovered as a fact, needs to be further explored) accords with the testimony of his close disciple, friend, and collaborator, George Scholarios-Gennadios II, that Marcos was an adherent of Aristotle's philosophy.<sup>325</sup> Eugenicos' Aristotelianism probably formed part of a latent Thomistic theological methodology of his, insofar as Eugenicos regarded Aristotelianism by and large as compatible with Christianity.<sup>326</sup> If this is to a considerable

322. MARCOS EUGENICOS, *Κεφάλαια* 16, ed. Gass (cf. *supra*, n. 251), p. 222,11-14.

323. See also his *Κεφάλαια* 28; ed. W. GASS (cf. *supra*, n. 251), p. 225,10.

324. See ARISTOTLE, *Topics* VI,3, 140b10; *De anima* II,3, 414b26-27; *De partibus animalium*, 685b15. It also occurs, rather rarely, in some Christian authors (see, e.g., CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA, *De Sancta Trinitate dialogi* V, PG 75: 996B; *De incarnatione Unigeniti*, PG 75: 1208D; MAXIMUS CONFESSOR, *Disputatio cum Pyrrho*, PG 91: 296B; *Capita de caritate* II,77, PG 90: 1009A).

325. "...τῶν Ἀριστοτέλει προσκειμένων εἶναι σε πάνυ καλῶς οἶδα, τῶν τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὀρόσα χρῆ μόνον θυμιάζοντα" (GEORGE SCHOLARIOS - GENNADIOS II, *Τῶ Ἐφέσου Γεώργιος*; edd. L. PETIT / X.A. SIDÉRIDÈS / M. JUGIE, *Γενναδίου τοῦ Σχολαρίου ἅπαντα τὰ ἐδοισζόμενα. Œuvres complètes de Gennade Scholarios*, tome IV, Paris 1935, p. 118,16-17). Obviously, PODSKALSKY, "Die Rezeption" (cf. *supra*, n. 185), p. 313, n. 50, is right in saying that "der Umfang seiner [sc. Marcos'] Thomaskenntnis steht... in keinem Vergleich zu Scholarios". Still, as we now see, it is not true that "Markos sieht Thomas nur mit den Augen des Polemikers". Cf. *infra*, n. 326.

326. J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, "Georgios Gennadios II - Scholarios' *Florilegium Thomisticum*. His Early Abridgment of Various Chapters and *Questiones* of Thomas Aquinas' *Summae* and His anti-Plethonism", in: *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales*, 69/1 (2002), pp. 117-171, esp. 162, note 55.

extent true, then the fact that Eugenicos developed a partial yet easily recognizable form of Thomistic Palamism should not surprise us.<sup>327</sup>

327. Marcos' writings should be checked for traces of scholastic influence throughout. For example, the opening words of the Preface to his *Πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν εἰρημένων Μανουήλ τῷ Καλέκῃ κατὰ τοῦ "Συνοδικοῦ τόμου" ἀντιοχητικῶς πρῶτος, ἢ περὶ διακορίσεως θείας οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας* (ed. PILAVAKIS [cf. *supra*, n. 138], pp. 157,2-4) sound like an imitation of the custom of numerous scholastic authors to explain the very production of their writings or the production of the ancient writings they commented upon in terms of the famous set of the four Aristotelian causes ("Τὸ μὲν κινήτικόν αἴτιον τοῦ συντάγμα-τος, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ τελικόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ σκοπός... Τὸ δὲ εἰδικόν τε καὶ παραδειγματικόν..."; cf. SCHOLARIOS' partial translation of RADULPHUS BRITO'S *Ars vetus* (Lect. V: "Προλεγόμενα εἰς τὴν Προφυρίου Εἰσαγωγὴν"): "Ποιητικὴ τόνου αἰτία τοῦτου τοῦ βιβλίου... Ὑλικὴ δὲ αἰτία ἐν τοῦτω τῷ βιβλίῳ... Ἡ δὲ εἰδικὴ αἰτία ἐν τοῦτω τῷ βιβλίῳ... Ἡ τελικὴ αἰτία... Τούτων τῶν τεσσάρων αἰτίων..."; edd. L. PETT et al., *Γενναδίου τοῦ Σχολαρίου ἅπαντα τὰ ἐδομημένα. Œuvres complètes de Gennade Scholarios*, tome VII, Paris 1936, p. 31,1-29). Further, the structure of MARCOS EUGENICOS' *Πρὸς Ἰσίδωρον ἱερομόναχον περὶ ὁσων ζωῆς αἰτήσαντα* (ed. J.F. BOISSONADE, *Anecdota nova*, Paris 1844, pp. 349-362 = PG 160: 1193-1200) displays some obvious signs of being influenced by Aquinas. Marcos called his writing an "oration" ("λόγος") (ed. BOISSONADE, *op. cit.*, p. 362,26); and he wrote a Preface (pp. 349,6-351,3) and an Epilogue (p. 362,24-29) to it, which bear typical marks of the Byzantine way of composing orations. Still, in fact, this writing is a *quaestio*, i.e., a "dialectical" "question" ("Τὸ μὲν οὖν ζητούμενόν ἐστίν. εἰ... ἦ..."; p. 351,4-5), as Marcos himself calls it ("...τὴν ζήτησιν..."; p. 351,23), which imitates the structure of the articles of Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*. After summarizing the two opposing views (first view: p. 351,4-16; second view: p. 351,17-25), Marcos begins expounding the arguments *pro*, i.e., by enumerating some arguments (some *ex auctoritate*, some theological) for God's determination of one's time of death (pp. 352,7-354,14). He then continues by expounding some arguments *contra*, which he explicitly calls "οἱ ἐναντίοι λόγοι" (pp. 354,15-356,20). Next, his own position ("Τί δὲ ἡμεῖς;") follows, which, as is normally the case with Aquinas' articles, is identical with the position supported by the latter arguments (pp. 356,20-357,6: "τιθέμεθα τῷ δευτέρῳ"). Finally (pp. 357,6-362,23), he examines the arguments of the view rejected in order to resolve them ("ἐπιλύσασθαι"). To do so, he once more imitates Aquinas in accepting the authority of the passages invoked by the holders of the opposite view yet rejecting the conclusion they thereby draw by drawing some subtle distinctions they had inattentively overlooked (pp. 357,12-14; 358,7). In this way, he shows (just as Aquinas does) that there is harmony ("συμβιβάζομεν"; pp. 351,27-352,2; 357,7) between the theological authorities invoked by the opposing views ("ἀντιφασίς"; p. 351,25-26). As for the Thomist affinities of the content of Marcos' writing, a special study should be devoted to them. Let me only note here the obvious similarity of his argument from the distinction between divine providence and divine predestination or between general and special providence (pp. 357,11-360,25) to Scholarios' relevant doctrine, which is almost exclusively based on Thomas Aquinas, who in turn based himself on John of Damascus; see J.A. DEMETRACOPOULOS, "Georgios Gennadios II - Scholarios' *Florilegium Thomisticum II (De fato)* and its anti-Plethonic Tenor", in: *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 74/2 (2007), pp. 301-376, esp. 320-321. Combining the traditional Byzantine literary *genre* of oration or treatise with the structure of the scholastic *quaestio* occurs in some writings of Eugenicos' most important disciple, George Scholarios-Gennadios II; see DEMETRACOPOULOS, *Πλήθων* (cf. *supra*, n. 70),

## 5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of the above the following conclusions might be drawn.

1) Almost all the Palamite thinkers of the Byzantine fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, most probably with the exception of Gregory Palamas himself, accepted in this or that sense that God's 'essence' should or, at least, might be distinguished from God's 'energy' *κατ' ἐπίνοιαν* or *ἐπινοία μόνη* or *λόγῳ μόνῳ*.

2) From Palamas' own lifetime and shortly after his death, the Palamites either based this position on the one hand on the fourth-century Greek patristic doctrine of the epistemological import of the 'divine names' (Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, Ps.-Athanasius of Alexandria, etc.) or applied the fifth- and sixth-century Greek Patristic 'conceptual distinction' between the persons of the Holy Trinity as well as between the two natures of Christ to the question of the distinction between God's essence and energy, or both. In so doing, they construed this distinction as a *distinctio realis minor*, which, although compromising Palamas' distinction, was still too *realis* to allow for a full defence of divine simplicity.

3) Immediately after the translation of Thomas Aquinas' *Summa contra Gentiles*, *Summa theologiae*, and *De potentia* by the anti-Palamites

pp. 76-79; "Georgios Gemistos-Plethon's" (cf. *supra*, n. 169), pp. 310-311. Further, Eugenikos' treatise *Περὶ ἀναστάσεως* (ed. A. SCHMEMANN, "Une œuvre inédite de St Marc d'Éphèse: *Περὶ ἀναστάσεως*", in: *Θεολογία* 22 [1951], pp. 51-64; text on pp. 53-60) is merely a defence of the rational possibility of the doctrine of resurrection and a rational refutation of some philosophical objections against it based almost entirely on Thomas Aquinas' description of the natural unity of the human soul with the body in explicitly hylomorphic and anti-Platonic terms (see *Summa contra Gentiles* IV,79-81; cf. *Vat. gr. 616*, ff. 289<sup>v</sup>-294<sup>v</sup>). Likewise, in his *De hominis imbecillitate*, he adopted some of the arguments for the compatibility of the eternal damnation of the sinners with the divine mercy in THOMAS AQUINAS' *Summa theologiae*, Suppl. 99,1 Resp. (see ed. A. JAHN, "Marcus Eugenikos..." (cf. *supra*, n. 285), p. 66,8-18). Further, Marcos, just like Theophanes of Nicaea (cf. *supra*, p. 319), describes God as *actus purus* (*Second Antirrhetics*; ed. PILAVAKIS [cf. *supra*, n. 236], p. 9,15-17), even if he immediately adds that He also has a naturally concomitant energy *ad extra* (cf. *op. cit.*, p. 2,9 sqq., where he explains which part of Aristotle's doctrine of the Prime Mover can be accepted by a Christian). The image of Eugenikos that emerges from all this evidence reinforces M. Pilavakis' position that Eugenikos "was not anti-Westerner or a fanatic and narrow-minded monk who *en bloc* rejected the thought of the Catholic Church; on the contrary, he both respected and was interested in St. Augustine... Though trained as a theologian, he was a cultured man with wide interests"; PILAVAKIS, *Markos Eugenikos' "First"* (cf. *supra*, n. 138), p. 57.

Demetrios and Prochoros Cydones (from 1354 to 1359/61), a trend of Thomistic Palamism emerged, which was even more compromised. Thomas Aquinas' doctrine of the '*nomina divina*', logically based on a *distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re*, was seen by some Palamists as a consistent way of reconciling unity and multiplicity in *Deus unus*. To these thinkers, the variety of the 'divine names' does not spring from God, but from the inadequate way our finite minds grasp God according to our knowledge of the effects caused by God in the world. In this sense, *ratio* is the cause of their distinction. On the other hand, by way of *analogy*, these names neither are fictitious nor correspond just to what happens in the world; they correspond to something real, since, in fact, God is the supreme goodness, justice, and so on. Still, adhering to Palamism, they seem to take this *fundamentum* (rather contrary to what Aquinas himself believed) as *determinatum*.

4) M. Jugie's classification of the Palamism of the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Byzantine Palamites as "mitigé" "pour ce qui est de formules",<sup>328</sup> in contrast with the Palamism of Scholarios, taken as "mitigé" "pour ce qui regarde le fond", should be revised. In fact, even the former Palamites, although they stood as the representatives of the "palamisme officiel",<sup>329</sup> departed from Palamas' *distinctio realis* by conceding either a strictly Basilian interpretation of the distinction between 'essence' and 'energies', which Palamas was rather reluctant to subscribe to,<sup>330</sup> or a Thomistic interpretation of the distinction, or both.<sup>331</sup>

328. M. JUGIE, "Palamite, controverse", in: *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* 11, Paris 1932, cols. 1777-1818, esp. 1795-1796 (to my view, Nicholas Cabasilas should be removed from the list of Palamites, on which he had once upon a time been included because of his being confused with his uncle Neilos Cabasilas and is usually still included because of the phenomenon of scholarly inertia).

329. GUICHARDAN, *Le problème* (cf. *supra*, n. 2), pp. 169-176, esp. 176.

330. M. JUGIE himself had noticed that some Palamites tended to "minimize" Palamas' distinction between 'essence' and 'energies' by accepting a "virtual distinction" (*art. cit. supra*, n. 328, col. 1797); and he had rightly pointed out John VI Cantacouzenos and Theophanes of Nicaea as the most striking cases of this sort of "édulcoration" (*art. cit.*, col. 1795). Still, having access to much fewer printed and sufficiently edited sources than we have today, he failed to notice that *ἐπίνοια* was the central notion of this compromise. In fact, he was surprised to see that a post-Byzantine Palamite, George Coressios (ca. 1570-1659/70) (cf. next note), stated that it is a "λόγου διαφορά" that distinguishes between God's 'essence' and 'energies' (see col. 1812; cf. N.M. ΣΤΟΥΡΑΚΗΣ, *Γεώργιος Κορέσιος (1570 ci.-1659/70). Ἡ ζωή, τὸ ἔργο του καὶ οἱ πνευματικοὶ ἀγῶνες τῆς ἐποχῆς του* [elaborated version of a Doct. Diss., Philosophical Faculty of the University of Athens, 1993], Chios 2000, pp. 357-358), and that the Byzantine translation of some of Aquinas' writings contributed quite a lot to this process. My impression is that Jugie implicitly

5) The positive way several Palamite authors implicitly used Aquinas in their writings shows that, setting aside the points over which ecclesiastical (i.e., political) disputes were held from the eleventh century onwards, they regarded Aquinas as a theological trans-confessional authority or, at least, semi-authority deserving to be seriously

suggests that the Palamites were conscious of the extreme character of Palamas' theology and thus tried to make it look possible to swallow; yet, being members of an 'Ecclesia dissidentium' and having, as a result, lost the guidance of the Holy Spirit, they were doomed to fall back again to the core of Palamism, which, as he had suggested elsewhere (M. JUGIE, "Les origines de la méthode hésychaste", in: *Échos d'Orient* 30 [1931], pp. 179-185, esp. 185), has roots in the late eleventh century (Symeon the New Theologian and others), when the 'dissidentia' on the Byzantines' part definitely took place. In general, the way most Catholic theologians approach the Palamite controversy implies partiality. For example, D. PÉTAU, in Vol. I of his monumental *Dogmata theologica* (1644-50), devotes a special chapter to this controversy and sanctions the anti-Palamite party as expressed, *inter alios*, in Manuel Calecas' *De essentia et operatione* (by then wrongly attributed to Demetrios Cydones), which he cites (D. PETAVIUS, *Dogmata theologica...* [cf. *supra*, n. 11], Lib. I, "De Deo Deique proprietatibus", cap. 12, "De Graecorum recentiorum opinione, qui a Dei substantia reipsa differe putant operationes illius..."), fols. 76b-79a; PS.-DEMETRIOS CYDONES' passage in col. 77a, note *a*). Orthodox theologians have been unaware of the mitigating character of most Byzantine Palamites' Palamism, too. For instance, when facing Vikentios Damodos' professed defence of Palamism in terms of distinguishing between 'essence' and 'energies' "κατ' ἐπινοίαν" or "κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς σημασίας, ὅχι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα" (see next note), although in principle unwilling to present an 'Eastern Greek' theologian as anti-Palamist, G.D. METALLINOS is so surprised by the way Damodos formulated his Palamism that he parallels a relevant passage from DAMODOS' *Compendium of Theology* with a passage from the *Περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ἐνεργείας* (PG 154: 364b) of the professed Byzantine anti-Palamist Manuel Calecas (ca. 1350?-1410); G.D. METALLINOS, *Vikentios Damodos (1679/1700-1752): Θεολογία δογματική κατὰ συντομίαν ἢτε Συνταγματίων θεολογικόν. Prolegomena – Kritische Ausgabe – Kommentar (Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität zu Köln)*, Athens 1980, p. 138, *ad* 9,4; p. 143, *ad* 14,24; *ad* 14,30-15,1; tellingly enough, one would in vain search for these specific complementary notes in the recent reimpression of this Diss.: G.D. METALLINOS, *Βικεντίου Λαμοδοῦ Θεολογία δογματική κατὰ συντομίαν ἢτε Συνταγματίων θεολογικόν. Εἰσαγωγή - κριτική ἔκδοση - σχόλια*, Holy Monastery of Vatopedion (Holy Mountain) 2008.

331. In the post-Byzantine history of Palamism, most (if not all) Orthodox theologians (see a list in JUGIE, "Palamite (controverser)" [cf. *supra*, n. 328], cols. 1810-1812) followed some sort of Byzantine "palamisme mitigé". For example, Sebastos Kyminetes (1632-1702) wrote a *Σύντομος θεωρία περὶ διαφορᾶς θείας οὐσίας καὶ θείας ἐνεργείας, κατὰ Λατίνων* (unedited; see CH. KARANASIOS, *Sebastos Trapezuntios Kyminetes (1632-1702). Biographie, Werkheuristic und die editio princeps der Exegese zu "De virtute" des Pseudo-Aristoteles* [Serta Graeca, vol. 10], Wiesbaden 2001, pp. 187-188, N° 54), where he speaks of "διαφορὰ μόνω τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ" (*Kos*, Municipal Library, 2, ff. 181<sup>v</sup>; 183<sup>v</sup>; 188<sup>r</sup>-188<sup>v</sup>; with an implicit reference to BASIL OF CAESAREA'S *Adversus Eunomium* I,7; cf. *supra*, n. 5). (My sincere thanks to Dr. Charitonas Karanasios (Academy of Athens) for providing me a copy of cod. *Kos* 2.)

and profitably taken into account in all matters. True, the case of Joseph Bryennios shows that this was not general; still, the case of Marcos Eugenicos (not to mention his disciple Scholarios) shows that this admiration for Latins did not regard only Aquinas but also Dietrich of Freiberg and that the Byzantines' recognition of the value of Western Scholasticism was based on their seeing that the Latins mastered and fruitfully used the sane and useful pieces of both ancient Greek philosophical literature (especially Aristotle) and Christian tradition (e.g., Ps.-Dionysius Areopagite and John of Damascus).

It goes without saying that, since many primary sources of the speculative thought of Late Byzantium are still unedited and most published texts are improperly edited (the Byzantine translations of some of Thomas Aquinas' major writings included<sup>332</sup>), and since the philosophical sources of Gregory Palamas (whose writings left almost none of the Late Byzantine intellectuals indifferent, either in a positive or in a negative way) remain practically unexplored, some of my main and secondary conclusions will be revised.<sup>333</sup>

332. This is a gap intended to be filled by the research and editorial project "Thomas de Aquino Byzantinus" (<http://www.eie.gr/nhrf/institutes/ibr/programmes/thomas-gr.html>; <http://www.rhul.uk/Hellenic-Institute/Research/Thomas.htm>).

333. I would like to thank Lecturer Dr. Charalambos Dendrinis (London) for providing me with valuable material on Manuel II Palaiologos; Dr. Christos Triantafyllopoulos (London) for helping me in my study of some manuscripts; and Assoc. Prof. Chris Schabel and Assoc. Prof. Martin Hinterberger (Nicosia) for their diligent study of my text as well as for polishing my English.